Ill be honest i just added that as when I saw it I just believed that headed directly into the action would be the best option.
The Long March (a TNO-sequel Comintern quest)
- Thread starter StarMaker764
- Start date
Honestly it's between "intervene immediately" and "intervene immediately with specific goals."
It kinda feels like we're united, we're just bickering about fine print more than any actual disagreements.
It's so nice to have such a calm commons when we're not doing budget meetings.
- Location
- [REDACTED]
It is funny to imagine that the Comintern is pretty calm and polite in the face of everything from internal unrest to external threats except for the yearly budget discussion. Then its just barely not an all out brawl as each side decries the other's plans as ruinous and destructive. Once a budget somehow manages to pass, everything immediately returns to normal.
This is the power of Democratic Centralism, Comrade
- Pronouns
- He/She/They
[X] United Front Intervention
Two more votes
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- She/Her
Does anyone have a reason for disliking the plan?
Probably because they don't think of the conquences
Anymore votes
[X] Immediate intervention (costs 15 lp and potentially causes ?? or ??)
- Pronouns
- Viewer
[X] United Front Intervention
- Location
- I think somewhere. I might be nowhere though
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Since some of you might be confused of what my write-in intends to accomplish, I will explain what it is below.
Now, as you can see, this plan is primarily divided into three planks: military, humanitarian, and judicial/reform. This plan is made largely as an extension and amendment of the "Immediate Intervention" option to hopefully act with the same speed while still addressing the concerns laid out within the story on the downsides of immediate intervention such that those downsides are minimized, if not eliminated. Should you be a fan of decisive and speedy action as "Immediate Intervention" and have no other concerns presented than the decisiveness of action, there should be no reason for you to not endorse the "United Front Intervention" as well as it intends to be equally quick and decisive. I therefore ask that those of you interested in Immediate Intervention give me your time to speak on the merits of my write-in and why I feel it improves on the Immediate Intervention foundation.
On the military side of things, this aims to immediately deploy and act without hesitation as immediate intervention posits. Nonetheless, it will still aim for a degree of legitimacy to it by immediately establishing coordinated operations with the constituent republics within Yugoslavia - as Yugoslavia is a federalized union of multiple republics - whom were noted in the update to be worried about this upheaval, along with any of the noted friendly organizations that have since risen up to resist this insidious plot. This allows us to not only easily build a secure logistics chain, but it also takes the burden off the IRB to be doing all this singlehandedly. As amazing as the IRB's , it is 400k people - not all of whom are even direct fighting soldiers - spread out over most of the world. Deploying IRBs to Yugoslavia will not just dump 400k soldiers there, even if that were logistically feasible on short notice or even something that we should do. Immediately working to coordinate will ensure the burden of advancement and securing territory from malicious non-state actors - because remember, these are militant groups we are fighting not actual armies as before so they are not as identifiable - is spread out between all rather than burdened onto the IRB alone. This also has the supplementary effect of ensuring we can keep any existing local government forces in check in case any of them turn out to have been infiltrated by dissident forces, lest we forget one of the republics of Yugoslavia already fell because of a police coup while Bulgarian nationalists have been pulling some shady things in the background.
Focusing more on the legitimacy aspect, coordinating with the federal republics, even if they aren't the federal government themselves, still ensures we have more than just the permission of Commons delegates to act, seeing as those might be Yugoslavian delegates but it's technically not within their authority to do more than coordinate with the Comintern and vote. It will also play well in to our budding reputation among the Comintern for protecting smaller countries against bigger, threatening regional power politics, lest we forget that Nepal joined us precisely because of that and it's been implied in updates since that other small countries have plans involving the Comintern as well. The Yugoslavian federal government may have failed to maintain itself against the forces of reaction, but the Comintern is protecting the vulnerable republics and minorities within Yugoslavia in its stead. Doing so as we are with a degree of legitimacy rather than in a heavy-handed manner of having the IRB doing it alone also minimizes the risk of the federal government becoming embittered by our intervention. This policy is overall a win-win both for our military effectiveness and for the positive effect it could potentially have on the Comintern's reputation following the end of the crisis.
The second plank is then the humanitarian aspect. This one is fairly straight-forward, and to be honest I'm pretty sure it's bog-standard Comintern policy regardless of whether it's explicitly mentioned. Nonetheless, I felt it had to be mentioned just in case. Overall the main thing is that the first step of the military plank being to establish safe areas before advancing further is not just for logistical reasons or security reasons, but also to aid this humanitarian relief. By securing specific areas (preferably ports), we can ensure refugees from affected areas have a place to retreat to until the end of this crisis. This also plays decently well into our reputation for protecting minorities, though I do not believe it will have an especially notable effect on our reputation unlike the military and judicial plank since it is bogstandard practice for us.
The final plank then is the judicial and reform aspect. This is what I am most excited for, and is both the biggest deviation from any of the standard intervention options AND potentially the most impactful for the Comintern following the crisis. This actually has multiple layers to it, from which I will start with the most shallow and work my way down. The most shallow aspect is the arrest and moving of high-profile fascists and dissidents aiding this nationalist uprising out of Yugoslavia into IOJ containment facilities is purely just a security measure. The local police have already shown to be infiltrated by such groups and Yugoslavia has proven itself rife with nationalist corruption undermining more vulnerable minorities so we can't really trust holding them in Yugoslavia while the fighting and threat of more uprisings is still around. The idea is to, after everything dies down, request to try them in International courts rather than leaving it up to Yugoslavian federal courts, though if they refuse we won't push the issue since they still have priority legal jurisdiction for now. Should they agree, there will be interesting and important precedent, but I will explain that in the deeper aspects of this policy rather than now.
The next aspect of this is that this actually creates a legal precedent for the Comintern that can aid in both future crises, and furthers the cementing of the Comintern into an actual government. You see, this is what the IOJ normally does.
I'm not saying the legal precedent itself would just let us run roughshod over member state governments mind you. Rather, I think it has the same effect on international law enforcement that former crises had for allowing interventions like we've done here, in Bharat, and other places. It's a foundational step towards normalizing it just as Comintern interventions have become normalized, if still requiring a bit of political capital to allow. When it is normalized, it no longer becomes this massive controversial argument that could shift dynamics between the Comintern and its member states forever, but rather it becomes just another argument on the necessity and degree to which the action should be taken - just as interventions themselves have. The degree the Comintern is intervening now even without the IOJ certainly wouldn't have been so easily accepted in 1975 after all. It took crises as this one to normalize it. Overall, I feel it is an important precedent to set because a government that cannot effectively enforce its laws can not be considered to govern at all. Should we wish the Comintern to continue its path of gradual internationalization, it is a most important foundation for its law enforcement.
The final aspect is then the investigation and reform, for they go hand-in-hand. This is important both for legal precedent and because it directly addresses the main concern given for "Immediate Intervention." You see, one of the things the chapter directly calls out as a concern is that immediately intervening risks normalizing the IRB being turned into a hammer against opposition, not allowing protests and reforms as we've seen so far to grow and advocate naturally. The full investigation calls for not just looking at the immediate uprising, but the root causes in lieu of the many issues exposed with Yugoslavia's government in the run-up to learn what solutions can be done by the Comintern to better aid Yugoslavia in its reform and prevent a similar crisis that could threaten the Comintern as a whole again. By acting proactively against not just the military threat, but also the systemic issues that in part led to it we have created a fair argument that we are not just acting as a hammer of destruction but also as a tool for liberation and change. This in turn further legitimizes the Comintern's own intervention.
The legal precedent then set expands the IOJ's jurisdiction just as the previous aspect did. The difference is while the deployment part of this judicial plank expands jurisdiction over physically where constitutes international law, the reform aspect would expand jurisdiction in redefining crimes against international law and human rights violations to potentially include malpractice by actors within member states towards corrupt, anti-communist, or otherwise hostile manners that could reasonably be considered to endanger the integrity of the member state, and thus the integrity of the Comintern as a whole. That is, after all, exactly what has happened here in Yugoslavia and what we would functionally be saying by considering it worthy of IOJ investigation. This is yet another important tool towards establishing a functional ability to enforce the laws of the Comintern even if it will be a more subtle matter for the moment.
I hope I have made my case well enough to all of you. Thank you those who took the time to read it through.
Now, as you can see, this plan is primarily divided into three planks: military, humanitarian, and judicial/reform. This plan is made largely as an extension and amendment of the "Immediate Intervention" option to hopefully act with the same speed while still addressing the concerns laid out within the story on the downsides of immediate intervention such that those downsides are minimized, if not eliminated. Should you be a fan of decisive and speedy action as "Immediate Intervention" and have no other concerns presented than the decisiveness of action, there should be no reason for you to not endorse the "United Front Intervention" as well as it intends to be equally quick and decisive. I therefore ask that those of you interested in Immediate Intervention give me your time to speak on the merits of my write-in and why I feel it improves on the Immediate Intervention foundation.
On the military side of things, this aims to immediately deploy and act without hesitation as immediate intervention posits. Nonetheless, it will still aim for a degree of legitimacy to it by immediately establishing coordinated operations with the constituent republics within Yugoslavia - as Yugoslavia is a federalized union of multiple republics - whom were noted in the update to be worried about this upheaval, along with any of the noted friendly organizations that have since risen up to resist this insidious plot. This allows us to not only easily build a secure logistics chain, but it also takes the burden off the IRB to be doing all this singlehandedly. As amazing as the IRB's , it is 400k people - not all of whom are even direct fighting soldiers - spread out over most of the world. Deploying IRBs to Yugoslavia will not just dump 400k soldiers there, even if that were logistically feasible on short notice or even something that we should do. Immediately working to coordinate will ensure the burden of advancement and securing territory from malicious non-state actors - because remember, these are militant groups we are fighting not actual armies as before so they are not as identifiable - is spread out between all rather than burdened onto the IRB alone. This also has the supplementary effect of ensuring we can keep any existing local government forces in check in case any of them turn out to have been infiltrated by dissident forces, lest we forget one of the republics of Yugoslavia already fell because of a police coup while Bulgarian nationalists have been pulling some shady things in the background.
Focusing more on the legitimacy aspect, coordinating with the federal republics, even if they aren't the federal government themselves, still ensures we have more than just the permission of Commons delegates to act, seeing as those might be Yugoslavian delegates but it's technically not within their authority to do more than coordinate with the Comintern and vote. It will also play well in to our budding reputation among the Comintern for protecting smaller countries against bigger, threatening regional power politics, lest we forget that Nepal joined us precisely because of that and it's been implied in updates since that other small countries have plans involving the Comintern as well. The Yugoslavian federal government may have failed to maintain itself against the forces of reaction, but the Comintern is protecting the vulnerable republics and minorities within Yugoslavia in its stead. Doing so as we are with a degree of legitimacy rather than in a heavy-handed manner of having the IRB doing it alone also minimizes the risk of the federal government becoming embittered by our intervention. This policy is overall a win-win both for our military effectiveness and for the positive effect it could potentially have on the Comintern's reputation following the end of the crisis.
The second plank is then the humanitarian aspect. This one is fairly straight-forward, and to be honest I'm pretty sure it's bog-standard Comintern policy regardless of whether it's explicitly mentioned. Nonetheless, I felt it had to be mentioned just in case. Overall the main thing is that the first step of the military plank being to establish safe areas before advancing further is not just for logistical reasons or security reasons, but also to aid this humanitarian relief. By securing specific areas (preferably ports), we can ensure refugees from affected areas have a place to retreat to until the end of this crisis. This also plays decently well into our reputation for protecting minorities, though I do not believe it will have an especially notable effect on our reputation unlike the military and judicial plank since it is bogstandard practice for us.
The final plank then is the judicial and reform aspect. This is what I am most excited for, and is both the biggest deviation from any of the standard intervention options AND potentially the most impactful for the Comintern following the crisis. This actually has multiple layers to it, from which I will start with the most shallow and work my way down. The most shallow aspect is the arrest and moving of high-profile fascists and dissidents aiding this nationalist uprising out of Yugoslavia into IOJ containment facilities is purely just a security measure. The local police have already shown to be infiltrated by such groups and Yugoslavia has proven itself rife with nationalist corruption undermining more vulnerable minorities so we can't really trust holding them in Yugoslavia while the fighting and threat of more uprisings is still around. The idea is to, after everything dies down, request to try them in International courts rather than leaving it up to Yugoslavian federal courts, though if they refuse we won't push the issue since they still have priority legal jurisdiction for now. Should they agree, there will be interesting and important precedent, but I will explain that in the deeper aspects of this policy rather than now.
The next aspect of this is that this actually creates a legal precedent for the Comintern that can aid in both future crises, and furthers the cementing of the Comintern into an actual government. You see, this is what the IOJ normally does.
Intervening in a crisis like this is technically outside of what its police force has usually handled. You see, in most cases it's dealt with external forces and captured war criminals as a result of war. This would be the first high-profile internal case for them to work on, setting a legal precedent that the Comintern can go after cases violating human rights and international law (i.e. law that the Commons passes) even when it's entirely internal rather than being external enemy actors such as if we were to overthrow the CAR and prosecute its leaders. This is theoretically already within its jurisdiction, but it's untested due to how evolving the concept of the Comintern as a government itself is. The crisis within Yugoslavia gives us the perfect legal cover to throw the IOJ into the mix. With the local police forces proven to be inflitrated, and in one case entirely taken over, by fascists and the startling exposure of massive government corruption in the build-up to the crisis, it is perfectly legitimate to insert our own more neutral (in terms of not favoring specific minorities) police into the region. To rely on the local police and law enforcement would be a proven security risk for the governments of Yugoslavia and people living within them after all.
I'm not saying the legal precedent itself would just let us run roughshod over member state governments mind you. Rather, I think it has the same effect on international law enforcement that former crises had for allowing interventions like we've done here, in Bharat, and other places. It's a foundational step towards normalizing it just as Comintern interventions have become normalized, if still requiring a bit of political capital to allow. When it is normalized, it no longer becomes this massive controversial argument that could shift dynamics between the Comintern and its member states forever, but rather it becomes just another argument on the necessity and degree to which the action should be taken - just as interventions themselves have. The degree the Comintern is intervening now even without the IOJ certainly wouldn't have been so easily accepted in 1975 after all. It took crises as this one to normalize it. Overall, I feel it is an important precedent to set because a government that cannot effectively enforce its laws can not be considered to govern at all. Should we wish the Comintern to continue its path of gradual internationalization, it is a most important foundation for its law enforcement.
The final aspect is then the investigation and reform, for they go hand-in-hand. This is important both for legal precedent and because it directly addresses the main concern given for "Immediate Intervention." You see, one of the things the chapter directly calls out as a concern is that immediately intervening risks normalizing the IRB being turned into a hammer against opposition, not allowing protests and reforms as we've seen so far to grow and advocate naturally. The full investigation calls for not just looking at the immediate uprising, but the root causes in lieu of the many issues exposed with Yugoslavia's government in the run-up to learn what solutions can be done by the Comintern to better aid Yugoslavia in its reform and prevent a similar crisis that could threaten the Comintern as a whole again. By acting proactively against not just the military threat, but also the systemic issues that in part led to it we have created a fair argument that we are not just acting as a hammer of destruction but also as a tool for liberation and change. This in turn further legitimizes the Comintern's own intervention.
The legal precedent then set expands the IOJ's jurisdiction just as the previous aspect did. The difference is while the deployment part of this judicial plank expands jurisdiction over physically where constitutes international law, the reform aspect would expand jurisdiction in redefining crimes against international law and human rights violations to potentially include malpractice by actors within member states towards corrupt, anti-communist, or otherwise hostile manners that could reasonably be considered to endanger the integrity of the member state, and thus the integrity of the Comintern as a whole. That is, after all, exactly what has happened here in Yugoslavia and what we would functionally be saying by considering it worthy of IOJ investigation. This is yet another important tool towards establishing a functional ability to enforce the laws of the Comintern even if it will be a more subtle matter for the moment.
I hope I have made my case well enough to all of you. Thank you those who took the time to read it through.
- Pronouns
- She/Her
It might be a mistake, but that's at least somewhat convincing.
[X] United Front Intervention
[X] United Front Intervention
[X] United Front Intervention
That's a very comprehensive explanation! You should be proud of yourself comrade.
[X] United Front Intervention
I'm changing my vote.
I'm changing my vote.
[X] United Front Intervention
[X] United Front Intervention
We should have learned our lesson about half-measures by now.
We should have learned our lesson about half-measures by now.
- Location
- The observable universe
Vote closed
Here we go guys prepare for the world first international judgement court