German POW Physicists React to the Hiroshima Bombing

Uh, A. The US never actually invaded the Home Islands, and B. The US military absolutely planned to use nukes during Downfall.

Look, Willyvereb's overall point is that the atomic bombings were not expected to bring the Japanese to surrender on their own (and arguably didn't). Most still expected an invasion or a blockade to be necessary to actually end the whole thing. Thus, you can't really praise any of the decision makers involved for using what they all considered just another step in the plan.

I am pointing that the atomic bombings was hoped to end the war, many argued against their use in strategic targets like they were because the production of nuclear weapons was slow and it was considered every one would be needed for Downfall.

Operation Starvation and Downfall were combined looking at tens of millions of Japanese deaths since the next step in Starvation was to destroy every field the USAAF could. Downfall was expected to face almost every civilian to be armed and attacking in human wave assaults, mass kamikaze attacks by the remaining Japanese aircraft, and one final charge by the IJN with every remaining large ship having just enough fuel to reach expected landing areas.

Now not every civilian would willingly join the attacks but millions would, millions more would be swept along with them, and those who refuse would face repercussions from the true believers.
 
If you think they did not save lives what action do you think would have been superior?
Not doing anything?
Stage a coup with the dissatisfied masses?
I am not a military planner and even if were I neither lived during WW2 nor studied it in such depth of detail to tell you the "awesome tactical plan in hindsight X" which is undoubtedly superior to whatever savage gaijin of the past century could've thought of.
/sarcasm

If the nukes were not used to end the war why were they not employed alongside the invasion as some proposed?
This is a loaded question.
Thankfully I have the answer. Why do you think USA only planned to drop two nukes? They had more in the making.
There's no "if" neither "or" in this scenario. Dropping nukes before the invasion is not exclusive to the idea to dropping nukes during the invasion, as well.

Edit: I do not like your wording saying a bombing will kill 90% of a city, it may destroy large amounts of structure but would not approach anywhere near that in terms of lives lost.
Yeah, lives lost is a bit harder to estimate with the percentages. Large cities were less populated already out of caution as US air raids targeted them, for example.
But the bombs dropped at Hiroshima destroyed about 60-70% of the city while fire bomb raids could approach 97% or so.
Look, I am not using the nuke as a label to declare USA's actions in WW2 as a special kind of evil. Shocking, I know. There's quite a big stigma on nukes nowadays with a good reason. But considering they were in the middle of the mess called total war it was really just the difference of dropping one super bomb instead of many smaller ones.
I'm of the opinion that the Japanese recognizing the futility of their plans and surrendering was most likely a matter of "when", not "if". I also rather disagree with the notion that the atom bomb had no influence upon that. Looking at the Japanese decision making apparatus, it is clear that the atom bomb accelerated the end of the war war by a noticeable amount of time (we're talking some months here), and in doing so saved more lives then it took. My attitude is actually the same for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria...

Speaking of which, one of the interesting things I recently realized is that much the same accusations that is levied against the atom bomb can likewise be hurled at the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.
Citations needed. Soviets were already invading Manchuria and that pretty much bound the hands of the Japanese political leadership.
For a while they didn't fight for victory but for peace talks where they can preserve their government and preferably avoid trial. With the Soviets at their doorsteps IIRC things pretty much were over within days, not months.
Japan capitulated to the USA before they'd be forced to do that to the Soviets or both.

I am pointing that the atomic bombings was hoped to end the war, many argued against their use in strategic targets like they were because the production of nuclear weapons was slow and it was considered every one would be needed for Downfall.

Operation Starvation and Downfall were combined looking at tens of millions of Japanese deaths since the next step in Starvation was to destroy every field the USAAF could. Downfall was expected to face almost every civilian to be armed and attacking in human wave assaults, mass kamikaze attacks by the remaining Japanese aircraft, and one final charge by the IJN with every remaining large ship having just enough fuel to reach expected landing areas.

Now not every civilian would willingly join the attacks but millions would, millions more would be swept along with them, and those who refuse would face repercussions from the true believers.
Operation Downfall was a measure of last resort. And believe me if it were necessary then Japan wouldn't have been scared of nukes, either.
The emerging Soviet push and Japan's intense fear of dealing with them would've forced the leadership to capitulate to the USA, anyways.
 
There were many factors in the Japanese surrender and even after the bombings and a soviet invasion and it almost didn't happen when it did because of an attempted palace coup aimed at preventing the recording of the emperor calling for surrender from being broadcast.

Though to be honest while the soviets likely would have taken all of Korea instead of part of it but I don't think they had the ships required for a full scale invasion of the Japanese homeland itself, the only power with that capability in 1945 was the US. More likely the soviets would have after overrunning Korea would have gone to destroy the Japanese armies in China putting the communists there in a even better position to defeat the nationalists.
 
There were many factors in the Japanese surrender and even after the bombings and a soviet invasion and it almost didn't happen when it did because of an attempted palace coup aimed at preventing the recording of the emperor calling for surrender from being broadcast.

Though to be honest while the soviets likely would have taken all of Korea instead of part of it but I don't think they had the ships required for a full scale invasion of the Japanese homeland itself, the only power with that capability in 1945 was the US. More likely the soviets would have after overrunning Korea would have gone to destroy the Japanese armies in China putting the communists there in a even better position to defeat the nationalists.
Makes sense but from what I vaguely remember the Japanese leadership had an almost irrational fear from the approach of the Soviets.
Maybe what they feared is that if Soviets contribute more in the war then perhaps Japan cannot avoid to involve them in the peace talks?
I mean that puts a stricter deadline on their actions than waiting for the Soviets to invade the mainland. With Soviets as a legit belligerent against Japan they were ought to have more say in things.
 
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Also relations between the US and the soviets was already souring in the final year of the war which likely fed into Truman's calculations when it came to the war and ending it. Both the soviets and the US were planning for the post war period and very, very distrustful of each other.
 
By not do anything do you include ending Operation Starvation?

The US did not plan to drop only 2 nukes and many argued to not use those nukes on their historic targets, I am asking why were they not saved for Downfall like so many asked if they were not intended to help bring a more swift end to the war.


Also, for the Soviet invasion thing it would not happen in a realistic time frame, they could do it eventually but they were not focusing on the necessary production of long range fighters and most models they had in production lacked the range to screen any landing ships from kamikazes (who at this point were training to hit landing ships).

Their sealift capacity was woefully insufficient and lacked naval landing experience. Eventually they could do it but that is because Japan was running out of effective methods of opposition.

Part of the fear came from a belief they could not really negotiate with the Soviets, remember Japan planned to negotiate terms right up until the very end with the US but did not see such a possibility with the Soviets anymore.
 

We do have the minutes of the meetings of the Japanese meetings before and after Nagasaki. We have Anami, the single biggest supporter of continued resistance, going from confidently predicting the Americans only had the one bomb to panically saying that they had thousands. And we have him discussing with great fear the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. It's clear that both events terribly shocked them.

Soviets were already invading Manchuria and that pretty much bound the hands of the Japanese political leadership.

And the atom bomb had already fallen on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yes, the Japanese were reacting to recent events. And bears shit in the woods. Any other flagrantly obvious observations you'd care to share?

For a while they didn't fight for victory but for peace talks where they can preserve their government and preferably avoid trial. With the Soviets at their doorsteps IIRC things pretty much were over within days, not months.

And when the atom bomb came down, things were over in days and not months. The atom bomb accelerated things by some months. The Soviets also accelerated things by some months. Which is my point. Without the atom bomb or the Soviets, the Japanese probably would have capitulated in September or October. Without the atom bomb and the Soviets, we're likely looking at November.

Mind, I'm not discounting the possibility that Japan would not surrender at all without the bomb and/or the Soviets, but even OTL its possible they wouldn't have quit without the Soviets and/or atom bomb. All Anami would have had to do is back that coup attempt...

Japan capitulated to the USA before they'd be forced to do that to the Soviets or both.

Japan capitulated when the national leadership came to a consensus to capitulate. That consensus formed slowly during the course of summer 1945. Without the bomb and/or without the Soviets, it would have taken longer.
 
The US did not plan to drop only 2 nukes and many argued to not use those nukes on their historic targets, I am asking why were they not saved for Downfall like so many asked if they were not intended to help bring a more swift end to the war.
Well, for starters, they were ramping up production and only planned to use a certain number anyway in Downfall, and for another there was growing consensus in the Navy and Army Air Force that Downfall was a terrible idea, and they were lobbying pretty heavily against it by August. That probably factored into AAF calculations when using the bombs.
 
Well, for starters, they were ramping up production and only planned to use a certain number anyway in Downfall, and for another there was growing consensus in the Navy and Army Air Force that Downfall was a terrible idea, and they were lobbying pretty heavily against it by August. That probably factored into AAF calculations when using the bombs.

They planned to use what was available based on production estimates feeling they would be important to destroying the various heavily entrenched areas they expected to encounter.

I do not know about the USAAF but the Army supported Downfall and Navy supported Starvation, it was your pretty standard inter-service operation competition where each favored the operation they took the forefront on.
 
The Soviet entry into the war was a major military blow to Japan, and this immediately:

1) It destroyed the Kwantung Army, the last major formation outside Japan that could have been brought back as reserves for the defence of the home islands.

2) A large proportion of coal (up to 40% iirc) was from Formosa, Korea and Manchuria. Of a total of 55 million tonnes. US production in 1945 was 600 million tonnes.

3) Likewise, large amounts of food was from the continent. The already meagre rations would have been further reduced.

The threat of a direct Soviet invasion was relatively minor compared to that of the Western Allies.

But what the Japanese leadership feared above all was that the entry of the Soviets would activate Japanese communists and greatly increase the chance of them taking over.

And nothing was worse in the nightmares of the Japanese leadership than a communist Japan.
 
Makes sense but from what I vaguely remember the Japanese leadership had an almost irrational fear from the approach of the Soviets.
Maybe what they feared is that if Soviets contribute more in the war then perhaps Japan cannot avoid to involve them in the peace talks?
I mean that puts a stricter deadline on their actions than waiting for the Soviets to invade the mainland. With Soviets as a legit belligerent against Japan they were ought to have more say in things.
The Japanese had been counting on their Non-aggression pact with Stalin holding him back for at least a year and his being a reliable channel for negotiations. Why they were counting on this is kinda hard to understand-sure the treaty was in force until 1946, but Stalin had finished with Germany. When they realized that Molotov had lied to them, their last hope withered on the vine.
 
What about the nightmares of Western leadership?

You underestimate level of anti-communist sentiment in the major Fascist governments in the Axis. Fighting against the Reds was a huge part of why these authoritarian governments came into existence, and why conservatives and business leaders tolerated these new governments. These were the nations that created the Anti-ComIntern pact. Also, one of the key laws that ended free speech in Imperial Japan was specifically targeted at communism.

This was the Public Security Preservation Law of 1925

Article 1
Anyone who organizes a group for the purpose of changing the national polity (kokutai) or of denying the private property system, or anyone who knowingly participates in said group, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offense not actually carried out shall also be subject to punishment.
Article 2
Anyone who consults with another person on matters relating to the implementation of these objectives described in clause 1 of the preceding article shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding seven years.
Article 3
Anyone who instigates others for the purpose of implementing those objectives described in clause 1, article 1, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding seven years.
Article 4
Anyone who instigates others to engage in rioting or assault or other crimes inflicting harm on life, person, or property for the purpose of attaining the objectives of clause 1, article 1, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years.
Article 5
Anyone who, for the purpose of committing those crimes described in clause 1, article 1, and in the preceding three articles, provides money and goods or other financial advantages for others, or makes an offer or commitment for same, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding five years. Anyone who knowingly receives such considerations, or makes demand or commitment for same, shall be punished in a similar manner.
Article 6
Anyone who has committed the crimes described in the three preceding articles and has surrendered himself voluntarily to the authorities shall have his sentence reduced or be granted immunity from prosecution.
Article 7
This law shall be made applicable to anyone who commits crimes described in this law outside of the jurisdiction in which this law is in effect.

While the kokutai clause ended up being more important in the long run, since kokutai was so poorly defined that it could be stretched to imprison anyone, it is clear that the writers considered protecting private property rights to be more important.
 
Anyone who thinks the allies didn't view the soviets should remember Churchill ordered the planning of operation unthinkable in 1945 and beyond that Truman ordered the planning of Operation Totality in august 1945 for nuking soviet 20 cities including Moscow as a bluff to make the soviets think he had that amount of nukes ready to go against them.
 
Certainly not with the depth of ingrained racism pervading all levels of western thinking from the bottom to the top. The Japanese could not possibly be people like the rest of us. They're backwards savages and fanatics because they had the audacity to fight hard for something they believed in! Who does that right? Who would resist democracy???

... that's not what the higher levels thought. At all. The intelligence officer who was directly responsible for MacArthur's psyops campaign had a Japanese ambassador as an in-law. The American soldiers--- MacArthur included--- behaved like they wee starstruck and or giddy whenever they interacted with the emperor or participated in duck hunts in the palace. They had a constant and well documented bias towards Japanese Imperial mysticism, to the point they rejected all the reports coming in after the war which made it clear the people no longer respected the emperor and were expecting the Americans to force him to abdicate at minimum. If anything, MacArthur's staff was packed full of the forerunner to modern American weeaboos.

You're being silly. You should feel silly.
 
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... that's not what the higher levels thought. At all. The intelligence officer who was directly responsible for MacArthur's psyops campaign had a Japanese ambassador as an in-law. The American soldiers--- MacArthur included--- behaved like they wee starstruck and or giddy whenever they interacted with the emperor or participated in duck hunts in the palace. They had a constant and well documented bias towards Japanese Imperial mysticism, to the point they rejected all the reports coming in after the war which made it clear the people no longer respected the emperor and were expecting the Americans to force him to abdicate at minimum. If anything, MacArthur's staff was packed full of the forerunner to modern American weeaboos.
I remember that as well, but I exactly remember where from. Got any sources I could look up, please?
 
... that's not what the higher levels thought. At all. The intelligence officer who was directly responsible for MacArthur's psyops campaign had a Japanese ambassador as an in-law. The American soldiers--- MacArthur included--- behaved like they wee starstruck and or giddy whenever they interacted with the emperor or participated in duck hunts in the palace. They had a constant and well documented bias towards Japanese Imperial mysticism, to the point they rejected all the reports coming in after the war which made it clear the people no longer respected the emperor and were expecting the Americans to force him to abdicate at minimum. If anything, MacArthur's staff was packed full of the forerunner to modern American weeaboos.

You're being silly. You should feel silly.

A minor point but I have never seen any evidence from any historical sources even remotely even suggested that the Japanese people no longer respected the emperor and expected he would be forced to abdicate even from anti-Japanese biased histories.
 
A minor point but I have never seen any evidence from any historical sources even remotely even suggested that the Japanese people no longer respected the emperor and expected he would be forced to abdicate even from anti-Japanese biased histories.
The Japanese Communist Party and its various subfactions, subgroups, and splinter factions gained a lot of support in the populace after the Emperor surrendered, so much that it's speculated MacArthur rushed the (re-)installation of the Emperor as the new head of head of state to check their power. Support for the Emperor was an all-time low just after the Japanese surrender, as people (rightly) felt like he had failed to check the military's mad expeditions and overreach that led to Japan's urban centres getting firebombed/nuked and ordinary people to starve and suffer conscription and abuse by military officers.

Hell, the Americans even made deals with the fucking yakuza to beat down the various communist groups in the streets. "We are all democrats now," said by a yakuza oyabun as he was released from prison where he was thrown by the Imperial regime.

(Can't exactly remember where it's from, but there was a really damn good book about life in Japan and its politics during WWII written by a Japanese historian that relates this anecdote. It caused an uproar when it was released in the seventies or eighties. Can't remember the title for the life of me, though. Damn it.)
 
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I remember that as well, but I exactly remember where from. Got any sources I could look up, please?

Embracing Defeat by John Dower is pretty much entirely dedicated to this subject.

EDIT:


A minor point but I have never seen any evidence from any historical sources even remotely even suggested that the Japanese people no longer respected the emperor and expected he would be forced to abdicate even from anti-Japanese biased histories.

How about Japanese secret police records? What about imperial claimants or the Emperor himself researching precedence and bringing in outside experts on the British monarchy for abdication after the surrender? All of this is brought up in Embracing defeat although these screenshots only cover a couple of the points.


 
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Being applied after the fact vs being considered at the time is orthogonal to whether or not they're true though.
If we're talking about the application of violence by state actors during war and whether they are justified, it's certainly not "orthogonal". :wtf:

Ex post facto justifications for violence are not and have never been acceptable when interpreting the actions of individuals through the lens of normal criminal law, never even mind the laws of war. What matters is the knowledge, the means, and the alternatives to the course taken available at the time the decision was made.

EDIT: To make it bluntly clear, this is how you have actions that would normally be war crimes (such as killing civilians, attacking or destroying protected buildings, or killing human shields) be not a war crime. Because context matters.
 
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If we're talking about the application of violence by state actors during war and whether they are justified, it's certainly not "orthogonal". :wtf:

Ex post facto justifications for violence are not and have never been acceptable when interpreting the actions of individuals through the lens of normal criminal law, never even mind the laws of war. What matters is the knowledge, the means, and the alternatives to the course taken available at the time the decision was made.

EDIT: To make it bluntly clear, this is how you have actions that would normally be war crimes (such as killing civilians, attacking or destroying protected buildings, or killing human shields) be not a war crime. Because context matters.

Okay. What was the alternative?

Forewarning: do nothing is not an ethically acceptable answer.
 
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