January 1, 1965. By the act of ROB, the United States of America and all its territories are...
well fun yes but a more simple scenario
I'm talking about the next several decades. The U.S. will still intervene and crush the central powers but that part was so obvious I didn't feel like it was worth mentioning.Another great post Buba, thank you. To the earlier bit by the atom:
I disagree. These three countries mentioned were just starting to receive the first bit of aid from the US. And that came at a really good time: Japan and the UK were finally starting to perfect a collaborative anti-submarine patrol. Top brass among Japan's WW2 ranks were actually present on WW1-era destroyers and torpedo boats on the lookout for Germans. They scrutinized everything about tactics and tech trends of both powers. And they would see the US deploying some inarguably more sophisticated tech as an excuse to wrap up WW1 involvement early and study abroad. 1925 attack on Pearl here we come.
No, I don't.
Yes, personally I would go for a race against the clock dynamic (basically refusing villains the chance to reverse engineer or gain momentum, see Plot Coupons) as that prevents a global domination outcome and introduces enough tension for individual camps to posit Foreign Policy maneuvers that either revisit Gunboat Diplomacy and / or Isolationism.This would be hilarious dystopian considering the heinous stuff America did to the global south w/ the presence of a hostile superpower to oppose them. Now they're completely untouchable.
Well, Japan hasn't made it's 21 Demands yet, so if they figure out just where the hell that's going before they actually set everything on fire, then they'll probably back off. Japan holding on to Manchuria through Proxy is probably something the U.S. won't care too much about so long as they stop stirring up trouble south of Shanhai pass. The thing that's gonna be interesting is how Europe, in the middle of the grand clusterfuck that burned the continent to the ground is going to react. I could legitimately see a reason for every power other than Serbia to call it off as a bad job and return to status quo with minimal grumbling.Full agreement.
1915 Japan is much weaker than 1918/19 Japan, 1985 USA will let Nippon into White Men Club without a moment's hesitation (1965 USA might hesitate a bit), USA will not be worried over Japanese military might or grabbing ex-German possessions.
However, IMO some USA/Japanese diplomatic conflict is inevitable in regard to Korea and China (I submerge the Japanese foothold in south Manchuria into The China Question)
Japan in 1915 is ruled by a fairly democratic system, and its army is yet to be filled with the crazy-pants of '41.
Control of Manchuria (well, Chinese Manchuria anyway) was pretty much settled when Japan won the Russo-Japanese war and the following political kerfuffle, and Japan ruled the area through various local warlords by proxy from 1912 or so.There is no Manchukuo yet.
Most of Manchuria is controlled by Russia, with Japan calling the shots in only a small part.
Well, the Navy had a much stronger non-delusional faction, even if people like Nagano had interesting ideas, but not really crazier than anyone else (the attrition/skirmishing phase that would preface the decisive battle was weird, yes, but not really weirder than whatever the hell the USN was doing when they repeatedly almost built a torpedo battleship because "it's going to work, I promise"). Admiral Yamamoto, for instance, had a pretty decent grounding in reality compared to the pants-on-head morons in the IJA (Kawabe and Sato, this means you). While the IJN to a large degree fell into the Kantai Kessen rabbit hole (not unlike the Kaiserliche Marine in the years leading up to WW1), Yamamoto was more than aware of his odds against the USA, given that he accurately predicted that the IJN would fall flat on its face in a war longer than a year, and in the previously mentioned quote, stated the need to reach Washington D.C. with military forces to dictate terms.Heh. Imperial Japan had two sets of crazy-pants, one for a Navy that since about 1899 believed it was in a self-determination mode akin to a real life Quest for the Holy Grail, and an Army that had bought most of the parliament seats and kept stalling IJN ship construction until they were satisfied the boats could transport their numbers.
I hate to disappoint, but I was actually talking about a USN proposal when I said Torpedo Battleship. The Japanese navy, for all their many flaws, didn't really outfit their battleships with many torpedoes. There's nothing inherently wrong about the IJN's battleship designs of this period - Fuso, Ise and Kawachi are all decent enough ships.So @KlinkerKing the linchpin of this scenario, regardless of US assets coming to the fore from 1960s or 1980s, is the burgeoning extension of IJN and IJA power projection through their respective experiences in recent combat arenas right before the first World War. But I have to excuse Yamamoto from this vantage point, as he and other officers who served aboard the armored cruiser Nisshin and therefore saw action against the Russian Eastern and Baltic fleets would be back in Japan healing up and completely missing the 1907-1908 tour of Roosevelt's new pre-dreadnought battlewagons.
And this is unfortunate. They would have key insights such as how not to equip a battleship with too many torpedo chutes, and unlike the 1915 American ship builders would already have a huge head start with having served aboard what was the first true collaboration on advanced cruiser designs that ultimately led to the Kongo. Just to be clear, Japan might have been the only naval power at the time to retain the Kongo (a 1910 hull) and expand it into a fast battleship role over several decades.
But pausing for a moment to look more closely at the 1915 stage, the Imperial Japanese Navy would have had about less than a calendar year's time to draw educated comparisons between Russian turn of the century armored cruiser tech versus their own, ignoring the shiny American builds on display in their home waters (1907 Great White Fleet), as it's mentioned that officers like Yamamoto did not resume presiding over a naval service occupation until 1914.
I think one of the big disadvantages to iron out in this what-if is how most of the developed world in 1915 was bogged down with missing a huge fraction of stalled supply routes (U-boats) and a complete slaughterhouse in No Man's Land (the UK sent over a million troops to replace a million dead by this point if memory serves). This does not include countries like the US and Japan, who were only sending out the occasional submarine spotter.
Yes, I mentioned it earlier too, but WW1 was really a clusterfuck for all the main combatants. The reason I specified Germany is that in January of 1915, they're the ones with the upper hand by a significant margin, being not too far from Paris.Taking the medium/longer point of view, the Entente did not fare particularly better (Russian Revolution, universal franchise leading to Labour edging out Liberals in the UK) in WWI.
There very well could (should!) be a general stampede for a status quo ante bellum peace.
Also - trade to the Entente would be greatly hampered by mismatch between 1915 merchant ships (did you know there still were sail ships plying trade routes at that time?) and 1965/85 port facilities.
To continue the derail - the Kongo class in WWII provided sterling service when used as originally envisioned by Fisher in 1906 - a cruiser with battleship guns to kill other cruisers. It was not to go toe to toe with battleships. Up armouring an almost 30 year old design (1912!) to modern battleship standards would had been an absolute waste of money. I am not sure if technically even possible.
I think Germany had at least a mild case of victory disease at all points after the end of the Franco-Prussian War; if they didn't, they would never have been so sanguine about getting into a conflict where they could potentially be nutcrackered between France and Russia in the first place.Oh, OK, now I understand your ideas about the Kongo class
January 1915 outlook - Germany should be in pre-Victory Disease stage, as this predates the Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive and its aftermath which relegated Russia to the level of a 2nd rate threat. And Moltke's Plan for knocking France out of the war in six weeks failed spectacularly.
On the other hand, a lot of that hardware is arguably no longer needed, except insofar as the US chooses to become involved in World War One. The Soviets no longer exist, and are unlikely to emerge as credible challengers to the ISOT'ed United States for several decades to come.Military-industrial complex happy. The USA just lost ALL the equipment of eight Army Divisions. Plus that of a Marine Division?
Also - all the aircraft in European and Asian bases. Lots of hardware to be replaced
I don't think it was ever that simple for the Soviets. They were a military-authoritarian state, but they were never that close to going full Red Alert on everyone.well fun yes but a more simple scenario
the 1915 US lost all its nukes so its time for the motherland to invade the world
I think it'd be screwy and complicated. A lot of the stuff the US did to the global south was motivated by great power rivalry with the Soviets. The causal chain goes like:This would be hilarious dystopian considering the heinous stuff America did to the global south w/ the presence of a hostile superpower to oppose them. Now they're completely untouchable.
If this is the 60s then this would probably be classified information at this point.Imperial Japan meanwhile would learn that Nagato (launched late 1910s) stayed afloat after taking two nukes, so their thinking would probably lead to a doomed repeat of launching the Yamato-class with even more bling.
Because when you get right down to it, United Fruit only has so much clout within the United States when it can't go "and if you don't help us, COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER!!!"
If this is the 60s then this would probably be classified information at this point.