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The two most oversaturated areas of alternate history are the Civil War and World War Two. In response to this, backlash has erupted along the lines of "A victory for the Confederacy/Hitler is impossible." But nothing in history is ever that simple. Welcome to a not-so-in-depth discussion on how these lost wars could have been won. This will take as given that you have a decent knowledge of the events as they really happened.
DISCLAIMER: What follows is not my own research. It is based almost entirely off the brilliant work of military historian Bevin Alexander, who has written several excellent books on this and other topics. If you notice something that you think is wrong, it's probably from his books, and there's a good chance I won't be able to reply to it.
Alright, let's begin.
STONEWALL JACKSON'S RAID THAT NEVER WAS
One of the earliest campaigns of the US Civil War was the Shenandoah Valley Campaign conducted by Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. As the hero of the First Battle of Mannasas/Bull Run, he'd been put in charge of the small but essential Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley. And here, he almost won the war.
In spring of 1862, MClellan had gathered a force three times the size of the Confederate's force guarding Richmond. However, McClellan was too cautious, and refused to attack unless the 40,000 strong force of Irvin McDowell, which was guarding Washington, was released to join him. McClellan already had 90,000, but he insisted on getting McDowell's men too. Lincoln gave in and said that he would send McDowell's corps to join McClellan. Meanwhile, Stonewall Jackson had 4,600 men in the Shenandoah Valley opposing 23,000 men under Nathaniel Banks and 15,000 under John Fremont. Jackson was forced out of his positions at Winchester. Banks, realizing that Jackson had very few men, left 9,000 men under James Shields and took the rest of his men to join McClellan. Jackson promptly attacked at the Battle of Kernstown, and suffered a crushing defeat, losing 718 men, but the effect was massive; disbelieving that Jackson would attack without large reinforcements, Lincoln sent back most of Banks' men and ordered McDowell's corps to stay in Washington, reassuring McClellan that he would release McDowell as soon as the threat to th capital disappeared. Meanwhil, Jackson recieved reinforcements, bringing his total strength up to 14,000. An additional 2,800 were blocking Fremont. The two Union armies, with a combined force of 34,000, marched against Jackson. Jackson brilliantly led his men on the railway out of the vally, misleading everyone into thinking he was leaving (and making Banks send 9,000 men off to McDowell), before marching right back in and driving out Fremont before turning and capturing Front Royal, behind Banks' lines, and forcing Banks to abandon his storng defensive positionat Strasburg. Jackson then defeated Banks' main army at Winchester. Lincoln, ordered McDowell to attack Jackson dirctly.
And here Jackson concieved a brilliant plan.
The whole of the Union army was either tied down at Richmond or chasing him to the Shenandoah Valley. If Jackson would suddenly attack north and swep behind Washington, he could capture the undefended Baltimore and maybe even Philadelphia. He could then begin raiding the north with immunity, doing to them what Sherman later did to the South. He requested reinforcements from Davis and Lee to "raise the siege of Richmond and transfer this campaign from the banks of the Potomac to those of the Susquehanna." The plan was brilliant, visionary, and would undoubtedly have worked. Jackson defeated Fremont at Port Republic and Shields at Cross Keys, and then the reply from Richmond came: Jackson would not raid north, and would instead come to Richmond. With Jackson's men, Lee attacked McClellan in the Seven Days campaign, and won a horrendously pyrrhic victory; he pushed McClellan up against the James River at the cost of a quarter of the entire Confederate army. An opportunity for victory had been squandered.
STONEWALL JACKSON TRIES AGAIN
Stonewall Jackson didn't give up trying to convince Lee and Davis to go around th Union lines. He tried to get Lee to swing around the unguarded flank of John Pope's army on the Rapidan River trap it, forcing it into surrender (Lee agreed, but moved so slowly that Pope escaped), he then drew Pope off his defensive position to Manassas where he fought the Second Battlle of Manassas, while Lee just sat montionless on the Union flank, and then Lee invaded the North.
Jackson saw an opportunity.
If Lee would maneuver north of Washington, Lincoln would keep the Union army between Lee and Wahington. The Confderates could then march in the direction of either Baltimore or Philadelphia, forcing the Union to attack. The Confederates could take up strong positions at Groveton and defeat the Union army before capturing Baltimore or Philadelphia. Lee turned down the proposal and instead met the Union at Sharpsburg, where he won a tactical victroy but suffered a strategic loss at Antietam.
Jackson tried again at Fredericksburg, trying to convince Lee to move back to a location where, while the terrain was slightly less favorable, they could attack around Burnside's flank. Lee refused and instead fought at Fredericksburg, winning but gaining nothing.
And then came Chancellorsville.
INCHES FROM VICTORY
Joseph Hooker, nicknamed "Fighting Joe", was a surprisingly adept commander. He almost managed to win, concieving a brilliant plan that failed only becuase he lost his resolve. He launched 10,000 cavalry on a raid on the Confederate rear, while planning to attack Lee with 40,000 men while 42,000 made a wide flanking maneuver onto Lee's left flank. On April 27th, 1863, Henry Slocum took command of the 42,000 flanking troops. Two days later, the battle began with a frontal charge from Hooker to hold Lee in place. Lee, however, was abl to dispatch a division uner Richard Anderson to block Slocum, but was pushed back to Zoan Church where he entrenched.
On April 30, Slocum reached Chancellorsville. Hooker promptly sent 30,000 twoops to meet Slocum and drive east together to overwhelm Lee's left flank with immense numerical superiority. However, there was one danger. Chancellorsville was just inside the Wilderness, a wild forested region. It would be a labyrinth for any fighting force, and the Union's greatest advantage - cannon - would be negated. The Union troops had to get east of Chansellorsville quickly.
Meanwhile, the Union force directly facing the Confederates made no attempt to attack. This allowed Lee to detatch another division to aid Anderson. This left just 10,000 men at Fredericksburg, with 47,000 men facing Hooker. Hooker, however, had 70,000, and on May 1, he advanced.
At 8 AM, Jackson reached Zoan Church, and made a masterful decision; he told the Confederate troops to abandon their strong fortified position and rush at the Union soldiers. This had the desired effect, and Hooker retreated to Chancellorsville. He was in the Wilderness, and his army was now in danger. That afternoon, Lee arrived, and then Jackson made a stunning request.
If the Union army got in trouble, they would have to retreat across the Rappahannock, and the only place to do that was the United States Ford. If Jackson would capture this position, Hooker would be trapped, and the whole 70,000 strong Union force would be forced to surrender.
Lee replied "Well, go on."
On the morning of May 2, Jackson took three divisions, hike for twelve miles around the Union position, and came up on the Plank Road at 2 PM. This was the only path between him and the ford, and at 5:15 PM, he assaulted the Hunion 11th Corps guarding the road. Jackson had ordered that the Confederate forces move as fast as possible irrespective of order or confusion, but Robert Rodes, who had led the assault, stopped and waited for A. P. Hill. This gave Hooker enough time to bring up some cannon and Hiram Berry's division. It took until 8:45 PM for A. P. Hill to arrive, but despite the late hour, Jackson told him "Press them. Cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill. Press them." The attack had begun.
Meanwhile, Jackson rode out ahead to scout the road ahead, when Union cavalry general Alfred Pleasonton burst out of the woods. The charge, going through thick wood, completely collapsed. However, it put the brigade of James Lane on guard, and when Jackson rode out in front of them, they mistook him for a Union general and fired. Three bullets struck Jackson. Soon afterwards, A. P. Hill was hit by artillery fire, and command fell to Jeb Stuart, who was too far away. A stunned Hooker managed to retreat across the Rappahannock, and the South lost it's greatest chance and greatest general. Jackson died on May 10.
They had come so close, but it was all for nothing.
GETTYSBURG
Only one month after Chancellorsville, Lee decided to advance into Pennsylvania. On June 10, 1863, he began marching. The first forces entered Pennsylvania on June 27 in two different places - Carlisle and Wrightsville. On June 28, a Confederate spy reported that the Union army under Hooker's replacement, George Meade, was a few miles west of their position. Lee told his men to march on Gettysburg, thity miles south of Carlisle.
This was a terrible mistake.
At Carlisle and Wrightsville, Lee had had an amazing position. If he had ignored Meade's army and marched on Harrisburg, just twenty miles away, he could have broken the bridges on the Susquehanna and prevented the Union from crossing. He could then march north along the undefended road to Philadelphia, whose capture would win the war. Even if this was too bold, Carlisle offered a far better location to concentrate his forces, without having to march his troops so hard.
A. P. Hill's troops bumped into Union forces on the western edge of Gettysburg, and a fierce struggle ensued. By the end of the day, the Confederates had driven the Union from Gettysburg itself, but the Union had taken very strong positions on hills south of Gettysburg. James Longstreet suggested that the Confederates move towards Washington, forcing Union forces to decamp from their positions to chase them, but Lee refused. Instead, he spent three days in fruitless assaults, losing over a third of his army and destroying the Confederacy's last offensive potential.
But things weren't over for the Confederacy just yet.
TAKEN FOR GRANTED
Ulysses S. Grant is an interesting character. He had shown at Vicksburg that he was more than capable of maneuvering around his enemy, but when appointed had of the Army of the Potomac, he resorted to frontal assaults. These brought him victory at the Wilderness and Petersburg, but at immense cost. The climax of Grant's bloody offensive was Cold Harbor, one of the worst examples of frontal charges in the whole war. By 1864, Grant had managed to wring defeat out of victory, and was stuck in a useless position opposite Richmond. Elections were coming up, and it looked like McClellan would defeat Lincoln. The Union neede a victory, and Grant couldn't provide one. The victory was provided by Sherman, who in his brilliant March to the Sea, ripped the heart of the Confederacy. As this is mostly irrelevant to "How the confederacy could have won", I'm going to mostly skip over it. However, one point must be elaborated on.
On May 10, 1864, John Johnston and William Sherman faced off at Resaca. Johnston was repeatedly outflanked and driven back, first to Cassville, then to Allatoona, and finally to Atlanta. However, this whole time, Sherman had a massive weakness - there was only one rail line supplying him. Had Johnston sent cavalry to raid and cut this railway, he coul have defeated Sherman. However, the only attempt to do so was bungled with the Confederate cavalry trying to hold their section of the railroad instead of cutting it and leaving. The cavalry was defeated, Sherman captured Atlanta, and the rest is history.
Lee's army began disentegrating as troops deserted to protect their homes, and Lee was forced to retreat. Richmond fell, and the Confederacy surrendered shortly afterwards. But it was not Grant who won the war, it was Sherman. Without the March to the Sea, the bogged down Grant would have been stuck, unable to move, and the Confederacy would have kept it's independence.
CONCLUSION
The Confederacy was at an immense disadvantage in the Civil War, but that doesn't mean they couldn't have won. There were several opportunities for a Confederate victory, but they were squandered. A Confederate victory is not impossible, merely unlikely. But unlikely things have happened before, and the Confederacy could have won. (Of course, staying stable afterwards is another matter altogether. THAT is probably near-impossible. This is emphasized so no-one misses it. Winning the war is not the same as thriving afterwards.)
But what about World War 2? Nazi Germany was facing so many powers, had so many disadvantages, and so few options. How could they possibly have won?
DISCLAIMER: What follows is not my own research. It is based almost entirely off the brilliant work of military historian Bevin Alexander, who has written several excellent books on this and other topics. If you notice something that you think is wrong, it's probably from his books, and there's a good chance I won't be able to reply to it.
Alright, let's begin.
PART 1: The Confederate States of America
STONEWALL JACKSON'S RAID THAT NEVER WAS
One of the earliest campaigns of the US Civil War was the Shenandoah Valley Campaign conducted by Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. As the hero of the First Battle of Mannasas/Bull Run, he'd been put in charge of the small but essential Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley. And here, he almost won the war.
In spring of 1862, MClellan had gathered a force three times the size of the Confederate's force guarding Richmond. However, McClellan was too cautious, and refused to attack unless the 40,000 strong force of Irvin McDowell, which was guarding Washington, was released to join him. McClellan already had 90,000, but he insisted on getting McDowell's men too. Lincoln gave in and said that he would send McDowell's corps to join McClellan. Meanwhile, Stonewall Jackson had 4,600 men in the Shenandoah Valley opposing 23,000 men under Nathaniel Banks and 15,000 under John Fremont. Jackson was forced out of his positions at Winchester. Banks, realizing that Jackson had very few men, left 9,000 men under James Shields and took the rest of his men to join McClellan. Jackson promptly attacked at the Battle of Kernstown, and suffered a crushing defeat, losing 718 men, but the effect was massive; disbelieving that Jackson would attack without large reinforcements, Lincoln sent back most of Banks' men and ordered McDowell's corps to stay in Washington, reassuring McClellan that he would release McDowell as soon as the threat to th capital disappeared. Meanwhil, Jackson recieved reinforcements, bringing his total strength up to 14,000. An additional 2,800 were blocking Fremont. The two Union armies, with a combined force of 34,000, marched against Jackson. Jackson brilliantly led his men on the railway out of the vally, misleading everyone into thinking he was leaving (and making Banks send 9,000 men off to McDowell), before marching right back in and driving out Fremont before turning and capturing Front Royal, behind Banks' lines, and forcing Banks to abandon his storng defensive positionat Strasburg. Jackson then defeated Banks' main army at Winchester. Lincoln, ordered McDowell to attack Jackson dirctly.
And here Jackson concieved a brilliant plan.
The whole of the Union army was either tied down at Richmond or chasing him to the Shenandoah Valley. If Jackson would suddenly attack north and swep behind Washington, he could capture the undefended Baltimore and maybe even Philadelphia. He could then begin raiding the north with immunity, doing to them what Sherman later did to the South. He requested reinforcements from Davis and Lee to "raise the siege of Richmond and transfer this campaign from the banks of the Potomac to those of the Susquehanna." The plan was brilliant, visionary, and would undoubtedly have worked. Jackson defeated Fremont at Port Republic and Shields at Cross Keys, and then the reply from Richmond came: Jackson would not raid north, and would instead come to Richmond. With Jackson's men, Lee attacked McClellan in the Seven Days campaign, and won a horrendously pyrrhic victory; he pushed McClellan up against the James River at the cost of a quarter of the entire Confederate army. An opportunity for victory had been squandered.
STONEWALL JACKSON TRIES AGAIN
Stonewall Jackson didn't give up trying to convince Lee and Davis to go around th Union lines. He tried to get Lee to swing around the unguarded flank of John Pope's army on the Rapidan River trap it, forcing it into surrender (Lee agreed, but moved so slowly that Pope escaped), he then drew Pope off his defensive position to Manassas where he fought the Second Battlle of Manassas, while Lee just sat montionless on the Union flank, and then Lee invaded the North.
Jackson saw an opportunity.
If Lee would maneuver north of Washington, Lincoln would keep the Union army between Lee and Wahington. The Confderates could then march in the direction of either Baltimore or Philadelphia, forcing the Union to attack. The Confederates could take up strong positions at Groveton and defeat the Union army before capturing Baltimore or Philadelphia. Lee turned down the proposal and instead met the Union at Sharpsburg, where he won a tactical victroy but suffered a strategic loss at Antietam.
Jackson tried again at Fredericksburg, trying to convince Lee to move back to a location where, while the terrain was slightly less favorable, they could attack around Burnside's flank. Lee refused and instead fought at Fredericksburg, winning but gaining nothing.
And then came Chancellorsville.
INCHES FROM VICTORY
Joseph Hooker, nicknamed "Fighting Joe", was a surprisingly adept commander. He almost managed to win, concieving a brilliant plan that failed only becuase he lost his resolve. He launched 10,000 cavalry on a raid on the Confederate rear, while planning to attack Lee with 40,000 men while 42,000 made a wide flanking maneuver onto Lee's left flank. On April 27th, 1863, Henry Slocum took command of the 42,000 flanking troops. Two days later, the battle began with a frontal charge from Hooker to hold Lee in place. Lee, however, was abl to dispatch a division uner Richard Anderson to block Slocum, but was pushed back to Zoan Church where he entrenched.
On April 30, Slocum reached Chancellorsville. Hooker promptly sent 30,000 twoops to meet Slocum and drive east together to overwhelm Lee's left flank with immense numerical superiority. However, there was one danger. Chancellorsville was just inside the Wilderness, a wild forested region. It would be a labyrinth for any fighting force, and the Union's greatest advantage - cannon - would be negated. The Union troops had to get east of Chansellorsville quickly.
Meanwhile, the Union force directly facing the Confederates made no attempt to attack. This allowed Lee to detatch another division to aid Anderson. This left just 10,000 men at Fredericksburg, with 47,000 men facing Hooker. Hooker, however, had 70,000, and on May 1, he advanced.
At 8 AM, Jackson reached Zoan Church, and made a masterful decision; he told the Confederate troops to abandon their strong fortified position and rush at the Union soldiers. This had the desired effect, and Hooker retreated to Chancellorsville. He was in the Wilderness, and his army was now in danger. That afternoon, Lee arrived, and then Jackson made a stunning request.
If the Union army got in trouble, they would have to retreat across the Rappahannock, and the only place to do that was the United States Ford. If Jackson would capture this position, Hooker would be trapped, and the whole 70,000 strong Union force would be forced to surrender.
Lee replied "Well, go on."
On the morning of May 2, Jackson took three divisions, hike for twelve miles around the Union position, and came up on the Plank Road at 2 PM. This was the only path between him and the ford, and at 5:15 PM, he assaulted the Hunion 11th Corps guarding the road. Jackson had ordered that the Confederate forces move as fast as possible irrespective of order or confusion, but Robert Rodes, who had led the assault, stopped and waited for A. P. Hill. This gave Hooker enough time to bring up some cannon and Hiram Berry's division. It took until 8:45 PM for A. P. Hill to arrive, but despite the late hour, Jackson told him "Press them. Cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill. Press them." The attack had begun.
Meanwhile, Jackson rode out ahead to scout the road ahead, when Union cavalry general Alfred Pleasonton burst out of the woods. The charge, going through thick wood, completely collapsed. However, it put the brigade of James Lane on guard, and when Jackson rode out in front of them, they mistook him for a Union general and fired. Three bullets struck Jackson. Soon afterwards, A. P. Hill was hit by artillery fire, and command fell to Jeb Stuart, who was too far away. A stunned Hooker managed to retreat across the Rappahannock, and the South lost it's greatest chance and greatest general. Jackson died on May 10.
They had come so close, but it was all for nothing.
GETTYSBURG
Only one month after Chancellorsville, Lee decided to advance into Pennsylvania. On June 10, 1863, he began marching. The first forces entered Pennsylvania on June 27 in two different places - Carlisle and Wrightsville. On June 28, a Confederate spy reported that the Union army under Hooker's replacement, George Meade, was a few miles west of their position. Lee told his men to march on Gettysburg, thity miles south of Carlisle.
This was a terrible mistake.
At Carlisle and Wrightsville, Lee had had an amazing position. If he had ignored Meade's army and marched on Harrisburg, just twenty miles away, he could have broken the bridges on the Susquehanna and prevented the Union from crossing. He could then march north along the undefended road to Philadelphia, whose capture would win the war. Even if this was too bold, Carlisle offered a far better location to concentrate his forces, without having to march his troops so hard.
A. P. Hill's troops bumped into Union forces on the western edge of Gettysburg, and a fierce struggle ensued. By the end of the day, the Confederates had driven the Union from Gettysburg itself, but the Union had taken very strong positions on hills south of Gettysburg. James Longstreet suggested that the Confederates move towards Washington, forcing Union forces to decamp from their positions to chase them, but Lee refused. Instead, he spent three days in fruitless assaults, losing over a third of his army and destroying the Confederacy's last offensive potential.
But things weren't over for the Confederacy just yet.
TAKEN FOR GRANTED
Ulysses S. Grant is an interesting character. He had shown at Vicksburg that he was more than capable of maneuvering around his enemy, but when appointed had of the Army of the Potomac, he resorted to frontal assaults. These brought him victory at the Wilderness and Petersburg, but at immense cost. The climax of Grant's bloody offensive was Cold Harbor, one of the worst examples of frontal charges in the whole war. By 1864, Grant had managed to wring defeat out of victory, and was stuck in a useless position opposite Richmond. Elections were coming up, and it looked like McClellan would defeat Lincoln. The Union neede a victory, and Grant couldn't provide one. The victory was provided by Sherman, who in his brilliant March to the Sea, ripped the heart of the Confederacy. As this is mostly irrelevant to "How the confederacy could have won", I'm going to mostly skip over it. However, one point must be elaborated on.
On May 10, 1864, John Johnston and William Sherman faced off at Resaca. Johnston was repeatedly outflanked and driven back, first to Cassville, then to Allatoona, and finally to Atlanta. However, this whole time, Sherman had a massive weakness - there was only one rail line supplying him. Had Johnston sent cavalry to raid and cut this railway, he coul have defeated Sherman. However, the only attempt to do so was bungled with the Confederate cavalry trying to hold their section of the railroad instead of cutting it and leaving. The cavalry was defeated, Sherman captured Atlanta, and the rest is history.
Lee's army began disentegrating as troops deserted to protect their homes, and Lee was forced to retreat. Richmond fell, and the Confederacy surrendered shortly afterwards. But it was not Grant who won the war, it was Sherman. Without the March to the Sea, the bogged down Grant would have been stuck, unable to move, and the Confederacy would have kept it's independence.
CONCLUSION
The Confederacy was at an immense disadvantage in the Civil War, but that doesn't mean they couldn't have won. There were several opportunities for a Confederate victory, but they were squandered. A Confederate victory is not impossible, merely unlikely. But unlikely things have happened before, and the Confederacy could have won. (Of course, staying stable afterwards is another matter altogether. THAT is probably near-impossible. This is emphasized so no-one misses it. Winning the war is not the same as thriving afterwards.)
But what about World War 2? Nazi Germany was facing so many powers, had so many disadvantages, and so few options. How could they possibly have won?
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