Balkan Tragedy: The Slow Disintegration of Southeastern Europe
Curby
recovering analytic philosopher, still sensitive
- Location
- Most Serene Republic of Unwashed Brooklyn
- Pronouns
- He/They
Update on developments in the Balkans below. We are close to the revolutionary events of October-November 1919 now, and the beginning of the First Revolutionary Era. We have just three more entries until TTL enters its next phase!
Balkan Tragedy: The Slow Disintegration of Southeastern Europe
Excerpts from Russell Kirk, Crisis on the Danube: The Slow Death of Austria-Hungary (Henry Regnery, 1949)
In the historiography of the Great War, political and social developments in Austria-Hungary are frequently either overlooked entirely or sidelined. The monarchy is treated as a teetering, imbalanced structure, destined to collapse, and Ferdinand's attempts at reform are depicted as the doomed efforts of a patriotic but shortsighted ruler. It is admittedly tempting to chalk up this dismissiveness to the events which followed the Great War; Austria-Hungary, having ceased to be a player upon the world stage, lost some of its interest to scholars.
An equally plausible explanation is that Austria-Hungary simply does not fit tidily into our present understanding of the war. In France, Germany, and Britain, centralizing tendencies all won out in the final three years, leading to a more total mobilization and the repression of liberal freedoms. In Austria, however, the centralizing ambitions of Ferdinand were mixed with a restoration of parliamentary institutions and partial demobilization.
In the final year of its existence, Austria-Hungary began to fully embody that adjective associated with one of its most celebrated writers - kafkaesque. It was the most frail of all the remaining great powers, yet the only one which could plausibly claim "victory", having defeated all the hostile states on its borders. It was at war with France and Britain, and yet it sought to transition to a civilian economy, resulting in a contradictory situation on the homefront. Emperor Ferdinand had engineered the creation of an independent, southern slav kingdom, thereby implicitly recognizing the principle of self-determination, but he consistently refused to extend its application to the Emperor's other minorities.
1918
Throughout 1918, Austria's relative resilience in the face of extraordinary social pressures was largely attributable to the energetic, inexhaustible personality of Franz Ferdinand. Following two years of administrative chaos in which military and civilian powers vied for control of Austria, Ferdinand outmaneuvered the high command, sacked Conrad, and reimposed imperial authority over the military. His appointment of a Czech Prime Minister, Ottokar Czernin, temporarily pacified Bohemia, and his professed interest in a polish state accomplished the same for Galicia. Hungary was forced to submit to a series of imperial decrees establishing a new, tripartite structure to the Empire. For Ferdinand, this was important not only to establish a new, loyal power base that would oppose Hungarian intransigency, but also to remove the frequently rebellious South-Slav delegates from the Austrian Reichsrat.
The Austrian parliament had been suspended since the beginning of the war, but Ferdinand did not intend this to be a permanent state of affairs. However, he wished to secure the ascendancy of the loyalist, German parties before calling it back into session. The creation of an independent Kingdom of Croatia was an important step in accomplishing this, but there was still the matter of the Polish parties. In the matter of the so-called "Galician problem", domestic policy became entangled with the question of Austro-German relations. Ever since the Russian offensives of 1916, Germany had sought to exert a greater influence on the Austrian military, eventually forcing Austria to concede to a unified, de facto German-led chain of command shortly before Franz Joseph's death. German plans for Central Europe were clearly intended to turn Austria into a client state and economic appendage. The Danube Monarchy's negotiating position was weakened by its dependence on loans from Berlin and German military assistance.
Ferdinand hoped to use Galicia as a wedge point in negotiations. The plan was to concede to the cession of Galicia in return for German concessions, thereby simultaneously disentangling from German military control and shoring up the position of the loyalist ethnic German parties in the Reichsrat. Unfortunately, over 1917, the Germans did not show much interest in the creation of a Polish Kingdom. However, the growing strength of Soviet Russia and the rebelliousness of Petliura's government eventually led to a change in German policy, and by August 1918, control of the occupied territories in Poland was being devolved to compliant local authorities. Ludendorff came around to the notion of creating a strong, semi-independent Polish protectorate to serve as a counterbalance to Soviet revanchism in the east. And of course, the addition of Galicia to this new entity would make it a significantly stronger, more viable state.
For Ferdinand, the change in German eastern policy came a bit too late. Protests and mass strikes began in March 1918, directed above all at the deteriorating food situation. Many protestors also demanded for the Reichsrat to be reopened. After several loyalist newspapers reiterated this call, Ferdinand concluded that it would be better to conciliate rather than repress the unrest, and gave permission for parliament to be reconvened. He believed that it would be occupied with examining the hundreds of unilateral decrees issued in the past four years, and thus would not be able to engage in real legislative work for some time. For now, this did not appear to be a particularly significant blow to the monarchy: Ferdinand's intentions toward Galicia were clear, and the Polish parties rewarded him by supporting Czernin's government.
The march protests soon subsided, but these were simply a symptom of much larger problems. Rising worker militancy and middle-class discontent both indicated that civilian support for the war was waning. Unrest was concentrated in Vienna, Graz, and Prague, the three large industrial cities of the Empire's western half. Social-Democrats chafed at Ferdinand's imposition of a "landsturm draft" upon all workers aged 17-55 in late 1917. The worsening food situation in Austria radicalized the regime's opponents, leading to more wide-ranging, extreme forms of resistance. Grain was much more plentiful in Hungary, which had a larger agricultural population; its refusal to decrease its more generous rations meant that the more urban, western half of the Empire had to bear the brunt of the British blockade.
The victories over Russia, Romania, and Italy were crucial in shoring up the state's diminishing legitimacy. Each buoyed the morale of the average citizen and stirred hopes that the war would soon be over. They also provided much needed economic relief; together, Italian war reparations, Ukrainian imports, and Romanian booty accounted for a large share of Austrian food consumption in 1918. With Austria's three enemies defeated, there now seemed to be a real prospect for demobilization and a return to economic normalcy. In an attempt to satiate Transleithania, Ferdinand allowed for the Hungarian Army to undergo the most extensive demobilization. While this likely contributed to paramilitary violence in Vojvodina, it also eased the food situation somewhat in urban centers, weakening social-democratic militancy.
At this point, Ferdinand's position still looked as if it could be salvaged. The victory over Italy brought him acclaim among South Slavs, Poles, Germans, and even some Hungarians. In November, a set of agreements were reached in Vienna, shortly after the revisions to the Treaty of Warsaw were signed in Riga. Galicia would be ceded to the new Kingdom of Poland as compensation for the "Border strip" that was annexed by Germany. Austria also committed to send no less than ten divisions to the western front, and also agreed to keep a force in the east to act as a deterrent to the Russians. In return, Germany would issue new low-interest loans for Austria, scale back the demands of the Hindenburg Programme, and revise article 4 of the Austro-German military agreement, returning some autonomy to the Austro-Hungarian Army Command. The Galician bargain had finally been achieved.
1919
As he looked ahead to the next year, Ferdinand saw a path to consolidating the imperial reform efforts and definitively stabilizing the ailing monarchy. On the domestic front, he tasked Czernin with achieving a final resolution to the Bohemian question and passing a new slate of social policies to reduce labor radicalism. Some settlement would have to be achieved with Hungary as well, which had grown quite bitter over its land cessions to the Kingdom of Croatia.
Internationally, Ferrdinand hoped to break loose from Austria's economic dependency on Germany while remaining active in the war until final victory was achieved. This would permit Austria to slowly reduce its troop numbers, and allow the domestic economy to transition back to a civilian footing. It was sincerely believed that a return to "economic normalcy" would improve living standards. There was some thought given to a separate peace with France and Britain, but the scant likelihood of the Entente actually winning the war enervated the pacifist voices. The policy of "seeing the war to its end" was bolstered by a surge in support for the government following the victory against Italy. In truth, however, the Italian surrender inspired jubilation less for the "victory over the hereditary enemy" than because it seemed to signal that the war might soon be over. Few imagined that Austria-Hungary would still have over half of its army mobilized well into 1919, and the wide gap between expectations and reality contributed greatly to the growing unrest and pessimism in the Dual Monarchy.
Prime Minister Czernin had a dramatically reshaped Reichsrat to work with. The loss of Galician, Croatian, and radical Bohemian representatives shrunk its overall size from 516 to 334 members. The German nationalist parties had grown from a fifth to a third of parliament, allowing them to achieve an absolute majority in coalition with the anti-semitic, conservative-populist Christian Social Union. A new coalition government was formed in December, 1919; Czernin retained his place as Prime Minister, but his cabinet was now filled out with politicians from the two conservative parliamentary groups.
...In Austrian history, the ten or so months before November, 1919 would be known as the Wartezeit, or "waiting-time". A sense of high expectation filled the air, but nobody quite knew what would come next. All wished for an end to the war, and many for the achievement of the government's agenda. But neither of these seemed to be at hand. After a year of successful military campaigns and political reforms, Ferdinand's ambitious plans seemingly hit a brick wall.
In part, he had his choice of coalition partners to thank. Ferdinand may have been an autocratic monarch, but he was not at heart a German nationalist, and these were his principal allies in the Reichsrat. The parties of German national liberalism wished to disjoin not just German-majority areas from Bohemia, but also those with a significant German population. This was an intolerable prospect for the Czech Union, and Ferdinand knew that moving through with the nationalist plans would agitate the Czech population of the Empire beyond measure. Yet the comparatively modest proposals of Prime Minster Czernin, in which only majority-German regions in Southern and Western Bohemia would become part of Austria, were received with indignation by large sections of the German nationalists. The Czechs were not particularly happy about any of this, as it was clear that Ferdinand intended to offer them much less than an independent kingdom.
The german parties were alienated further by the introduction of new social policy by imperial fiat. The middle-class parties of german market liberalism were particularly incensed by this "betrayal", though some among the Christian socials were more receptive. In reality, these social reforms were likely much less than was necessary to ensure the maintenance of social order.
...Demobilization had not improved the economic situation of workers. In fact, the winding down of the war economy generated enormous social dislocation. The government shifted from wartime spending into harsh civilian austerity as the scale of its debt responsibilities became clear. Hundreds of thousands of workers were laid off from their jobs at munitions plants in response to a sharp decline in army procurement orders. These unemployed workers mixed with the demobilized soldiers, who also had difficulty finding work. The sudden loosening of the labor market led to downward pressure on wages, and for a time, the economy was on the verge of entering into a deflationary crisis as the prices of basic goods began to fall. Declining demand for Austrian wares in German export markets made it harder to prop up these prices and maintain profitability. Nonetheless, the Austrian economy shrank less than most others, even though it suffered a far worse spike in unemployment.
Somewhat ironically, worsening economic conditions were blamed largely on the war. Few understood why Austria must continue to fight "Germany's Battles". Anti-war protests occurred in every major city of the Danube Monarchy. Even German nationalists advocated for German "reparations" to Austria in return for its continued assistance.
In April, Ferdinand chose to solve the Bohemian issue through a series of imperial decrees. Bohemia was granted its own parliament, but was still considered subordinate to Austria. Some southern, German-majority regions were ceded to Austria, but not all of them. Predictably, the compromise pleased nobody, and the government fell on the 14th after a vote of no confidence in Czernin. Ironically, the exclusion of the Czech delegation now gave the German nationalists even more power.
There were some limited successes. Following the fall of Czernin's government, he was retained as foreign minister by the new prime minister, Heinrich Clam-Martinic. Czernin had a great deal of experience in this role, and he was tasked with persuading the governments-in-exile of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro to sign peace deals with the Central Powers. At one point in the war, this would have been unthinkable, but growing insurgencies in all three territories caused occupation costs to skyrocket and stymied plans for demobilization. Most economic experts now thought that more foodstuffs and resources would flow to Austria if responsible, civilian leaders governed the conquered territories. Germany at first hesitated on the matter of Romania, but Ludendorff agreed to participate in peace overtures after the April fighting in the west depleted the manpower needed for the Dammerungoffensive.
Over the summer, Czernin negotiated peace deals with each of the governments-in-exile. Sweden and Spain acted as unofficial mediators. Serbia and Montenegro were required to undergo dynastic changes, and all three governments had to submit to punitive reparations payments. Some territory in northern Serbia was ceded to the Kingdom of Croatia, but the core of the state remained intact. In reality, prohibitions on the rebuilding of its military and provisions requiring economic integration rendered it something close to an Austro-Bulgarian protectorate. The Romanian terms were somewhat more generous, principally because Germany viewed it as another bulwark against the Soviets. They were allowed to rebuild a small army, but also would have to keep a number of western mountain passes demilitarized. Germany and Austria-Hungary were given resource rights to the oil fields in Wallachia and Moldova, and Romania was forced to recognize Bulgarian sovereignty over Dobrudja. In the short-term, the return of civilian administrations enabled further Austrian demobilization and the transfer of additional German troops to the western front.
Meanwhile, matters in Transleithania were deteriorating quickly. Ever since the fall of Tisza, Hungarian politics had been in terminal crisis, with cabinets rising and falling on a monthly basis. On the streets, the social-radical Hungarian nationalist Mihaly Karolyi built up his power base among the immiserated petite-bourgeousie and demobilized soldiers. "People's militias" loyal to Karolyi clashed with police and German gangs. A tacit alliance existed between his forces and the Hungarian social-democrats. Yet despite Karolyi's large base of popular support, it appeared that he had little chance of becoming formally appointed prime minister in a legislature dominated by conservative parties. This changed after the bloody British summer offensive, in which the Hungarian Army suffered over 40,000 casualties. In its wake, a new wave of discontent swept the Danube monarchy. Massive crowds converged on the Hungarian diet, demanding Karolyi be made prime minister. The legislature balked after police refused to fire upon the protestors.
This raised alarm bells in Vienna. Technically, Ferdinand had to appoint Karolyi, but refusing to do so might provoke a Hungarian revolt, something which the monarchy was scarcely prepared for. Karolyi was eventually appointed, but the Emperor immediately began scheming for his removal. Austrian troops were stationed along the eastern border with Hungary. In the meantime, Karolyi could not pass meaningful legislation without the support of the Hungarian legislature, which viewed him as an alien imposition. It appeared as if, at least for the time, not only Karolyi but Hungary itself had been outmaneuvered - the conflict between Prime Minister and legislature rendered the nation incapable of resisting Austrian demands.
In late September, merely a month after Karolyi's appointment as prime minister, Austrian newspapers reported a lurid story detailing Karolyi's attempt to negotiate a peace deal behind the monarch's back. While pacifist sentiment ran high, many outside Hungary - including in the newly-formed Kingdom of Croatia - were outraged by this betrayal, which they treated as tantamount to a Hungarian "declaration of independence". When Karolyi refused to publicly disclaim the negotiations, the legislature readied to sack him, only to face another set of protests. Militias loyal to Karolyi secured Budapest later that week, intimidating the recalcitrant legislature. Austria could not tolerate this blow to its prestige. On October 9th, Ferdinand declared Hungary to be in a state of insurrection, and prepared to invade the wayward Kingdom.
Matters were not much better in the empire's western half. Bereft of parliamentary support, the new Clem-Martinic government leaned heavily on the device of the imperial decree, alienating german liberals, national minorities, and social-democratic workers. A series of strikes in crucial war industries rocked Vienna, Prague, and Tyrol in April 1919. Renner and Adler, the moderate leaders of the Social democrats, asserted that they would only call for an end to the strikes if there were improvements in unemployment insurance, an end to the draconian labor regime, early elections to local councils and mayoralties, and a further drawdown in troop numbers on the eastern front. The government only consented to the latter two demands, but after they were subjected to government pressure and threats, the right-wing social democrats directed the party to end the strikes. By this point, however, the workers had soured on the trade union bureaucracy, and most of the strike activity continued even after it lost party support.
This had the effect of discrediting the right-wing Social Democrats. Inspired by Julius Martov's Internationalist Mensheviks, Otto Bauer, a social-democratic activist, mounted a successful leadership bid and ousted Adler and Renner from the commanding heights of the party. His popularity grew after the government made the controversial decision to ban him from running in an upcoming mayoral election in Vienna, prompting a renewed round of mass strikes and a boycott of the election from the social democrats. Before the war, Bauer was closer in his politics to Haase and Bernstein than he was to Martov, but the draconian policies of the government radicalized him. In August, a warrant was issued for his arrest, but he evaded the Viennese police, and ended up hiding in the basement of a sympathetic worker until November.
Further north, ethnic violence between Germans and Czechs intensified following the partition of Bohemia. In majority-German regions still part of the new Czech autonomy, farmers, shopkeepers, and workers formed militias and defense associations, and town councils issued resolutions declaring their desire to be incorporated into Austria. Small-scale raids and ethnic cleansing were endemic in the border areas. The cession of the southern lands also inflamed nationalistic sentiment in the Czech heartland; the Czech union condemned the cession of "traditional Bohemian territories". Similar internecine struggles were waged in Trieste, Vojvodina, Slovakia, and German West Hungary. Everywhere, the rule of law in the Austro-Hungarian Rechtstaat was disintegrating as its various ethnic groups turned against one another, while socialist radicalism swept the urban centers.
Ferdinand was not unaware of the violent storm approaching. He placed Karl von Bardolff, a trusted former adjutant, at the head of the Austro-Hungarian Army, who began purging it of potentially "disloyal elements". The demobilized soldiers joined the swelling ranks of Vienna's underground red brigades. In September, a number of prominent Czech politicians were arrested after it was discovered that they had links to pro-entente dissident groups. Even the German nationalists were subject to increasing police scrutiny. Perhaps the one bright spot was the Kingdom of Croatia, which had remained resolutely loyal to the monarchy…
Excerpts from "Bulgaria", in The Zurich Encyclopedia of the Great War (Zurich Press: 1952)
Bulgaria may have been involved in setting off the Great War, but none of its politicians or generals believed that when they attacked Serbia, beginning the Third Balkan war, that they would be fighting for another five years. After all, the Serbian Army was in a piteous state, and it was thought that a swift offensive toward Belgrade would allow for the consolidation of Bulgarian gains and permit a reorientation toward Romania, which had embarked on a menacing program of army expansion.
Over the seven years of its "long great war", the Bulgarian Army fought well, displaying a level of professionalism and discipline absent from many of the other Balkan Armies. In 1912, it played the largest role in Turkey's defeat in the First Balkan War. In the Second Balkan War, only intervention from the great powers prevented it from winning a total victory against a numerically superior Greco-Serbian coalition. In the next war, its army had some trouble breaking through Serbian lines, but once it did, it approached Belgrade swiftly, provoking the July Crisis and the onset of the Great War. A Franco-British relief expedition landed in Albania and attempted to aid Serbia, but was too late to relieve the siege of Belgrade. When they faced off against the Bulgarian Army, they were defeated and opted to evacuate from Albanian ports. Only around 40,000 Serbian soldiers and civilians were able to make their way to neutral Greece, where they were interned.
The next two years presented a curious dilemma for Bulgaria. Its immediate enemies were defeated, though its own army was exhausted. Russia had technically never declared war, though Britain and France did. The traditionally russophile peasantry were overwhelmingly in favor of peace. Few wanted to fight Germany's war. Yet Bulgaria was dependent on the financial largesse of the Central Powers. If it abandoned its allies, it would be diplomatically isolated. There was no alternative to fighting.
Radoslavov attempted to steer a moderate course. Around a third of the Bulgarian Army was demobilized. The rest were split between garrisoning the Greek and Romanian borders and defending Austrian Galicia. It is doubtful that this policy could have been maintained indefinitely, and Radoslavov pressed the Central Powers to allow for the further demobilization of Bulgarian troops, a request which was consistently refused. Increasing peasant unrest in 1916 prompted fears of a military coup.
The winter of 1917 changed everything. With Constantinople in British hands and Greek and Romanian troops bearing down on Sofia, the war became one of national defense. In less than a month, all the progress toward demobilizing the nation was reversed. In the defense of the capital, Bulgaria suffered casualties equal to ten percent of the strength of its standing army. The loss of the eastern provinces was a shattering blow. King Ferdinand declared a Levee en Masse, and Bulgaria took out large loans from Germany to pay for the re-arming and expansion of its military.
Over the next year, the Bulgarian, British, and Romanian armies squared off in several vicious campaigns. More battle-tested than its adversaries, the Bulgarians slowly clawed back their lost territories. But the armed forces were close to their breaking point. Mutinies broke out during an offensive into Romania, polarizing Bulgarian society between the pro-war government and the opposition. The Agrarian Party, which had begrudgingly endorsed the government following the Romanian assault over the Danube, now returned to the anti-war camp.
The Bulgarian Army faced enormous pressure over 1917. It was divided between Greek, Thracian, and Romanian fronts. Only the continued flow of German materiel and troops kept it from suffering collapse. Salonica and southern Dobrudja remained in enemy hands, as did some of Bulgarian Thrace. The threat to the homeland was sufficient to steady Bulgarian morale, but generals were hesitant about launching another offensive.
In 1918, the military situation improved. The triumph over Romania and reconquest of Salonica bolstered the morale of the army and allowed for further troops to be concentrated against the British on the Thracian front. The Greek Army, plagued by its own morale issues and still sorting out its logistics, ceased to pose a serious threat.
At the home front, matters were less stable. The urban population objected to the quantities of grain and other foodstuffs being sent to Germany and Austria, and farmlands in the east were devastated by the fighting of 1917. Many were attracted to the ideals of the Russian Soviet Republic. After an acrimonious internal debate, the Broad Socialists expelled their moderate right-flank, paving the way for a reconciliation with the orthodox-marxist Narrow Socialists. Anger at German and Austrian "exploitation" grew as agricultural produce continued to flow out of Bulgaria.
Concerned about the prospect of social revolution, in February 1919 the Bulgarian Chief of Staff Nikola Zhekov staged a coup with the Agrarian populist Aleksandar Stamboliyski. Ferdinand, faced with few options, appointed Stamboliyski as the new prime minister. Germany and Austria-Hungary both had substantial troop concentrations stationed in Bulgaria, and they demanded clarification of the new government's intentions. Stamboliyski wished to sue for a separate peace with the Entente, but Zhekov still believed the war could be won, and hoped to use the Agrarian party's popularity to bolster the government's legitimacy. When it became clear that Stamboliyski would not budge, he was ousted from the government by the parties of the Liberal Concentration, which replaced him with a compliant prime minister. German soldiers defended the parliament. Bulgaria was now under de facto military rule.
Stamboliyski was placed under house arrest, but with the aid of supporters, he managed to escape into the Bulgarian countryside in August. Escalating repression finally prompted the merger of the broad and narrow socialists, who now incorporated their respective parties as distinct factions in the new "Bulgarian Socialist Worker's Party". Together with Stamboliyski's agrarians, they began a boycott of parliament, and collaborated in the creation of an underground, revolutionary "Worker-Peasant's Front" which conspired to seize power when the time was ripe.
1. The Triumphal March of Socialism: Labor Radicalism and the Development of Interstitial Institutions
2. Ostpolitik: Poland, West Ukraine, and the Consolidation of Soviet Russia
3. Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Plight of the Minor Nations (Updates on Norway, Serbia, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands)
2. Ostpolitik: Poland, West Ukraine, and the Consolidation of Soviet Russia
3. Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Plight of the Minor Nations (Updates on Norway, Serbia, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands)
Balkan Tragedy: The Slow Disintegration of Southeastern Europe
Excerpts from Russell Kirk, Crisis on the Danube: The Slow Death of Austria-Hungary (Henry Regnery, 1949)
In the historiography of the Great War, political and social developments in Austria-Hungary are frequently either overlooked entirely or sidelined. The monarchy is treated as a teetering, imbalanced structure, destined to collapse, and Ferdinand's attempts at reform are depicted as the doomed efforts of a patriotic but shortsighted ruler. It is admittedly tempting to chalk up this dismissiveness to the events which followed the Great War; Austria-Hungary, having ceased to be a player upon the world stage, lost some of its interest to scholars.
An equally plausible explanation is that Austria-Hungary simply does not fit tidily into our present understanding of the war. In France, Germany, and Britain, centralizing tendencies all won out in the final three years, leading to a more total mobilization and the repression of liberal freedoms. In Austria, however, the centralizing ambitions of Ferdinand were mixed with a restoration of parliamentary institutions and partial demobilization.
In the final year of its existence, Austria-Hungary began to fully embody that adjective associated with one of its most celebrated writers - kafkaesque. It was the most frail of all the remaining great powers, yet the only one which could plausibly claim "victory", having defeated all the hostile states on its borders. It was at war with France and Britain, and yet it sought to transition to a civilian economy, resulting in a contradictory situation on the homefront. Emperor Ferdinand had engineered the creation of an independent, southern slav kingdom, thereby implicitly recognizing the principle of self-determination, but he consistently refused to extend its application to the Emperor's other minorities.
1918
Throughout 1918, Austria's relative resilience in the face of extraordinary social pressures was largely attributable to the energetic, inexhaustible personality of Franz Ferdinand. Following two years of administrative chaos in which military and civilian powers vied for control of Austria, Ferdinand outmaneuvered the high command, sacked Conrad, and reimposed imperial authority over the military. His appointment of a Czech Prime Minister, Ottokar Czernin, temporarily pacified Bohemia, and his professed interest in a polish state accomplished the same for Galicia. Hungary was forced to submit to a series of imperial decrees establishing a new, tripartite structure to the Empire. For Ferdinand, this was important not only to establish a new, loyal power base that would oppose Hungarian intransigency, but also to remove the frequently rebellious South-Slav delegates from the Austrian Reichsrat.
The Austrian parliament had been suspended since the beginning of the war, but Ferdinand did not intend this to be a permanent state of affairs. However, he wished to secure the ascendancy of the loyalist, German parties before calling it back into session. The creation of an independent Kingdom of Croatia was an important step in accomplishing this, but there was still the matter of the Polish parties. In the matter of the so-called "Galician problem", domestic policy became entangled with the question of Austro-German relations. Ever since the Russian offensives of 1916, Germany had sought to exert a greater influence on the Austrian military, eventually forcing Austria to concede to a unified, de facto German-led chain of command shortly before Franz Joseph's death. German plans for Central Europe were clearly intended to turn Austria into a client state and economic appendage. The Danube Monarchy's negotiating position was weakened by its dependence on loans from Berlin and German military assistance.
Ferdinand hoped to use Galicia as a wedge point in negotiations. The plan was to concede to the cession of Galicia in return for German concessions, thereby simultaneously disentangling from German military control and shoring up the position of the loyalist ethnic German parties in the Reichsrat. Unfortunately, over 1917, the Germans did not show much interest in the creation of a Polish Kingdom. However, the growing strength of Soviet Russia and the rebelliousness of Petliura's government eventually led to a change in German policy, and by August 1918, control of the occupied territories in Poland was being devolved to compliant local authorities. Ludendorff came around to the notion of creating a strong, semi-independent Polish protectorate to serve as a counterbalance to Soviet revanchism in the east. And of course, the addition of Galicia to this new entity would make it a significantly stronger, more viable state.
For Ferdinand, the change in German eastern policy came a bit too late. Protests and mass strikes began in March 1918, directed above all at the deteriorating food situation. Many protestors also demanded for the Reichsrat to be reopened. After several loyalist newspapers reiterated this call, Ferdinand concluded that it would be better to conciliate rather than repress the unrest, and gave permission for parliament to be reconvened. He believed that it would be occupied with examining the hundreds of unilateral decrees issued in the past four years, and thus would not be able to engage in real legislative work for some time. For now, this did not appear to be a particularly significant blow to the monarchy: Ferdinand's intentions toward Galicia were clear, and the Polish parties rewarded him by supporting Czernin's government.
The march protests soon subsided, but these were simply a symptom of much larger problems. Rising worker militancy and middle-class discontent both indicated that civilian support for the war was waning. Unrest was concentrated in Vienna, Graz, and Prague, the three large industrial cities of the Empire's western half. Social-Democrats chafed at Ferdinand's imposition of a "landsturm draft" upon all workers aged 17-55 in late 1917. The worsening food situation in Austria radicalized the regime's opponents, leading to more wide-ranging, extreme forms of resistance. Grain was much more plentiful in Hungary, which had a larger agricultural population; its refusal to decrease its more generous rations meant that the more urban, western half of the Empire had to bear the brunt of the British blockade.
The victories over Russia, Romania, and Italy were crucial in shoring up the state's diminishing legitimacy. Each buoyed the morale of the average citizen and stirred hopes that the war would soon be over. They also provided much needed economic relief; together, Italian war reparations, Ukrainian imports, and Romanian booty accounted for a large share of Austrian food consumption in 1918. With Austria's three enemies defeated, there now seemed to be a real prospect for demobilization and a return to economic normalcy. In an attempt to satiate Transleithania, Ferdinand allowed for the Hungarian Army to undergo the most extensive demobilization. While this likely contributed to paramilitary violence in Vojvodina, it also eased the food situation somewhat in urban centers, weakening social-democratic militancy.
At this point, Ferdinand's position still looked as if it could be salvaged. The victory over Italy brought him acclaim among South Slavs, Poles, Germans, and even some Hungarians. In November, a set of agreements were reached in Vienna, shortly after the revisions to the Treaty of Warsaw were signed in Riga. Galicia would be ceded to the new Kingdom of Poland as compensation for the "Border strip" that was annexed by Germany. Austria also committed to send no less than ten divisions to the western front, and also agreed to keep a force in the east to act as a deterrent to the Russians. In return, Germany would issue new low-interest loans for Austria, scale back the demands of the Hindenburg Programme, and revise article 4 of the Austro-German military agreement, returning some autonomy to the Austro-Hungarian Army Command. The Galician bargain had finally been achieved.
1919
As he looked ahead to the next year, Ferdinand saw a path to consolidating the imperial reform efforts and definitively stabilizing the ailing monarchy. On the domestic front, he tasked Czernin with achieving a final resolution to the Bohemian question and passing a new slate of social policies to reduce labor radicalism. Some settlement would have to be achieved with Hungary as well, which had grown quite bitter over its land cessions to the Kingdom of Croatia.
Internationally, Ferrdinand hoped to break loose from Austria's economic dependency on Germany while remaining active in the war until final victory was achieved. This would permit Austria to slowly reduce its troop numbers, and allow the domestic economy to transition back to a civilian footing. It was sincerely believed that a return to "economic normalcy" would improve living standards. There was some thought given to a separate peace with France and Britain, but the scant likelihood of the Entente actually winning the war enervated the pacifist voices. The policy of "seeing the war to its end" was bolstered by a surge in support for the government following the victory against Italy. In truth, however, the Italian surrender inspired jubilation less for the "victory over the hereditary enemy" than because it seemed to signal that the war might soon be over. Few imagined that Austria-Hungary would still have over half of its army mobilized well into 1919, and the wide gap between expectations and reality contributed greatly to the growing unrest and pessimism in the Dual Monarchy.
Prime Minister Czernin had a dramatically reshaped Reichsrat to work with. The loss of Galician, Croatian, and radical Bohemian representatives shrunk its overall size from 516 to 334 members. The German nationalist parties had grown from a fifth to a third of parliament, allowing them to achieve an absolute majority in coalition with the anti-semitic, conservative-populist Christian Social Union. A new coalition government was formed in December, 1919; Czernin retained his place as Prime Minister, but his cabinet was now filled out with politicians from the two conservative parliamentary groups.
...In Austrian history, the ten or so months before November, 1919 would be known as the Wartezeit, or "waiting-time". A sense of high expectation filled the air, but nobody quite knew what would come next. All wished for an end to the war, and many for the achievement of the government's agenda. But neither of these seemed to be at hand. After a year of successful military campaigns and political reforms, Ferdinand's ambitious plans seemingly hit a brick wall.
In part, he had his choice of coalition partners to thank. Ferdinand may have been an autocratic monarch, but he was not at heart a German nationalist, and these were his principal allies in the Reichsrat. The parties of German national liberalism wished to disjoin not just German-majority areas from Bohemia, but also those with a significant German population. This was an intolerable prospect for the Czech Union, and Ferdinand knew that moving through with the nationalist plans would agitate the Czech population of the Empire beyond measure. Yet the comparatively modest proposals of Prime Minster Czernin, in which only majority-German regions in Southern and Western Bohemia would become part of Austria, were received with indignation by large sections of the German nationalists. The Czechs were not particularly happy about any of this, as it was clear that Ferdinand intended to offer them much less than an independent kingdom.
The german parties were alienated further by the introduction of new social policy by imperial fiat. The middle-class parties of german market liberalism were particularly incensed by this "betrayal", though some among the Christian socials were more receptive. In reality, these social reforms were likely much less than was necessary to ensure the maintenance of social order.
...Demobilization had not improved the economic situation of workers. In fact, the winding down of the war economy generated enormous social dislocation. The government shifted from wartime spending into harsh civilian austerity as the scale of its debt responsibilities became clear. Hundreds of thousands of workers were laid off from their jobs at munitions plants in response to a sharp decline in army procurement orders. These unemployed workers mixed with the demobilized soldiers, who also had difficulty finding work. The sudden loosening of the labor market led to downward pressure on wages, and for a time, the economy was on the verge of entering into a deflationary crisis as the prices of basic goods began to fall. Declining demand for Austrian wares in German export markets made it harder to prop up these prices and maintain profitability. Nonetheless, the Austrian economy shrank less than most others, even though it suffered a far worse spike in unemployment.
Somewhat ironically, worsening economic conditions were blamed largely on the war. Few understood why Austria must continue to fight "Germany's Battles". Anti-war protests occurred in every major city of the Danube Monarchy. Even German nationalists advocated for German "reparations" to Austria in return for its continued assistance.
In April, Ferdinand chose to solve the Bohemian issue through a series of imperial decrees. Bohemia was granted its own parliament, but was still considered subordinate to Austria. Some southern, German-majority regions were ceded to Austria, but not all of them. Predictably, the compromise pleased nobody, and the government fell on the 14th after a vote of no confidence in Czernin. Ironically, the exclusion of the Czech delegation now gave the German nationalists even more power.
There were some limited successes. Following the fall of Czernin's government, he was retained as foreign minister by the new prime minister, Heinrich Clam-Martinic. Czernin had a great deal of experience in this role, and he was tasked with persuading the governments-in-exile of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro to sign peace deals with the Central Powers. At one point in the war, this would have been unthinkable, but growing insurgencies in all three territories caused occupation costs to skyrocket and stymied plans for demobilization. Most economic experts now thought that more foodstuffs and resources would flow to Austria if responsible, civilian leaders governed the conquered territories. Germany at first hesitated on the matter of Romania, but Ludendorff agreed to participate in peace overtures after the April fighting in the west depleted the manpower needed for the Dammerungoffensive.
Over the summer, Czernin negotiated peace deals with each of the governments-in-exile. Sweden and Spain acted as unofficial mediators. Serbia and Montenegro were required to undergo dynastic changes, and all three governments had to submit to punitive reparations payments. Some territory in northern Serbia was ceded to the Kingdom of Croatia, but the core of the state remained intact. In reality, prohibitions on the rebuilding of its military and provisions requiring economic integration rendered it something close to an Austro-Bulgarian protectorate. The Romanian terms were somewhat more generous, principally because Germany viewed it as another bulwark against the Soviets. They were allowed to rebuild a small army, but also would have to keep a number of western mountain passes demilitarized. Germany and Austria-Hungary were given resource rights to the oil fields in Wallachia and Moldova, and Romania was forced to recognize Bulgarian sovereignty over Dobrudja. In the short-term, the return of civilian administrations enabled further Austrian demobilization and the transfer of additional German troops to the western front.
Meanwhile, matters in Transleithania were deteriorating quickly. Ever since the fall of Tisza, Hungarian politics had been in terminal crisis, with cabinets rising and falling on a monthly basis. On the streets, the social-radical Hungarian nationalist Mihaly Karolyi built up his power base among the immiserated petite-bourgeousie and demobilized soldiers. "People's militias" loyal to Karolyi clashed with police and German gangs. A tacit alliance existed between his forces and the Hungarian social-democrats. Yet despite Karolyi's large base of popular support, it appeared that he had little chance of becoming formally appointed prime minister in a legislature dominated by conservative parties. This changed after the bloody British summer offensive, in which the Hungarian Army suffered over 40,000 casualties. In its wake, a new wave of discontent swept the Danube monarchy. Massive crowds converged on the Hungarian diet, demanding Karolyi be made prime minister. The legislature balked after police refused to fire upon the protestors.
This raised alarm bells in Vienna. Technically, Ferdinand had to appoint Karolyi, but refusing to do so might provoke a Hungarian revolt, something which the monarchy was scarcely prepared for. Karolyi was eventually appointed, but the Emperor immediately began scheming for his removal. Austrian troops were stationed along the eastern border with Hungary. In the meantime, Karolyi could not pass meaningful legislation without the support of the Hungarian legislature, which viewed him as an alien imposition. It appeared as if, at least for the time, not only Karolyi but Hungary itself had been outmaneuvered - the conflict between Prime Minister and legislature rendered the nation incapable of resisting Austrian demands.
In late September, merely a month after Karolyi's appointment as prime minister, Austrian newspapers reported a lurid story detailing Karolyi's attempt to negotiate a peace deal behind the monarch's back. While pacifist sentiment ran high, many outside Hungary - including in the newly-formed Kingdom of Croatia - were outraged by this betrayal, which they treated as tantamount to a Hungarian "declaration of independence". When Karolyi refused to publicly disclaim the negotiations, the legislature readied to sack him, only to face another set of protests. Militias loyal to Karolyi secured Budapest later that week, intimidating the recalcitrant legislature. Austria could not tolerate this blow to its prestige. On October 9th, Ferdinand declared Hungary to be in a state of insurrection, and prepared to invade the wayward Kingdom.
Matters were not much better in the empire's western half. Bereft of parliamentary support, the new Clem-Martinic government leaned heavily on the device of the imperial decree, alienating german liberals, national minorities, and social-democratic workers. A series of strikes in crucial war industries rocked Vienna, Prague, and Tyrol in April 1919. Renner and Adler, the moderate leaders of the Social democrats, asserted that they would only call for an end to the strikes if there were improvements in unemployment insurance, an end to the draconian labor regime, early elections to local councils and mayoralties, and a further drawdown in troop numbers on the eastern front. The government only consented to the latter two demands, but after they were subjected to government pressure and threats, the right-wing social democrats directed the party to end the strikes. By this point, however, the workers had soured on the trade union bureaucracy, and most of the strike activity continued even after it lost party support.
This had the effect of discrediting the right-wing Social Democrats. Inspired by Julius Martov's Internationalist Mensheviks, Otto Bauer, a social-democratic activist, mounted a successful leadership bid and ousted Adler and Renner from the commanding heights of the party. His popularity grew after the government made the controversial decision to ban him from running in an upcoming mayoral election in Vienna, prompting a renewed round of mass strikes and a boycott of the election from the social democrats. Before the war, Bauer was closer in his politics to Haase and Bernstein than he was to Martov, but the draconian policies of the government radicalized him. In August, a warrant was issued for his arrest, but he evaded the Viennese police, and ended up hiding in the basement of a sympathetic worker until November.
Further north, ethnic violence between Germans and Czechs intensified following the partition of Bohemia. In majority-German regions still part of the new Czech autonomy, farmers, shopkeepers, and workers formed militias and defense associations, and town councils issued resolutions declaring their desire to be incorporated into Austria. Small-scale raids and ethnic cleansing were endemic in the border areas. The cession of the southern lands also inflamed nationalistic sentiment in the Czech heartland; the Czech union condemned the cession of "traditional Bohemian territories". Similar internecine struggles were waged in Trieste, Vojvodina, Slovakia, and German West Hungary. Everywhere, the rule of law in the Austro-Hungarian Rechtstaat was disintegrating as its various ethnic groups turned against one another, while socialist radicalism swept the urban centers.
Ferdinand was not unaware of the violent storm approaching. He placed Karl von Bardolff, a trusted former adjutant, at the head of the Austro-Hungarian Army, who began purging it of potentially "disloyal elements". The demobilized soldiers joined the swelling ranks of Vienna's underground red brigades. In September, a number of prominent Czech politicians were arrested after it was discovered that they had links to pro-entente dissident groups. Even the German nationalists were subject to increasing police scrutiny. Perhaps the one bright spot was the Kingdom of Croatia, which had remained resolutely loyal to the monarchy…
Excerpts from "Bulgaria", in The Zurich Encyclopedia of the Great War (Zurich Press: 1952)
Bulgaria may have been involved in setting off the Great War, but none of its politicians or generals believed that when they attacked Serbia, beginning the Third Balkan war, that they would be fighting for another five years. After all, the Serbian Army was in a piteous state, and it was thought that a swift offensive toward Belgrade would allow for the consolidation of Bulgarian gains and permit a reorientation toward Romania, which had embarked on a menacing program of army expansion.
Over the seven years of its "long great war", the Bulgarian Army fought well, displaying a level of professionalism and discipline absent from many of the other Balkan Armies. In 1912, it played the largest role in Turkey's defeat in the First Balkan War. In the Second Balkan War, only intervention from the great powers prevented it from winning a total victory against a numerically superior Greco-Serbian coalition. In the next war, its army had some trouble breaking through Serbian lines, but once it did, it approached Belgrade swiftly, provoking the July Crisis and the onset of the Great War. A Franco-British relief expedition landed in Albania and attempted to aid Serbia, but was too late to relieve the siege of Belgrade. When they faced off against the Bulgarian Army, they were defeated and opted to evacuate from Albanian ports. Only around 40,000 Serbian soldiers and civilians were able to make their way to neutral Greece, where they were interned.
The next two years presented a curious dilemma for Bulgaria. Its immediate enemies were defeated, though its own army was exhausted. Russia had technically never declared war, though Britain and France did. The traditionally russophile peasantry were overwhelmingly in favor of peace. Few wanted to fight Germany's war. Yet Bulgaria was dependent on the financial largesse of the Central Powers. If it abandoned its allies, it would be diplomatically isolated. There was no alternative to fighting.
Radoslavov attempted to steer a moderate course. Around a third of the Bulgarian Army was demobilized. The rest were split between garrisoning the Greek and Romanian borders and defending Austrian Galicia. It is doubtful that this policy could have been maintained indefinitely, and Radoslavov pressed the Central Powers to allow for the further demobilization of Bulgarian troops, a request which was consistently refused. Increasing peasant unrest in 1916 prompted fears of a military coup.
The winter of 1917 changed everything. With Constantinople in British hands and Greek and Romanian troops bearing down on Sofia, the war became one of national defense. In less than a month, all the progress toward demobilizing the nation was reversed. In the defense of the capital, Bulgaria suffered casualties equal to ten percent of the strength of its standing army. The loss of the eastern provinces was a shattering blow. King Ferdinand declared a Levee en Masse, and Bulgaria took out large loans from Germany to pay for the re-arming and expansion of its military.
Over the next year, the Bulgarian, British, and Romanian armies squared off in several vicious campaigns. More battle-tested than its adversaries, the Bulgarians slowly clawed back their lost territories. But the armed forces were close to their breaking point. Mutinies broke out during an offensive into Romania, polarizing Bulgarian society between the pro-war government and the opposition. The Agrarian Party, which had begrudgingly endorsed the government following the Romanian assault over the Danube, now returned to the anti-war camp.
The Bulgarian Army faced enormous pressure over 1917. It was divided between Greek, Thracian, and Romanian fronts. Only the continued flow of German materiel and troops kept it from suffering collapse. Salonica and southern Dobrudja remained in enemy hands, as did some of Bulgarian Thrace. The threat to the homeland was sufficient to steady Bulgarian morale, but generals were hesitant about launching another offensive.
In 1918, the military situation improved. The triumph over Romania and reconquest of Salonica bolstered the morale of the army and allowed for further troops to be concentrated against the British on the Thracian front. The Greek Army, plagued by its own morale issues and still sorting out its logistics, ceased to pose a serious threat.
At the home front, matters were less stable. The urban population objected to the quantities of grain and other foodstuffs being sent to Germany and Austria, and farmlands in the east were devastated by the fighting of 1917. Many were attracted to the ideals of the Russian Soviet Republic. After an acrimonious internal debate, the Broad Socialists expelled their moderate right-flank, paving the way for a reconciliation with the orthodox-marxist Narrow Socialists. Anger at German and Austrian "exploitation" grew as agricultural produce continued to flow out of Bulgaria.
Concerned about the prospect of social revolution, in February 1919 the Bulgarian Chief of Staff Nikola Zhekov staged a coup with the Agrarian populist Aleksandar Stamboliyski. Ferdinand, faced with few options, appointed Stamboliyski as the new prime minister. Germany and Austria-Hungary both had substantial troop concentrations stationed in Bulgaria, and they demanded clarification of the new government's intentions. Stamboliyski wished to sue for a separate peace with the Entente, but Zhekov still believed the war could be won, and hoped to use the Agrarian party's popularity to bolster the government's legitimacy. When it became clear that Stamboliyski would not budge, he was ousted from the government by the parties of the Liberal Concentration, which replaced him with a compliant prime minister. German soldiers defended the parliament. Bulgaria was now under de facto military rule.
Stamboliyski was placed under house arrest, but with the aid of supporters, he managed to escape into the Bulgarian countryside in August. Escalating repression finally prompted the merger of the broad and narrow socialists, who now incorporated their respective parties as distinct factions in the new "Bulgarian Socialist Worker's Party". Together with Stamboliyski's agrarians, they began a boycott of parliament, and collaborated in the creation of an underground, revolutionary "Worker-Peasant's Front" which conspired to seize power when the time was ripe.
Last edited:
