I don't think low popular support is a given. First of all, Britain (and to a much lesser extent France) is the only potential obstacle to resources the U.S. might still need abroad. Secondly, the U.S. military industrial complex is going to be put into a tough position to justify itself, and there's no reason to expect they'll go quietly into that good night. Thirdly, with America's traditional opponents gone, both the American government and public are going to have fewer reasons to look the other way from France and Britain's colonial atrocities.If the US tries to use warfare to 'solve' that problem, then they run into the fact that there's very little popular support for wars with those countries. If they fight anyway and win, then 1965!US has to garrison literally the world... And this is taking place at a time when 19th century revolts by tribes and fights by kingdoms to throw off colonialist shackles were still well within living memory. The perception that the imperialists are struggling among themselves for dominance will create a lot of opportunites for independence movements... And to fight those independence movements the US would end up having to make the same kinds of moves that OTL led to the debacle of the Vietnam War.
The big issue is that the US wouldn't be realistically capable of extending a net of influence over the entire world without allies.
Thirdly, with America's traditional opponents gone, both the American government and public are going to have fewer reasons to look the other way from France and Britain's colonial atrocities.
I don't expect it to. The things to remember:I don't think low popular support is a given. First of all, Britain (and to a much lesser extent France) is the only potential obstacle to resources the U.S. might still need abroad. Secondly, the U.S. military industrial complex is going to be put into a tough position to justify itself, and there's no reason to expect they'll go quietly into that good night. Thirdly, with America's traditional opponents gone, both the American government and public are going to have fewer reasons to look the other way from France and Britain's colonial atrocities.
You're right that the U.S. will still need allies abroad but there's already a precedent of preferring pliable third world client states over European imperialists in the American hemisphere and that trend could very well be extended to the rest of the world if American opinion of the British and French starts to seriously sour.
1) This is true, which is why I said nothing would happen right away. I'm thinking more about 10-15 years down the line, where they've actually begun to settle into this new world and gradually stop viewing it through the lens of the old.I don't expect it to. The things to remember:
1) The dominant mentality of the time still thinks of the British and French as 'friends.' World War Two is in relatively recent memory for the American populace here, and the Cold War NATO relationship is more recent still.
2) By 1915, the aforementioned colonial atrocities, while still very real, are beginning to wind down somewhat. Voices opposed to massacres, especially of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators, are becoming more common. We are only a decade or two out from Ghandi's nonviolent protests in India starting to work; they would likely not have worked on the 19th century Raj, by contrast.
3) To the typical white (and thus politically in control) American of 1965, the atrocities committed by Britain and France in their colonies aren't that exceptional; their interest in fighting over them will be reduced.
4) Capitalism, and anticapitalists, sometimes forget this, is good at making accommodations to circumstance. One of the reasons it is such a widespread system is that it generally won't break your society's back trying to achieve things it can buy someone else to doing. This system, of course, is no exception to the general principle.
In this case, trade provides the needed resources far more smoothly and cheaply than conquest, for instacne.
It wasn't just a weakness thing.2) Even if they were winding down in a real sense but media interest would be scaling up. In a world where it's mostly just the U.S. and imperialists, journalists won't exactly have much else to talk about. And fewer massacres isn't guaranteed. If WW1 is cut short and France and Britain don't see their empires start to weaken it could potentially go on for much longer.
Yeah, but in real life we get that same kind of rhetoric and the US has failed to surge to its feet and eliminate, oh, hunger in the Third World.3) Again, this is something that's true in our world, where little indiscretions like torture and massacres were casually looked over because there were Communists to watch out for and there's trade networks to safeguard. In this world none of this is true. It'll take years for trade to be even a fraction of what it was before, and there's no other rivals for America to prioritize over Western Europe. It's just a few big empires sitting there, slowly but surely becoming increasingly unpleasant to look at.
Journalists and news networks will be more interested, activists will be more interested, and nobody in a position of authority has many reasons to discourage them because to be honest they're starting to have their own issues with the British and French.
So what the average white American is subjected to is a steady drip of anti-Imperialist rhetoric on the news for years and years on end.
It'll take years for trade to be even a fraction of what it was before, and there's no other rivals for America to prioritize over Western Europe.
I'm saying the determined propagandists would do exactly that though.It wasn't just a weakness thing.
By 1915, the French and British colonial empires had pretty much reached their maximum extent outside the Middle East, and the two nations had established an administrative infrastructure over that territory. When you've already toppled the local elites, massacred any tribes that are being really rebellious, and set up your own administration, you just don't need to shoot as many people. And that trend continued moving on into 1925-35, the time period you're talking about.
Think about it. How many bloody colonial wars did the British and French get into in the 1920s and '30s, relative to past decades? There were some, true enough! But many of them took place in remote areas, often in contexts that could be pretty easily presented as "tribes raiding across the frontier and hitting settlements," something that fits pretty comfortably into the 1970s-era American national narrative as "this is at worst morally gray."
I'm not saying that a determined propagandist couldn't credibly present '20s Britain as a bloody-handed tyrannical empire (obvious places to start would include the Easter Rising, where the rebels get American sympathy by being white). What I'm saying is that I think that outside of a few specific issues, it's unlikely to become something that motivates a whole new Cold War from the perspective of the average American citizen.
American media was perfectly capable of lionizing groups of non white resistance fighters, even back then.Yeah, but in real life we get that same kind of rhetoric and the US has failed to surge to its feet and eliminate, oh, hunger in the Third World.
I'm not saying there will be none of it. I'm saying that in the background of an America that is still fairly racist and comfortable-with-destruction-of-the-Indians culture, in the context of the British and French being able to speak up for and justify their own rule, and with that rule still being mostly stable and only sometimes violent specifically at the fringes and in unusual cases...
I don't think it'll escalate to the point where there's popular support for, say, mass American troop deployments overseas to disrupt the British and French colonial empires.
Why would Americans be interested in that sort of thing?As to Evul! Colonialists - the '65 and '85 Americans will be receiving quite fresh accounts of US troops' exploits in the Philippines ...
There's a direct financial incentive to push this narrative this time around, and relatively little of note to distract the media?@the atom
I just don't know where you get this iron certainty that 1965!America's media and political culture will so eagerly and aggressively turn to an anticolonial narrative, so relatively quickly.