Did Big Pharma Invent Trans Girls? Let's Read: Bob Ostertag's Sex, Science, Self. A Social History of Estrogen, Testosterone, and Identity.

Introduction (pp. 1-7)

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Just the other week, I was doing a little bit of research while working on my book. To be precise, I was trying to find out the exact date and circumstances of the first laboratory synthesis of estrogen. In the process, it struck me how while I can name at least three different books about the culture and history of testosterone (Cordelia Fine's Testosterone Rex, Rebecca Jordan-Young and Katrina Karkazis' Testosterone: An Unauthorized Biography, and Carole Hooven's Testosterone: The Story of the Hormone that Dominates and Divides Us), I could not recall ever coming across an analogous study of the distaff counterpart "male hormone". So I dug deeper, and found a few potentially promising volumes, chief among them being Bob Ostertag's Sex, Science, Self. A Social History of Estrogen, Testosterone, and Identity, published in 2016 by the University of Boston Press. The book billed itself as a critical history of hormone therapy, with a special focus on how such therapies were and continue to be marketed and employed. As the big fan of science and technology studies that I am, I was immediately sold. I acquired a copy and started reading.

Soon enough, my interest shifted into a sharp sense of frustration. Partially it is because, and let us be blunt here, Sex, Science, Self is a transphobic book. I understand that the author did not intend it to be such, and to a degree I can almost empathize with that, but that does not substantially change what the takeaway from his writing is. Ostertag's work represents the kind of transphobia that is perhaps least represented in the contemporary landscape of the culture war surrounding trans people: it is a one that derives not from socially conservative, religious right wing positions, nor one that has its roots in trans-exclusionary feminism. Instead, it is a queer transphobia, based in a particular understanding of queerness (especially as routed through radical gay politics of the 80s and the 90s), and which has its intellectual origins in the anti-psychiatry movement and variants of queer anti-capitalism. It is an intellectual position which enjoyed a degree of popularity in the 90s, and is today mostly marginal within queer studies. Nonetheless, it pioneered a series of practically, if not intentionally, anti–trans arguments that have made their way to more mainstream and more vicious forms of anti-trans rhetoric, and as such it deserves attention. Hence, Sex, Science, Self.

But really, the actual reason why the book frustrates me so is that it is not that great as a piece of scholarship. It has a number of relatively obvious flaws—and very telling ones, at that. In a way, Sex, Science, Self shows how not to research transness, and more importantly, how not to do critical history. This is not to say that it is worthless: it very clearly isn't, and especially the parts of it devoted to studying the history of the emergence of the sex hormone markets are useful, as reference material if nothing else. But when it comes to analysis—well, things get complicated then.

Here, I'd like to quickly go through the introduction to the book and use it as a demonstration of what I mean both by queer transphobia, and by bad scholarship. If there is enough interest, I may possibly end up providing a let's read of the rest of Sex, Science, Self, but due to the number of obligations I am procrastinating on by writing this, I can't promise that it will happen.

Anyway.

Sex, Science, Self.

Article:
My hope is that this book will be useful for anyone who has taken estrogen or testosterone, or considered doing so, for any reason. Given the sales figures for these products, and the advertising that has accompanied those sales, this includes many millions of Americans. When I began this project, my interest was more narrowly focused. I wanted to write a book, first and foremost, for young people wondering if they should begin hormone treatment in order to undergo what has become known as "transitioning" between genders. And their families. And their friends. This group has recently grown far larger than it was in even the recent past.

This turn to pharmaceuticals is coloring queer culture more generally. Beginning in the 1960s, one of the principle rights demanded by queer activists was the right to be left alone by doctors. Today, one of the principle rights demanded by queer activists is the right to receive medical treatment. This fact alone merits our attention. What were the causes and what will be the consequences of this about-face? The medical industry is a powerful and complicated beast, with billions of dollars, entrenched hierarchies of power and authority, and a rapidly expanding arsenal of technologies. In seeking not to isolate ourselves from that beast but rather to embrace it more fully, queer culture is changing in ways both subtle and profound.
Source: p. 1


Bob Ostertag is undoubtedly a veteran of the gay movement—a man who has been involved in it since the seventies, and as such has seen several decades of activism. It is a perspective he purposefully centers in his writing, partially to preemptively deflect accusations of an anti-queer bias (more on that later). And in those opening words, he lays out, relatively clearly, what Sex, Science, Self is supposed to be: a critical history of the rise of the pharmaceutical hormone industry, as understood through the lens of radical queer activism.

And in the same paragraph, he also demonstrates an issue that plagues his work from the very start. It lies in the mention of the demand made by "queer activists" in the 1960s. Obviously, this is a mental shorthand: Ostertag knows very well that "queer" activism, or activism that refers to itself as "queer" comes much later than that (it develops in the late 80s, to be specific). What he is referring to, here, is the new gay liberation movement which grows out of the dissatisfaction with the mostly tepid and assimilationist politics of the 50s homophile activism, and out of a fascination with various radical social movements of the 60s, including the Civil Rights Movement, student anti-war protests, and the general birth of the so-called New Left. One could charge this formulation with being anachronistic, but for reasons I'll outline shortly, I don't really care all that much. What I care for, however, is that by implying a direct continuity between the gay liberation movement and the contemporary trans demands for gender-affirming care, he collapses gay liberation and early trans activism together into one blob. And while it's true that it was trans women who led the Stonewall riot, those two movements were not synonymous at all. Early trans activism has made its own slew of material demands, including demands for transition access, social justice, and so on which were not congruent with gay liberation calls for demedicalisation of homosexuality. Already in the 70s (if not earlier), there were people asking to be left alone by the doctors, and the people asking to be cared for by those doctors: and they were not the same. However, by positing that the movements were always one, Ostertag can then charge trans activism with the loss of the radical, emancipatory position of skepticism towards the establishment medicine. More broadly, however, this also shows Ostertag's lack of attention towards trans history as trans history, not simply an off-shoot of the mainline gay history that he is better-attuned to.

Article:
But there's more. Estrogen and testosterone, the so-called sex hormones, have become important to the queer community for reasons that go far beyond their use in transgender "transitioning." The idea that queers are "born that way" because of prenatal exposure to "sex hormones" has become the foundation on which many of the social and political claims of the community rest—enshrined in judicial rulings, legislation, health insurance policies, and medical practice, emblazoned on t-shirts, banners, and placards, and sung in pop songs. Few are aware that the science behind this claim, currently known as "brain organization theory," is shaky to nonexistent. Even fewer are aware that this same research is routinely invoked for social and political ends many would find appalling. When Lawrence Summers, one of the most powerful men in the nation and at the time the president of Harvard University, provoked a furor by arguing that men outperform women in math and science because of genetic differences between men and women, he was invoking exactly the same research used by queers to claim that they too are "born that way."
Source: p. 1-2


Here is the other problem with Ostertag's basic assumptions. Briefly setting aside the use of scare-quotes around the word "transition", here the author makes a very bold, but rather shaky claim that is at the center of his book. He assumes that the logic animating gender transition is broadly comparable to the one behind the "brain organisation theory" and various attempts at finding the gay gene and explaining away homosexuality through flatly biological terms.

This, incidentally, is I think the crux of his entire work, as it reflects the core anxiety behind Sex, Science, Self: Ostertag's eminently justified dislike of attempts to provide a medical justification for homosexual desire becomes projected on any kind of an attempt to associate sex, gender, and biology. It is a position that has strong roots in critical humanities, especially feminism and queer theory, which share a deep and abiding distrust of attempts to understand human diversity through reference to their biology. However, it is also a position which, as many STS scholars show, is based on a misunderstanding of biology as the static, pre-cultural, and ultimately unconstructed oppositional pair to the fluid and historical culture. As writers like Elizabeth Wilson or Donna Haraway show, this type of thinking ultimately cannot help but to reinforce the image of biology as the domain of the unassailable, non-political truth. In other words, Ostertag implicitly makes a claim that reinforces the nature-culture dualism, instead of interrogating how the distinction between "nature" and "culture" is being created for political ends. Put a pin in that: this will be a running theme.

Incidentally, his ability to make such claims also betrays a broad lack of familiarity with the scholarship in the field he is engaging with. His book was published in 2016, which means he probably wrote it between 2014 and 2015. The troubling thing is that the statement that "few are aware" of the problems with brain organization theory is either flatly wrong in a way that is self-contradictory (Ostertag will shortly cite a lot of scholarship which denies the notion), or shows how Ostertag is starting to construct a model of the "trans community" which is completely inattentive towards trans scholarship itself. I have never met a trans person who explained their use of hormones through reference to various theories of the "sex of the brain", and yet Ostertag seems intent on proving that this is the governing logic.

But of course, as Ostertag rightly notes, this is not just a trans thing. He follows those opening paragraphs with a mention about how his intellectual project expanded during research. Instead of focusing purely on trans people, he instead sets his aim on hormone therapies in general, for both cis and trans folk, correctly noting that Americans consume hormones at prodigious rates for a variety of ends, only some of which have to do with transitioning. At the same time, however, he also gets lost in this expanded perspective, as his implicit assumption is that the rise on transgender visibility has to do with the rise in hormone use; this is a techno-determinist argument that has a long history (to which I will return, too). This assumption practically erases any sort of concern about the different ways that hormones are procured and used by different populations, which will then enable Ostertag to follow it with his suspicion that Big Pharma is pushing hormones onto the community, and the expansion of transness is merely indicative of that.

This is the part, incidentally, where my alarm bells started to go off.

Next, he proceeds to argue that we know relatively little about the long-term effects of hormone use, and charges trans people and queer activists with incuriosity about that. Now, I am not an endocrinologist (and neither is he, really), so I can't argue with or against this point. What I can say, however, is that there is some dubious historiography happening here. To demonstrate:

Article:
This troubled me. Yes, of course, we should know what dose to take, but surely there were bigger questions to ask. The idea that gender has a chemical essence, or that taking a pill can cause one's gender to "transition," are extraordinary claims. They cannot have just fallen from the sky. They must have a long history. Does anyone know it? Doesn't anyone want to learn about it? And what do we really know about the effects of long-term use? Are these well understood?

To my surprise, few even seemed curious about such questions. To the contrary, I encountered more than a little hostility for even asking them. This was especially striking since so much of the intellectual energy fueling transgender activism comes from that part of academia that takes pride in deconstructing ideas scientists take as given. Why were hormones getting a free pass?
Source: p. 3


First of all, they did not. Paul B. Preciado's wildly popular auto-theoretical study of testosterone, its history, its involvement in the market economy, and its potential use a bio-hacking tool has been available in English since 2013—a no small feat for a book originally written in Spanish, given the broad incuriosity of the American academic world for works that to not originate in the Anglophone sphere. In fact, the absence of Preciado's work (however one may feel about it) from Ostertag's study is absolutely striking, as it represents a bare failure to engage with then-leading scholarship.

Secondly, however, and more importantly, Ostertag own incuriosity about trans studies leads him to ignoring the fact that the relative paucity of scholarship focusing on the history of technologies of gender transition, especially when it comes to hormones, was also the product of the broad lack of scholarship on the history of transness in general. Ostertag wrote near the start of the period marked by a rapid proliferation of trans studies, and within a few years of the publication of Sex, Science, Self, there was already a broad variety of books in the field touching precisely on the problems that he named. To name but a few: Jules Gill-Peteron's landmark Histories of the Transgender Child, Emma Heaney The New Woman, or Ruth Pearce's Understanding Trans Health.

I am willing to give Ostertag a pass here: obviously, he could not have consulted works that had not yet been written while he was working on his study. However, I have serious doubts as to his assertion about trans people's incuriosity or, worse yet, passive acceptance of the narratives peddled by Big Pharma about what hormones are. And this, in particular, gets rapidly worse.

In the next section, Ostertag references a whole slew of standard reference texts when it comes to the history of hormones and that "science of sex", including, but not limited to, Anne Fauso-Sterling Sexing the Body and Elizabeth Watkins' The Estrogen Elixir. He follows that up with the claim that he has been "astonished" that transsexuals and transgenders do not feature in those histories, correctly charging the authors of those books with trans issues, and charmingly observing that they all had "good reasons why they might not wish to have their main story get sidetracked in trans issues, which may not have even been on their radar" (p. 4, emphasis mine).

Here is the rub: the studies he cites, mostly coming from the early 2000s, did not have trans issues on radar, because extremely few people outside of the specialized and still nascent trans studies, were even thinking about them, then. This, incidentally, answers his question about why there is so little attention paid to the idea of "gender transition" —because up to relatively recently, there has been extremely little attention paid to trans people in general. The question why, however, does not entirely interest Ostertag. He does not pause to ask why trans people are a footnote in the history of sex hormones and their marketing, instead of being the main character—which is, by the way, precisely the question animating both Preciado's work, as well as Gill-Petersen's. But forgoing it allows Ostertag to frame his own study as a critical intervention into a field mired in politically-motivated incuriosity. Which, as we all know, is a move that has since become thoroughly adored by various GC types. Anyway.

Ostertag then proceeds to note about the "meteoric rise" in the visibility and media cachet of the term "transgender" itself. And this is the first seriously and blatantly objectionable section of the introduction.

He starts with the stock narrative of the 2014 "transgender tipping point" and reference to now-famous Laverne Cox TIME magazine cover, spinning it into a broader rumination about have we gotten to this point, and what even hides behind the notion of "transgender". And yet, as he returns to time after time, all this interest is not matched by the internist in the history of sex hormones and HRT, which he sees as the one shared element of all disparate understandings of the word "transgender". There is a lot to unpack here.

Article:
The silence of "sex hormone" scholarship on trans history is reciprocated by the silence of trans scholarship on "sex hormone" history. Major books about trans issues began to appear in the mid-1990s, such as Leslie Feinberg's Transgender Warriors (1996). The most comprehensive is Joanne Meyerowitz's How Sex Changed (2002); Deborah Rudacille's The Riddle of Gender (2006) is also excellent. Transgender History (2008), by the transgender activist and scholar Susan Stryker, is a historical introduction for a general readership. For primary source material, there is the massive, 752-page Transgender Studies Reader, edited by Stryker and Steven Whittle. And we have just scratched the surface.

You could read every page of all these books and never learn that the corporations which own the patents for the major estrogen and testosterone products spent millions of dollars over several decades selling the idea that testosterone and estrogen are the chemical essences of masculinity and femininity. You would not learn that contesting this marketing had been a major goal of the feminists of the 1960s and 1970s, and that for many of those women, the first step in resisting the patriarchy was to "take back their bodies" by rejecting the "sex hormone" marketing hype pharmaceutical companies were heaping upon them. Nor would you have any inkling of the decades of research and debate about the safety of long-term use of these products, debates that are anything but settled.
Source: p. 5


I don't really like the performative dunking which has become one of the leading styles of internet criticism, so please, mentally insert the obligatory "bruh" here. Because, oh boy.

A few things.

One, perhaps the fact that those books do not, in fact, spend so much time on arguing about who own hormones is because the history of HRT is not the history of transness. Nowhere could it be more blatant than in Feinberg's book which specifically eschews a medicalized language of transsexuality to extend the category of "transgender" onto a dizzyingly wide array of historical characters, most of which would never cross their paths with the idea of sex hormones, let alone of HRT. Now, one can argue that Feinberg's approach was notably flawed and represented an anachronistic tendency to gather all kinds of gender variance under a single, Western-centric umbrella term of "transgender", but this a subject of another shelf of books, so I will spare you that.

Two, Susan Stryker's Transgender History: Roots of Today's Liberation engages very openly with the idea about feminist criticism of medicine, mainly to argue about the different histories of trans and feminist movements. In fact, she makes this point clear because it is necessary to understand why the rift between trans women and radical feminism has even occurred.

Three: Transgender Studies Reader, while admittedly massive, is not a collection of primary sources. It contains a few, but is mostly a source of excerpts representing the state of scholarship of transness at the time of it's publication (2006). In 2013, it has been followed by another, just as massive (693 pages) Transgender Studies Reader 2, this time edited by Styrker with the help of Aren Z. Aizura. In Reader 1, the student can find out about the history of hormones, their synthesis and first employment in trans affirming care, by reading Henry Rubin's essay "The Logic of Treatment". In Reader 2, meanwhile, one can find a reprint of a massively popular work by Michelle O'Brien which "traces the links of a commodity chain: from her own consumption of feminizing hormones to the pharmaceutical corporations that produce, market, and distribute synthetic estrogens; to health insurance companies that exclude coverage of transgender healthcare; to government agencies that regulate pharmaceutical distribution; and to transnational free trade agreements that structure the imbalances that make buying medicines in Mexico or Canada more "affordable'' than in the U.S.A". Incidentally, O'Brian's essay, first delivered as a speech, comes from 2003.

Four: on pages 335 to 364 of Transgender Studies Reader 1, there is an excerpt from Bernice Hausman 1995 book Changning Sex. It will become very relevant, very quickly.

The next few pages of the introduction are an extension of the enumeration quoted above; Ostertag goes down the list of what you could and could not find in scholarship available to him, consistently charging it with eliding the market nature of pharmaceuticals, their historical use in attempted gay conversion therapies, or the fact that Harry Benjamin was something of a kook. Or to put it differently, Ostertag claims (and his claims are not really supported by the literature he cites) that trans scholarship has taken the sex hormones for granted, and in doing so fell victim to the pharmaceutical industry's drive to expand its reach onto new markets.

He claims that trans people have been duped by Big Pharma. That they have become the dupes of sex hormones. Or, as one could even say, the dupes of gender. And I have heard that phrase somewhere before.

Ah, yeah, it's from a book.

So, about Bernice Hausman. Here is how the Transgender Studies Reader 1 introduces the excerpt from her book:

Article:
In Changing Sex, Bernice Hausman historicizes the relationship between the discovery and synthesization of the so-called sex hormones, gender reassignment surgeries, and theories of gender identity. She asks how medical practitioners have justified the physical transformation of the transsexual body, and concludes that the theory of the gendered self originated precisely in the efforts of those practitioners to manipulate the sexed body. Transsexualism, rather than being a very marginalized and esoteric concern, thus is actually central to the development of contemporary Western notions of self, gender, body, and sex.

Hausman clearly believes that greater freedom of gender expression is a social good, yet she takes a remarkably conservative ethical perspective on bodily transformation. Unlike Janice Raymond, whose analysis she follows to a significant degree, Hausman does not presume that transsexual people are in themselves dangerous to women, but she starts from the premise that they reproduce gender stereotypes, which are quintessentially opposed to personal freedom and feminist progress. Consequently, her explicitly goal is to produce a compelling argument for the discontinuation of medical gender-reassignment procedures. In her advocacy of this position, she assumes that she, as a self-styled feminist scholar, should have greater authority over transsexual embodiment than transsexual people themselves.
Source: Transgender Studies Reader 1, p. 335


What grinds me isn't even the fact that Ostertag arrives at the same conclusions. Rather, it is the fact that he does it while seemingly being completely unaware of Hausman's work, and the debate it sparked—despite sharply criticizing a collection in which her book is excerpted for failing to address those precise issues.

Right. I don't even care if this is transphobic or not. I am just disappointed as an academician. This is just a flat-out fail when it comes to engaging with prior scholarship. If you want to bash trans folk for getting addicted to the titty skittles that Big Pharma pushes onto them, at least quote some actual authorities on trans bashing.

We are now 8 pages into the introduction, and 4.000 words into this essay. So I will pause for now, and try to return to it at a later point - if there is any interest in that. So, let me know: do you want to see more? Do you want to see how Ostertag defines the term "transgender"? Or where anti-depressants come into all of this?
 
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The question why, however, does not entirely interest Ostertag. He does not pause to ask why trans people are a footnote in the history of sex hormones and their marketing, instead of being the main character—which is, by the way, precisely the question animating both Preciado's work, as well as Gill-Petersen's.

I'm assuming here the reason is that insofar as sex hormones have been used to create gendered traits or for gender affirmation, it's been for affirming the gender of cis men and women - such as estrogen treatments for menopause, testosterone for men who are dissatisfied with their testosterone levels or lack of male development, or in the modified form as anabolic steroids, people who are insufficiently jacked and want to become jacked (I suspect you would argue that bodybuilding, in some ways, can be seen as gender affirmation, and I think you'd make a convincing argument)?

Or am I somewhat off base here?
 
Absolute banger of a post, very interested in seeing where this goes. I've also notice the relative paucity in studies relating to the history of estrogen as a synthesized substance myself, regarding research into early transmedical care in Pahlavi Iran and finding a total lack of studies on it, so it is annoying to hear that this work is not good.
 
I'm assuming here the reason is that insofar as sex hormones have been used to create gendered traits or for gender affirmation, it's been for affirming the gender of cis men and women - such as estrogen treatments for menopause, testosterone for men who are dissatisfied with their testosterone levels or lack of male development, or in the modified form as anabolic steroids, people who are insufficiently jacked and want to become jacked (I suspect you would argue that bodybuilding, in some ways, can be seen as gender affirmation, and I think you'd make a convincing argument)?

Or am I somewhat off base here?

Pretty much. Ostertag is aware of that, but he nonetheless foregrounds cross-gender hormone use. However, hormone industry did not develop with them in mind. This is what I mean by saying that his analysis fails short by not sufficiently differentiating the use of sex and cross-sex hormones. He does this for an intellectually valid reason (he is working towards noting how the very association of particular hormones with a particular sex is a social construct), but there are some serious problems with this approach I will get to if I get more of those posts out of me.
 
I would like to read more, but frankly i'd rather toss the book out a window.
But then I've always had a simplistic approach to academia.
 
I have it electronically and I doubt my poor old battered reader would survive the damage.
Mhm, well, better safe than sorry.

I just... I can't decide whether I'd prefer to ascribe this dull transphobia to ignorance or malice. Because it's just dull. If it was malice, I'd prefer he'd managed to find something more interesting to lambast trans people over and if it's ignorance, well, I wish he'd read more.
 
This is really fascinating to read about, it's like finding some evolutionary dead-end that failed to establish itself as a successful species before dying off.

I can kind of see the echoes of Ostertag's strain of transphobia in some modern transphobic rhetoric. I've occasionally heard far-right transphobes try to frame modern trans people as just the product of a big business trying to indoctrinate people into using hormones and nonsense like that. Usually by the Nazi types who like to frame themselves as anti-capitalists as part of the normal attempt to co-opt working class radicalization. But with them it's always just one rhetoric amongst many without any sincere focus on it. Ostertag seems to take it much more seriously then they do.

I'll definitely be watching this thread closely.
 
Watching, seems well-done and curious to see more.
 
Introduction (pp. 7-13)
I was wrong, actually. We are on page 7. There are a few claims here that need addressing—or, to be more precise, a few rhetorical flourishes. Now, it is generally speaking bad form to put too much attention to those, but the ones we face here are, in many ways, highly indicative. Of what?

Ostertag's long list of what has been neglected in histories of transness culminates with a forceful reminder of the past failings of endocrinology, followed by a more reflexive note on the shortcomings of the field as a whole:

Article:
And most certainly you would not learn of the long series of medical catastrophes that has resulted from the use of "sex hormones," or the crusading doctors who led their patients off medical cliffs.

(...)

The field of transgender history is so new it is only now being written. Paradoxically, the history of estrogen and testosterone that has recently been excavated from the field of endocrinology is being buried anew in the field of transgender history. Transgender histories too often take "sex hormones" at face value, as the timeless, ahistorical chemical essences of gender. The chemicals simply are what they are, always have been, and always will be. Yet as Oudshoorn observed early on, "Sex hormones are not entities that only had to be 'discovered' in nature . . . [but] were objects constructed in the laboratory as materializations of particular ideas about what sex hormones should look like."
Source: p. 7


Oudshoorn note is not the objectionable part here—please nobody get the wrong idea! In fact, it is a reasonably obvious observation that underpins much of science and technology studies. So is Ostertag's core thesis that the sexing of hormones is a social process and needs to be understood as such.

What is, however, highly questionable is the explicit accusation of trans history of purposefully disengaging from critical analysis of hormone use to achieve political goals. Obviously, it is not a position that is possible to be upheld today—not after Gills-Peterson's work, not after the emergence of the trans-of-color critique of the presumed whiteness of the transitioning subject. However, I also highly doubt it was a position one could support in scholarship back in 2016. Fausto-Sterling's work, which Ostertag references reverently, has been an important touchstone for the development of trans studies as a field; a lot of literature that he arbitrarily describes as "feminist" has always been closely linked to the budding trans critique. In fact, the 2020 reissue of Sexing the Body explicitly addresses the connection.

This then leads to a question: why should trans history be so concerned with hormones? After all, as much of this history has worked to demonstrate, "trans" is a far more capacious category, able to contain (for better or worse) far more than just the modern, medically transitioning subject. And while this expanding of trans has been solidified in academia by (primarily) C. Riley Snorton in 2017's Black on Both Sides, it was a conceptual frame that has been percolating in the field since its inception in the 90s (see, again, Feinberg's Transgender Warriors).

Fortunately, the answer is not difficult to glean from Ostertag's subsequent arguments. But this will get some time getting to, so please be patient.

Having made his central points clear, Ostertag moves on to show that the exact implications of what does it mean to be trans are still an object of political contention. It is a banal, if necessary observation. Unfortunately, he does not make his personal opinion here clear, but proceeds to frame the problem by saying that "intense emotions surround assertions about who transgender people "really are," and indeed who women and men "really are" (p. 7). On the face of it, this is another obviously true claim; intense emotions certainly do surround such assertions. It is also emblematic of uninformed cis scholarship to take those intense emotions at face value, as the timeless, ahistorical essences of the politics of transness. When I say "uninformed cis scholarship" I mean one that approaches the issues of trans presence in the society as problems of social and cultural recognition ("what is a woman"), instead of trying to focus on the material conditions that allow some people to live an unperturbed, gendered life, while denying it to others. Again, this critique would not have been as widely disseminated while Ostertag's book was being written, but it was already there (for example in the form of Vivian Namaste's Invisible Lives, published in 2000).

Once more, however, Ostertag does not, at all, engage with that scholarship. In fact, he does not particularly engage with trans voices themselves. A telling example of that follows immediately after:

Article:
Within the transgender community, there is an equally explosive debate as to whether there is a medical pathology at the root of the transgender identity that can be treated with medical technology. Here again, some transgender people hear any assertion that they are somehow "sick" as a denial of the discrimination and violence they have faced all their lives, and even a negation of their personhood, which they feel compelled to resist. Other transgender people hear the assertion that they suffer from no valid medical pathology as a denial of the pain and suffering they have endured, and as discrimination against people with one particular pathology and not another. The bitterness in the confrontation over whether transgender people are "really sick" comes from the fact that the outcome of this debate carries a price tag, in that it heavily influences the question of whether hormones and surgeries for transgender people are covered by health insurance.

The tensions over who transgender people "really are" have recently escalated to the point where some transgender activists and writers have accused women who insist that male-to-female transgender people are not "real women" of engaging in hate speech, and demanded that their organizations be labeled hate groups.
Source: p. 8


The core thesis of the first paragraph—that the real argument within the trans community whether transness ought to be understood as a mental illness fundamentally is about the "price tag" of gender affirming care—is a glaring example of surface-level knowledge. To a degree, it is true; what goes unsaid is that this price tag is not just a question of individual trans people's bottom line, but about who gets to transition at all. Furthermore, this also conveniently elides the fact that the very establishment of the "gender identity disorder" as a pathology in DSM-III was seen by some early trans advocates as a success not because it would lead to health insurance covering the costs of gender transition (which, for the most part, it usually wouldn't well into the 2000s), but rather that it would provide a strong argument that such care should at all be allowed.

It is a point that Stryker makes clear in Transgender History, a book that Ostertag engages with. Many gender affirming medical procedures are invasive, which made a lot of physicians balk at performing them unless they had a medical justification for their necessity, which the concept of a "gender-identity disorder" provided. If gender-affirming care could be framed as a cure for an illness, then it could be framed as a permissible practice. The specific lay-out of the rather libertarian and poorly controlled US medical system makes this less obvious, but this point should become glaringly obvious if Ostertag engaged with any study of the way that gender-affirming care functions (and what history it has) outside of the US, like the 2013 book Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary Iran by the Iranian-born American scholar Afsaneh Najmabad.

Crucially, though, the first paragraph, talking about the internal disputes within the trans community, is left without a citation. We do not know where Ostertag sourced this knowledge; my hunch is that it was gained through reading of other surface-level writing on the subject in the press and on the Internet. The second paragraph, meanwhile, ends on a citation of an online petition to add a group called "Gender Identity Watch" to SPLC's list of hate groups. The actual work done by misgendering, or its social and cultural implications (which have been, at that time, thoroughly covered by Thalia Betcher) is left unexamined. To look for the most minimal kind of good-faith reading here, I would say that this is a badly uninformed pair of paragraphs that would not be possible to be written in this form in 2023, and which were already highly, and typically, suspect in 2016—especially in the light of Ostertag's immediate exhortation that he is not here to resolve issues about who trans people really are, but merely to provide a corrective to the putative lack of sex hormone history; he also stresses that there is a lot of "anger" surrounding "these questions".

The terrible thing is that I am reasonably certain he is serious here. That he really believes he is clarifying, not taking a stand. After all, his book is dedicated "to my people, the freaks and the queers". That trans people have been the scapegoats of the gay rights movement eludes his attention, as does trans history in general. But I digress.

Afterwards, he restates his ambition, writing that:

Article:
For example, I put the term "sex hormones" in scare quotes. I want to know: Where did the idea that estrogen is female and testosterone male, that chemicals can be masculine or feminine, come from? What research supports it? What research contradicts it? Who proposed it? Who benefits financially from its propagation? My goal is not to finally determine what these chemicals "really are," but to understand the story of how we arrived at the set of beliefs we currently hold about them.
Source: p. 9


Those are all very interesting and relevant questions—I want to make that clear, again. The problem, however, lies in the fact that some of the answers are already here, and Ostertag treats them as if they were entirely beside the point:

Article:
But limiting my focus in this way hardly means this book will not cause controversy. Many people have battled long and hard to win access to these chemicals. Socially and politically, they see access to "sex hormones" as the victory of a gender revolution waged by an oppressed minority that took years of struggle and sacrifice to achieve. Politically, they may perceive any critical examination of them as a negation of their struggle and their victories, and even a denial of the discrimination and violence they experienced that fueled that struggle. Personally, they may believe that this technology caused their gender to "transition." This transition may now be a deep part of who they understand themselves to be, and thus any questioning of the meaning they have assigned to that technology is profoundly threatening.
Source: p. 9


The word "may", which may have been introduced here in order to soften the implications, does not do its work. In fact, it is a rhetorical bludgeon, and I can only hope that it is one that Ostertag wields accidentally, rather than intentionally.

(Also, this is highly petty, but Ostertag's mention of the "long and hard" battle for access to HRT seems mildly contradictory of his previous claim about the "price tag" as the actual stake within trans debates on what transness even is.)

The thing is, academic writing is rhetoric. It is meant to argue for certain points and certain understandings. The staccato enumeration of what trans people "may" believe about hormones conveys a sense of a shared delusion—which is an old, transphobic trope. But really, what is especially surprising here is not even this frankly mean streak, but rather the suggestion that trans people do not question the meaning of their transition. A brief exposure to then-modern trans memoir (Janet Mock's Redefining Realness, 2014), trans literature (Imogen Binnie's Nevada, 2013), or essayism (Julia Serano's The Whipping Girl, 2007) ought to put a stop to this claim. But Ostertag does not stop. He presses on.

Article:
Even the mere telling of the history of "sex hormones" can be threatening. For the story includes many prior dramatic claims about what these chemicals are and can do. Most of these claims experienced a spectacular rise, and then an equally spectacular fall, often with a belated realization that severe harm was caused to thousands of people. It is difficult to come away from this history with a high degree of confidence that our present-day beliefs and practices surrounding these technologies will prove any more permanent than those that went before. This is at the root of the silence on the history of "sex hormones" in transgender history.
Source: p.9


As I hope I have already demonstrated, this is factually wrong when it comes to what trans history has done, and is doing. Yet more troublingly, however, this also betrays a deep methodological deficiency of Ostertag's entire project: namely, he does not stop to ask why, in the face of all the evidence towards the dangers inherent in hormone usage, do trans people really stick to them. Of course, one can infer that his answer is that they have been duped and misinformed, but this does not really answer the question about the persistent desire for hormones. After all, we've been at that for almost a century now.

To put it in other words: Ostertag does not really concern himself with trans people's own voices in the regard; though he had certainly set out to hear some of them (more on that later), he failed to actually immerse himself in the discourse surrounding HRT and transitions. He takes a surface-level understanding of what trans people are after in "sex changes", assuming the concept is self-explanatory. And this, as any anthropologist will tell you, is simply a bad methodology.

He is, however, very concerned about the effect his book will have, claiming that it is likely to "stir up a hornet's nest" (p. 9), cause controversy, and perhaps even expose him to backlash. I am not unsympathetic to this worry, which is something most queer scholars experience at some point or another. However, at the risk of sounding a little bit mean, I must note that Sex, Science, Self has, seemingly, mostly failed to attract any sort of attention. Today, the book is occasionally mentioned by an odd gender critical feminist, but I believe that it is ultimately too tepid in tone for that crowd, and too specialist and quaint to really spark a trans furor.

The next passage of the chapter is devoted to explaining the significance of the project in excess of the narrow bounds of the trans issue. Here, Ostertag correctly notes that the problem of hormone use is merely a facet of a broader set of problems regarding human interface with technology, and the way our bodies and identities are affected by our participation in what Preciado famously termed "pharmacopornographic capitalism". Incidentally, it is startling that no reference to Preciado follows, nor to his intellectual guru, Haraway. In other words, this is less new than he claims it is. In fact, this entire project is really a set of questions that are standard for science and technology studies, particularly feminist science and technology studies, and I am genuinely surprised he does not engage with the field at all.

In any case, Ostertag states again and again that understands why his project may feel threatening to people who have invested their entire identity into a set of medical procedures (thus displaying rather cleanly his failure to understand the stakes of transness), before returning to an impassioned plea that this knowledge he uncovered (or, practically speaking, collated) must not be silenced.

Article:
But we cannot simply declare large swaths of history to be politically out of bounds. I rebel, deeply, at statements that effectively tell us, "Don't study this because it is dangerous to do so." The real danger, I believe, is in ruling some parts of history off limits. Given the current rate of technological change, and the new physical and social terrains that technology is permeating, admonishments to not examine the meanings of technology are particularly dangerous.

We live in the age of global warming, mass extinction, big data, Google Earth, killer drones, smartphones, constant surveillance, and a rapidly growing medicine chest of pharmaceutical products that have become so powerful we now experience them as central to our sense of self. If we are going to find our way in all of this, all of it must be open to scrutiny, questioning, and debate. All meanings of technology must be on the table, open to examination, and fallible.
Source: p. 10-11


There is quote I like, and keep returning to, from an American writer and sometimes-preacher Marilynne Robinson: "Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense."

It rarely does academia good to set up a phalanx before the battle-lines have been drawn, which is to say: it rarely does academia good to presume a hostile reception before it is declared. In fact, as I hope I have already demonstrated, the questions that Ostertag hopes to approach are questions which are vital (and often-discussed) both within academic trans theory, as well as within the trans community itself. However, Ostertag instead frames himself as a lone warrior for truth in a world gone mad. This preempts dialogue, and, more importantly, positions any kind of critique of work as an ideological attack on the freedom of thought and expression. It is a dirty move, even if an eminently understandable one. Yet, it is difficult not to wonder what else would be possible if Ostertag decided to actually converse with the community he attempts to deconstruct, instead of taking its meaning for granted.

It is telling that he follows this up by a long elaboration on his own standpoint—again, nothing objectionable here, it is basically a standard practice to say a few paragraphs about that nowadays, especially in this kind of critical humanities. What he is attempting to do here, however, is to establish his credentials not as much as someone with a stake in the hormones debate (though he does a little bit of that—more on that later), but rather to show that he is not some kind of a reactionary figure. He preempts a defense, and preempts a counterattack. He also explicitly situates his work in the context of an attempt to return to a radical form of gay liberation politics of the 70s that were broadly anti-establishment and sought to undermine the normative institutions of the society, including the psychiatric regime. This is key, as it informs his perspective in significant ways.

And so he says:

Article:
The dedication with which the book begins, "to my people, the freaks and the queers," is sincere. My own life—emotional, romantic, artistic, intellectual, social, and sexual—has been rooted in the queer community, and my loves have been multiply transgressive: interracial, intergenerational, with lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, drag queens, effeminate fags, and butch dykes. A butch lesbian lover and I made a baby together in the 1980s (something not so out of the ordinary now but way out of bounds back then). My daughter grew up raised by her two moms in one house and myself and a drag queen in another a block away.
Source: p. 12


I do not doubt the sincerity of intent behind the dedication, but it must not be overlooked what is overlooked in the list of freaks he proposes: one which will include lesbians, gays, and bissexuals, and then follow it with various other figures of transgression, but not trans people of any kind. It is hard for me the shake the feeling that the book in microcosm: Ostertag's reassertion that trans people are the "dupes of gender", whose lives are not transgressive, but rather made out of a submission to the gendered order of the world, and to the great institutions that establish them and enforce them, drawing from their vast chest of pharmaceuticals.

Ostertag contrasts this with his own transgressive acts, and figures of what is presumably real rebellion; against, he seems unaware that so many of the figures he lists could, under various discursive conditions, be counted among the transgender people, hormones or not. But more on that later.

The strongest piece of rhetoric, however, that he employs comes next. He says:

Article:
Today, I am as ensnared in the contradictions of life in the pharmaceutical age as anyone. My chemicals of choice today begin with a daily three-pill HIV "cocktail." When I was diagnosed with HIV in 1993, I was told I had just a few more years to live. In all likelihood, without these newly synthesized chemicals produced for profit by giant capitalist enterprises, I would not be alive to write this book. My morning pill regimen also includes yet another newly synthesized chemical sold for a tidy sum by a giant corporation, called an antidepressant. The effects of antidepressants are poorly understood and fiercely debated among specialists. Some believe the drugs' effect on depression to be entirely placebo in character, while others doubt that depression as it is currently understood "even exists." I have extremely ambivalent feelings about these drugs myself and as a result have stopped using them several times, always with very unhappy results. When I see my transgender friends also taking pills about which there are similarly heated, unresolved debates over whether the drugs do anyone any good, and whether the disease they are intended to treat "even exists," I am struck by how much their experiences have in common with my own. Thus, if at any point in this book the writing seems to suggest that I see myself as above the pharmaceutical fray, that is my mistake, not my intention.
Source: p. 13-14


I want to underline this passage because this is where Ostertag's personal stakes in the matter come to light. As one (among the few that I could find) reviewer of the book asks: "is he just projecting on trans people his own ambivalence about being dependent on HIV and depression medications and enriching Big Pharma?" Now, I am not hugely fond of psychology, and especially of psychology as a critical method, so I want to instead draw attention to something else: namely the fact that so much of Ostertag's perspective on hormone use seems to be derived from drawing an equivalency between that and antidepressant usage. But for all the potential use of this comparison, it is also one that is left mostly unexamined. How are hormones like anti-depressants, or rather, how is the culture of hormone use like the culture of anti-depressant use? Analogies are attractive, but also intellectually dangerous, because they provide a ready-made course for thinking to run through. Which means that ultimately, Sex, Science, Self is also a book about depression, but one that cannot bring itself to be properly comparative about it, as such comparisons would threaten the neatness of the method employed. Also, incidentally, this is the same fucking comparsion that Paul B. Preciado made, then analyzed, in Testo Junkie and I can't believe I am actually recommending this Spaniard so much here.

Anyway. We're on page 13, and another 4000 words in. Until later.
 
I'm really creeped out by him describing "having a baby with a butch lesbian lover". I sure hope that the lesbian wasn't exclusively into women, or else that has horrifying implications.
 
I'm really creeped out by him describing "having a baby with a butch lesbian lover". I sure hope that the lesbian wasn't exclusively into women, or else that has horrifying implications.
Huh? No he just means that he and a dyke agreed to have a baby together?
That's like... extremely normal in some queer circles?
 
Huh? No he just means that he and a dyke agreed to have a baby together?
That's like... extremely normal in some queer circles?
Sure, but he describes her as a "lover", which is what made me uncomfortable. Maybe I'm missing something here, I know I can be more sensitive to potential lesbophobia than most people due to trauma.
 
I'm really creeped out by him describing "having a baby with a butch lesbian lover". I sure hope that the lesbian wasn't exclusively into women, or else that has horrifying implications.

I mean, this kind of arrangement was not unheard of in the lesbian and gay communities at the time. It was in fact one of the easiest ways for same-sex couples to have kids; just have your gay friend cooperate. Plus, it needs to be stressed that a lot of lesbians had sex with men, for a variety of reasons. This is why the category of the gold star lesbian got so contentious, esp. for some of the old guard/bar dyke crowd: they were weirded out by the insistence that Real Lesbians Do Not Have Sex With Men For Any Reason.
 
I mean, this kind of arrangement was not unheard of in the lesbian and gay communities at the time. It was in fact one of the easiest ways for same-sex couples to have kids; just have your gay friend cooperate. Plus, it needs to be stressed that a lot of lesbians had sex with men, for a variety of reasons. This is why the category of the gold star lesbian got so contentious, esp. for some of the old guard/bar dyke crowd: they were weirded out by the insistence that Real Lesbians Do Not Have Sex With Men For Any Reason.
Hi, I'm a traumatised dyke who has fucked gay boys. This is fine.
Thank you for the explanations, I guess I just wasn't sure how it was possible for a gay guy and a women-exclusive lesbian to be "lovers"?

Was it just because there are lesbians who are also romantically interested in men, and there always has been? Am I reading femme-exclusivity into a situation where it doesn't exist?

Again, I sincerely apologize, I feel like I made people uncomfortable and I really didn't mean to.
 
The hormones / anti depressant thing is kinda funny to me, because I was on anti depressants before I was on hormones, and largely stopped using them as my transition wrapped up? Hormones helped my mental wellbeing a lot more than Prozac and Ativan, in the end.
 
Thank you for the explanations, I guess I just wasn't sure how it was possible for a gay guy and a women-exclusive lesbian to be "lovers"?

Was it just because there are lesbians who are also romantically interested in men, and there always has been? Am I reading femme-exclusivity into a situation where it doesn't exist?
You certainly haven't made me uncomfortable, you've just come across as... ill-informed?

It's possible for a gay guy and a wlw lesbian to be lovers because people are complicated. Butches fuck fags fuck femmes fuck bears. All sorts of people describe themselves as all sorts of things because labels aren't firm and solid-walled categories but vague ideas that give others (or ourselves) a sense of who we actually are. It's possible, because lover is a very varied word. It's possible, because gays and dykes have been fucking for generations.

Also, just as a side-note: as a butch, I find the idea that lesbianism implies femme-exclusivity a horrendous idea :p
 
Introduction (pp. 14-18)
We come back to Ostertag on page 14, where several severe historical mistakes are made.

A small disclaimer here. It is genuinely easy to find an academic author you don't like, who is not a career historian and who digs into history, and flog them over mistakes about historical details. This is often done as a series of cheap shots to ridicule someone for getting the facts wrong—and God knows I have had my own fair share of rolling my eyes at people claiming that Richard von Krafft-Ebing first coined the term "masochism" in 1886, while it was in fact 1891. The thing is, oftentimes, such details don't fundamentally matter; they tend to be incidental to the point being raised. As such, they do not really serve as solid criticism. They are nitpicking. Historical errors start to matter when the nature of the error weighs on the nature of the point being made; simple slips of chronology and similar minutia usually do not. But sometimes they do. As is the case in Sex, Science, Self.

Having established his credentials, Ostertag moves on to define some terms he will be using in the book. And here, some foundational mistakes are made, reinforced, and firmly inserted into the very foundation of the entire argument the book hinges around. And it has to do with the question of what the term "transgender" even means. To quote:

Article:
The blazing rise of the trans identity has been matched by the intensity of controversies over what the identity actually means and who it includes. The story begins at the end of the 1960s, when a tireless activist and small-scale publisher named Virginia Prince "coined the words transgenderism and transgenderist as nouns describing people like myself who have breasts and live full time as a woman, but who have no intention of having genital surgery." Prince went to great lengths to distinguish transgender from homosexual and transexual. She founded the world's first transgender organization, which explicitly banned "homosexuals, transsexuals or emotionally disturbed people" from joining. To make her disdain for homosexuals even more pointed, she titled her first book The Transvestite and His Wife. As for transexuals, she claimed that "sex reassignment surgery is a communicable disease" that is spread to gullible transvestites by sensational media reports.
Source: p. 14


The cite here sends us to a presentation during some conference in the year 2000. As a general note, papers presented during conferences are not the best source of data, especially not ones that have over a decade on them at the time of writing. But this is the kind of nitpicking minutia I have just condemned, so enough with that. The real problems are in the fact that this is a pile of half-truths that Ostertag does not pause to investigate, with terrible results. Explaining what is going on will require getting really technical, so bear with me.

First of all, it is not entirely clear if Virginia Price was the one to coin the term. Certainly, she made a significant effort to popularize it (and to claim ownership of it), but hers was probably not the first use. This alone does not really contradict the points that Ostertag is making (again, minutia). The devil lies in the details of the way Price understood the concept, and the way she tried to seize it. Here, I am working mostly from the work by Cristan Williams, primarily her keyword article on the matter from the inaugural issue of the Transgender Studies Quarterly journal (published in 2014).

So, here goes: it's a mess. While Price was an influence on popularizing the term, she was not the only one to use it, and the specific meaning she ascribed to it: a person who medically transitions, but does not seek a genital surgery (and so not a transvestite and not a transsexual) was not as universally adopted as she would like others to think. In fact, the word circulated somewhat broadly, and inconsistent usage, ranging from describing a person who transitions socially, but not medically to contemporarily-legible idea of "transgender" as an umbrella term under which a great diversity of gender expressions falls. As Williams notes: "Etymological research clearly documents, however, that since the 1970s, ''transgender'' has in fact been used with a variety of meanings.One important use has been to group together different kinds of people who might otherwise have virtually no social contact with one another". However, Price tried to exert control over the meaning of the term, routinely accusing people of misusing it or "stealing" it from her. Are you lost yet? Because this gets worse.

Somewhat in the parallel to the circulation of the term "transgender" (alongside derived, and mostly abandoned coinages such as "transgenderal") in the transsexual/transvestite culture of the 70s and 80s, an alternate usage of it developed in the late 80s and the early 90s. During that time, in no small part thanks to efforts of Leslie Feinberg, whose 1992 landmark essay Transgender Liberation: A Movement Whose Time Has Come helped launched the new meaning of the word into popularity, "transgender" started to be used as either the umbrella term mentioned above or as a word whose closest contemporary equivalent would be "nonbinary": i.e. to describe people who refuse identification with "either" gender. Confusingly, and somewhat contrary to what Williams wrote, the Transgender Studies Reader introduced by Feinberg's essay with the claim that:

Article:
Previously, "transgender" had referred most frequently to biological males who lived socially as women, but who did not undergo genital modification surgery. In Feinberg's redefinition, the term came to refer to a "pangender" movement of oppressed minorities—transsexuals, butch lesbians, drag queens, cross-dressers, and others—who all were called to make common revolutionary cause with one another in the name of social justice.
Source: Transgender Studies Reader 1, p. 205


The "transgender-as-nonbinary" use of the term was, in fact, extremely popular in the 90s, which in turned produced its own internal dissent within the broader trans community, based around the questions of "who counts as trans", whether trans people should submit to the medical gatekeeping (Ostertag would be pleased to hear that many 90s transgender advocates were against medical transitioning, drawing ire from the self-identified transsexuals), and so on. Many of those conflicts continue today; their echoes can be heard whenever a frustrated trans woman declares herself an "old-school transsexual" in order to distance herself from something likely painted in pastel colors and involving catgirls.

It does not help that few people, if any, used those terms consistently and so much queer life of that period happened in weird grey zones of the gender galaxy. If someone wants a nice overview of what those discussions looked like back then, I recommend checking out Jack Halberstam's famous essay "Transgender Butch. Butch/FTM Border Wars and the Masculine Continuum" which shows just how scatter-shot the understanding of various terms meant could get. In short, from the 1960s to the 2000s, the word "transgender" never had a fixed meaning, and it definitely was never primarily moored to hormone usage. Which, unfortunately, is exactly was Ostertag claims. Perplexingly, he precedes that with a reference to Stryker's work who explicitly uses the term "transgender" in a maximalist, umbrella term fashion, including any "practice or identity [that] crosses gender boundaries that are considered socially normative in the contemporary United States." Having brought that up, Ostertag immediately pivots to claim instead that:

Article:
I observed these developments in my own social world. When I moved to San Francisco in the 1980s, transgender was a term I heard rarely if at all, even though my social circle centered on the most consciously gender-transgressive part of the queer community. Today many of my peers consider themselves transgender. And when I question them about the precise meaning of the term, I hear the same debate and disagreement Stryker summarizes in her book.

Despite all the confusion and animosity, when I listen closely to those around me, particularly the younger queers in their twenties and thirties, I find there is a more specific meaning of transgender that has in fact come into common vernacular in the sexual subcultures of the major urban centers where such things are adjudicated. In actual conversational practice, transgender often refers to people who take hormones to modify their bodies: female-bodied people who take testosterone, and male-bodied people who take estrogen. The former may also possibly undergo a double mastectomy ("top surgery"), and the latter may also opt for surgical breast implants, but this is not required. People who go further and engage in genital surgery are generally referred to as transexual.
Source: pp. 15-16


It takes a certain degree of gumption to, without any reference other than anecdotal personal experience, go on and contradict Susan Stryker on matters of trans history and language. That aside, there is a not-so-subtle semantic slide that occurs within those passages. First, Ostertag notes that the meaning of the word "transgender" is highly contentious and constantly debated, only to then follow it up with an assertion that it has a highly specific meaning that most people agree upon (i.e. hormones, yes/SRS, no) in contrast to an equally specific meaning of the term transsexual.

Suppressing the urge to quote my own personal experiences and say "bullshit" to that, I want to draw your attention to a serious methodological issue here. And, okay, methodology is not my strongest suit. I have a PhD in cultural studies, which is about as methodologically rigorous as it is well defined, which is not at all. But some things are just glaring—and it is how Ostertag implicitly assumes that the usage of a term he is exposed within his particular community is, in fact, universal. In other words, he fails to recognize the limitation of his own standpoint, having spent so much time espousing it just pages earlier. San Francisco, and San Franciso's queer community is not the entire world. In fact, it is not the entire queer community either, nor is it the entire queer community in San Franciso either. This does not necessarily contradict Ostertag's point in vacuum, but it puts his conclusions under a serious question mark he does not, in fact, address.

What's worse, however, is what he does with his definition next. As one can plainly see, despite being aware of the complicated history of the term, Ostertag chooses to describe and understand it as if there was a simple, direct line going from Price's usage of it in the late 60s to the one he encounters among the young generation queers around him. This is just bad analysis, which forcibly flattens a very complex issue so that it can be better used to drive an argument. And the argument is that transgender, in essence, equals hormones and always has.

Article:
Debates about the source of the transgender identity are just as fierce and unresolved as the debates over who it includes. The dominant position today holds that one's gender identity, one's sense of self as male or female, is determined by the chemical processes in a mother's body while a fetus is still in the womb. At the other extreme, Susan Stryker argues that people become transgender when they choose to engage with technology: "It's about trying to speak from this embodied place that is technologically constructed." Yet as we will see over the course of this book, these are just different ways of talking about hormones. One position focuses on the hormones produced by a mother's body, or entering the mother's body through pharmaceutical drugs or environmental sources. Stryker focuses on hormones produced by giant pharmaceutical corporations and taken deliberately at some time after birth. But as disparate as these positions appear at first blush, all agree that hormones are what make a transperson trans.
Source: p. 16


And so the slide concludes. Observe how Stryker's extremely broad and inclusive definition of "transgender" gets reduced in this passage into a claim that "hormones are what makes a transperson trans". This is the fulcrum for Ostertag's rhetorical lever. He bases his argument on a poorly substantiated assumption that transgender people are defined by their hormone usage, and utilizes the equivalence between "transgender" and "HRT" throughout his book to argue that, essentially speaking, trans people are the product of a marketing push. I am being uncharitable here, but not without good reason. This is just shoddy, on a methodological level. It is a series of misreadings propped up by a handful of anecdotes.

Now, don't quote me on that—I would have to actually dig into literature I do not have on hand; this is off the record. I know for a fact that a lot of trans people have searched for explanations of their transness which reference such things as hormonal imbalances in their mothers' wombs, or in the environment. I also know that a lot of such research has been produced by cis academicians, and I frankly don't know which of it came first. It is not super important, but I do want to stress that Ostertag is not really fudging the data, as much as fumbling with it. He references a series of concepts and studies without examining their context, and extends very far reaching consequences from them. It is not malice, it is malpractice.

Incidentally, page 16 also contains one of the more frustrating asides that Ostertag has made thus far. Describing the decision by Justin Vivian Bond to come out as transgender, he makes a note that:

Article:
Bond identified at times as a gay man, as a drag queen, and most often simply as a tranny (a term that gained favor in the 1990s among the gender queer as a term of endearment, but is now increasingly rejected as "transphobic" by a younger generation).
Source: p. 16


It needs to be noted that the usage of this word as a slur predates its partial reclaiming within the queer movement; Ostertag should be aware of that, just as he should be aware of the fact that it is a term that continues to be used as a slur, especially outside of the bounds what I assume his community is like. More broadly, this aside yet again points towards just how limited his perspective is, assuming that a certain narrow slice of the gay world he has lived through and in represents the sum total of queer experiences. This framing also elides the fact that the category of "tranny" was used as a way to establish hierarchies within the world of drag queens that Ostertag is fond of, where "tranny drag" was considered a base, street, and non-respectable form. Ostertag is blatantly uninterested in the social context of trans lives, and renders them down to pure matters of identity and medicine; this, just as his flattening of the term "transgender", facilitates most arguments he makes. Again, this shines through in the part of the introduction.

Ostertag moves from his definition of transgender towards his early fieldwork, namely a series of interviews he did with various trans people. Now, if I were to be extremely petty, I'd note that there is a serious lack of anthropological rigor on display here, and no explanation of Ostertag's methodology in making those interviews. It is a weak criticism, however, not only because a semi-religious devotion to questions of methodology is one of the greatest failings of ethnography as a practice, but also for a far more prosaic reason, which has to do with book marketing.

Sex, Science, Self belongs to what can be called the "middle market" of academic literature: books which are written with an eye towards a non-specialist reader. This is often mandated by the publisher (because it makes the book easier to sell), though not always. In any case, one of those things which scare casual readers off are long introductions filled with extremely dry and technical descriptions of research methodology. As it turns out, few people are interested in reading an in-depth explanation of how interviews were conducted or interview partners selected; not that it is not important (it is very important). And so, often those are the bits that first hit the cutting floor when an editor sits to prepare a book for publication. I don't know if an earlier draft of Sex, Science, Self went in-depth here; I highly doubt it. However, this is not a good enough reason to slam the book. What is, however, is what Ostertag does with the contents of his interviews.

Article:
A high-profile trans-identified doctor whose practice includes mostly trans patients told me that his infallible method for distinguishing "real transpeople" from wannabes was to see whether they were willing to take the full dosage of hormones he prescribes. If patients take just half of the daily dose, so that the changes in their bodies occur more gradually, he diagnoses them as not "really" transgender. Here the equation of trans-ness with hormones is not only explicit but quantifiable: a "real" transperson takes a certain dose of hormones; those who take a lesser dose are less than trans.

I went directly from that interview to an interview with Sam, a young transman who is centrally involved in trans activism in San Francisco. Sam told me that he himself was one of those who took a half-dose of hormones. He said that he had watched others in his social circle begin testosterone therapy and lose their femininity so fast that the experience was traumatic, so Sam wanted to take his time. He felt insulted that a doctor who was himself transgender would dismiss Sam's trans identity on that basis, and drew immediate connections from the doctor's diagnostic procedure to how hormones and identity are understood by his friends. "Theoretically my understanding is that to my generation transgender means the explosion of all boxes," he told me. "But my experience in my social circle is that transgender means that you need to have made the rite of passage of doing hormones. It seemed like if I was not going to do hormones then transgender wasn't the term for me."

I later had a conversation with another young transman in New York City about these same issues. When I mentioned that the only thing I could find consistent in how transpeople actually use the term "trans" was to refer to people who take hormones to modify their bodies, he objected, "But I don't know anybody who thinks that." Later in the conversation, I told him about Sam's decision to do a half dose of hormones at a time. "Well," he replied, with no sense of irony, "maybe he's not really trans."
Source: pp. 16-17


Most people who are trans know the "trans broken arm syndrome" —the old joke about how, if a person shows up at the ER room with a broken arm, the first question they get asked is how does this relate to their gender identity. This extends far beyond appendages, and, in fact, medicine. Ostertag takes three interviews with trans people in radically different social and cultural circumstances, and hammer out of them a shared understanding of what tranenss is, focused on hormones. Not for a moment does he stop to wonder if, for example, the fact that his first interview partner is a doctor may influence his perspective on the issue, just as an activist involvement might. In other words, the fact that those people are trans overrides any and all aspects of their perspective or situatedness in the world.

The other thing is that Ostertag chooses to interpret evidence of a highly contentious understanding—he interviews three people, and gets three different answers—as yet further evidence of the fact it all comes down to the hormones.

Of course, there is an interesting question underlying this, namely to which degree medical transition is often, unwittingly, understood as necessary for transitioning, or living a trans life in general. The fact that two out of three of Ostertag's interview partners stumble over that issues does indicate that there is something at play here. But this something is more nuanced than simply "they equate being trans with being on hormones", because they do not. That they contradict themselves does not mean that the understanding Ostertag prefers is the one they prefer, or that they orient themselves around in the world.

Immediately afterwards, Ostertag authoritatively claims that "the contradiction Sam describes dates back to the early 1990s and the activist group Queer Nation" (p. 17). He argues that the early 90s queer movement "promoted "queer" as a way to bring the multiplying identities of the sexual subculture under a single all-inclusive term focused more on what people had in common than what divided them" (p. 17). I can't vouch here for what Queer Nation in specific did, though it bears noting that a lot of queer activism of the period was not presented as a corrective to gay-and-lesbian identity focused politics, but an alternative openly in conflict with them. The history of that moment and its politics is hugely complicated, so I will spare you that; what matters is that queer was often proposed in a very adversarial fashion, and it did not really become a byword for LGBT until the 2000s. To this day, it maintains a degree of lexical independence.

Ostertag instead argues, however, makes a somewhat strange argument that I am not sure I fully follow. He writes that:

Article:
Queer Nation was structured as a collection of affinity groups, and in 1992 a transgender affinity group formed in San Francisco's Queer Nation chapter. Queer Nation faded from the scene not long after, but the transgender affinity group continued as Transgender Nation, linking similar affinity groups in other cities. Transgender activism took off, and instead of replacing the acronym LGB with the single word queer, the accepted acronym has expanded even further to LGBT, and sometimes LGBTQ—with Q as yet another letter rather than an umbrella to encompass all.
Source: p. 17-18


Again, there is no citation here, so I am taken to understand (especially in the light of the reference to San Francisco) that Ostertag is drawing from his personal experiences. In any case, there is a reading of the passage that suggests that it was the Transgender Nation that ended up ultimately disarming the liberatory potential of "queer", instead boiling it down into more idle identity politics. I am not sure if this is intentional, but this type of queer transphobia is not unprecedented (see here for another, and far more virulent variant of it). If that is the case, this also resonates with earlier exclusion of trans people from the list of queer and freaks that Ostertag provides. However, I am disinclined to this reading; I feel like this more an attempt at explaining a history of the term "trasngender" again, and again based off the same number of flawed assumptions that have driven this introduction thus far. This is supported by the next paragraph where Ostertag reiterates that while "transgender" is theoretically an inclusive term, practically it boils down to hormone usage.

Article:
Yet this "theoretical" definition exists in acute tension with what Sam finds to be the social reality in San Francisco and other queer urban centers: if you are not ready to go through "the rite of passage" of hormone therapy, then transgender is not the term for you.
Source: p. 18


Once more, bracketing whether this is accurate or not, it is hard not to notice the tendency to assume that the "social reality" of "San Francisco and other queer urban centers" is the sum total of transgender's circulation. There is a complete lack of mention here of, for example, extant trans communities (we are in 2014-2015, well into the social media era), and other alternate forms of trans community and life which exist outside of those centers. Their excision serves to underline Ostertag's point, but it also makes it far more fragile. It also, on a more theoretical note, completely neglects the possibility of resistant or disidentificatory approaches to trans-identification; Ostertag is not interested in people who identify as trans in spite of the putative social pressure, as he sees them as necessarily outliers. In that, he ignores much of queer scholarship, particularly queer scholarship of color, which illustrates how, for example, the identification with the category of "gay" can function for those queers who have been traditionally excluded from the "queer urban centers" which tend to be predominantly white and middle class.

Interestingly, Ostertag immediately spins that into a narrative of newness, seemingly suggesting that the question of hormone usage is one that is only now becoming a pressing issue for the current generation of queers. Again, the history does not support that (or at least forces us to ask: "for which queers?"), as, to use but one example, the question of whether to use hormones (and become a "hormone queen") was a hotly debated and highly contentious issue in the 1960s world of drag queens as described by Esther Newton. Which is to say: the problems that Ostertag posits as fundamentally new are in facts problems with a long history; however the rhetorical framing them as unprecedented supports Ostertag narrative of the emergence of HRT as a slow encroachment of capital (embodied by Big Pharma) into the queer world. He writes that: "the question of whether or not to take hormones is now part and parcel of the coming out process" (p. 18), and the key word here is now.

Page 18, and 4000 more words. Let's pause here for now, and for today.
 
Last edited:
Introduction (pp. 18-21)
This update should cover the last part of the introduction; it will also likely be shorter, because we are on page 18, and with very little of the text left. However, those last few percent are especially thick.

We left off with Ostertag arguing about the emergence of the new concept of gender transition, explicitly lashed to market proliferation of sex hormones. Incidentally, this type of an argument about the origin point of transness has a specific name: "technological determinism".

Having made his case, Ostertag then proceeds to again make it clear what the aim of his analysis is going to be, clearly moving the entire introduction towards a conclusion:

Article:
The chemical rite of passage now has its own word, transition, as in transition from male to female, or vice versa. The underlying belief is that bodies or people don't have gender, chemicals do. Estrogen is female, testosterone is male. Bodies are understood to be blank slates on which maleness or femaleness can be chemically inscribed.

This book can be considered a history of that idea: where and when it emerged; the political, economic, social, and personal interests that shaped and reshaped it; and how it came to such a place of prominence today.
Source: p. 18


All the points he has been making throughout the introduction come together in this passage: Sex, Science, Self is supposed to be an intellectual history of the emergence of the idea of "sex hormones" and their subsequent employment in the pharmaceutical market. This is propped up by, on one hand, the understanding of the term "transgender" which sees it as inseparable from HRT, and on the other, by an assumption about the logic governing gender transitions, which implicitly reduces them solely to medical transitions.

Ostertag does not expand on that, for reasons which should become obvious shortly. In any case, those issues are not central to his interest, which is more in, as said, how hormones got assigned sex. As I have been saying, this is a very interesting problem. But it is also, as one should be able to see from the above passage, one that reaches farther than Ostertag intends it to be.

The thing that Ostertag does not pause to consider is the formulation of "having gender". It is not exactly clear what it is meant to suggest here. I believe that for Ostertag, it is supposed to express a cultural shift in which the understanding of gender has been shifted away from personal identity towards a medically-established, measurable hormonal state. This reading is consistent with the arguments he raises, and sheds a lot of light on what his project is really about. By making such a point, Ostertag essentially tries to show that the danger present in putting our faith in pharmaceuticals is one of determinism; if we accept that gender is in the hormones, instead of the person, we basically give up our ability to self-determine to the medical establishment and the pharmaceutical industry. This also explains why Ostertag is so focused on criticizing the notions of the "sex of the brain" or the "gay gene", as he assumes that the cultural notion of hormonally-administered gender transition relies on the same notions of what makes sex and gender as various attempts at biologically determining gayness. The point of contact between the two phenomena is, for him, the fact that hormone therapies have been historically employed as forms of conversion therapy. And so the underlying anxiety beneath Ostertag's concerns is that contemporary "gender transitions" (to use his use of scare quotes) are dangerously close to conversion therapy by other means, and people who pursue them are threatened by a pervasive cultural push towards biological determinism.

In abstract, those concerns are not unsympathetic, and come from a healthy suspicion towards any forms of deterministic social theories of gender. They also in interesting ways reference the long and troubled history of the overlap between homosexuality and transness, which is a subject of great interest to me, but not one I will be going into in depth here (a good overview of that can be found in the introduction to Simon Joyce's LGBT Victorians). However, Ostertag's line of argument runs aground because it fails to examine its own basic assumptions—which is what I mean by questioning his use of the notion of "having gender". His concern is built on an opposition between a supposedly mobile, humanistic, and cultural "persons" contrasted with stable, chemically controlled, and natural "chemicals". It also implicitly repeats the old analytical movement of distinguishing maleness and femaleness as sex from womanhood and masculinity as gender. Though Ostertag does not say so explicitly, he seems to operate on the understanding that sex is natural, while gender is cultural (and therefore sex is unalterable, and gender can change).

Anyone who has ever sat in a seminar room with a competent gender studies teacher should be able to tell that the criticism of this notion is at the absolute bedrock of contemporary queer theory and trans studies, because it is what Gender Trouble, the field-defining book by Judith Butler, is. The crux of Butler's argument, after all, has not been that "gender is a performance" as people insist, but rather that the idea of a stable, biological sex upon which fluid, cultural gender is built is a self-reinforcing fiction. The concept of sex, Butler shows, is not primary to gender, but rather secondary to it: bodies are sexed according to the dominant gender norms of the time, and one of the primary gender norms of our time is the idea that sex is a stable, purely biological, and binary phenomenon. But this understanding is an inscription of gender upon a body, which then is treated as a supposedly stable reference point.

This is a somewhat confusing and arcane line of argument that is not helped by young Butler's fatal immersion in the deep academic language of critical theory. The key part of it, however, is to remember that what counts as "biology" and what counts as "culture" is not immediately given to us and self-obvious; it is, in fact, itself a product of political and discursive distinctions. A good example here is how surgeries on intersex infants tended to be justified. Since it is assumed that a healthy, natural body must be unambiguously either female or male, then an appearance of a body that is not that is treated as a proof of an aberration. Since such a body does not fit within the definition of what a "natural body" is like, its diversity can be then alternated through surgery which works to ultimately reinforce the notion that proper bodies must be male or female, and if they are not such, then they must be made such.

I am bringing all of this up to point out that by noting the culturally constructed assignment of gender to sex hormones, Ostertag fails to follow it up with the examination of the cultural assignment of gender in general. He treats terms like "male" and "female" as self-explanatory and plainly obvious, while harshly criticizing our cultural assumption that estrogen is female and testosterone is male for the same thing: for our belief it is self-explanatory and plainly obvious. He admits as much:

Article:
The issues at the heart of this book are historical. But within academia, study of queer and transgender issues is often viewed through the lens of critical theory. As a result, what students learn runs heavy on philosophy and light on history. Students at many colleges and universities can major in Queer Theory or Gender Studies and graduate with the ability to wield obscure philosophical vocabulary, while remaining unaware of most or all of the basic history recounted in this book. For example, many more are able to carry on a nuanced conversation about the philosophy of gender identity than are aware that the belief that testosterone is a "male" and estrogen a "female" chemical—beliefs so widely accepted today—are the result of decades of advertisement and promotion by the corporations who profit from the sale of those chemicals. This emphasis on philosophy or "theory" to the detriment of history is not serving our community well, and I hope this book will be at least a nudge in the other direction.
Source: pp. 18-19


The issue of the relationship of history to queer theory is hugely complex (I keep saying that; a lot of those issues, sadly, are). But this is not the real issue with this paragraph. Ostertag fails to recognize that the arguments about "philosophy of gender identity" are, in fact, no less arguments about history than his inquiry. The thing is, after all, that it is not just the belief that "testosterone is male" and "estrogen is female" are products of history: any claims about what is male and what is female are that, too. This is, incidentally, a point that trans history makes extremely forcefully, and which has a long tradition in feminist scholarship in general.

Ostertag may not be wrong that queer theory and gender studies courses run light on history, but in practice, so does his own work. As I hope I have already shown, his introduction shows severe inattention to the historical context of many terms he uncritically uses, such as "queer", "transgender" or "transition". Instead, he selectively chooses to historicize sex hormones only, allowing all the adjoining concepts to be represented as trans-historical and immutable. This is a critical flaw in his analysis.

Notably, it is also not a flaw that was unavoidable, as the next (and final) section of the introduction demonstrates. Ostertag devotes it to making a pair of points: first, that he is not an endocrinologist, and that his work therefore should not be seen as an authority on that issue. And this is, I stress it, fine; he writes an intellectual history of an idea, not a medical textbook. Of course, a perennial danger in this kind of science and technology studies is that a humanities scholar may show their ass talking about sciences they don't fully understand, but considering the sheer amount of the same that STEM researchers routinely do when referencing concepts in the humanities, this is understandable. Incidentally, I am not an endocrinologist either, so I can't really comment on a lot of stuff that Ostertag claims re: the field. He does, however, repeat his claim here that he is "not so much writing a new history here as creating a synthesis of two fields of historical scholarship that have been kept in mutual isolation" (p. 19), which, I repeat, neglects much of the preexisting scholarship that did just that.

More interestingly, however, he then follows this caveat up with a brief exploration of how the endocrine system works. Immediately, however, he notes that there is a serious limitation to our medical knowledge, which comes from the nature of the process of knowledge production instead. Showing the trouble surrounding determining what the "normal" temperature of the human body is (and the series of cultural and medical conventions which surround the concept of the "normal"), he argues that we have a bad tendency to take our knowledge for granted, instead of seeing it as influenced by outside factors which themselves factor into what we see as the scientific truth.

Article:
The latest (but not final) word on the subject is that "normal" body temperatures differ from individual to individual, as well as by time of day, season, and activity. Nevertheless, 98.6 is the undisputed cultural norm, indelibly inscribed in our understanding of our bodies. It is the title of several pop songs, a country western song, a male vocal group, a book on survival and preparedness, two novels, a book on meditation, and so on. Though if we happened to have lived in the former Soviet bloc, the magic number glorified in literature and song would have been 97.9.

The story of human body temperature provides a neat example of a system in the human body that was initially thought to be simple and fully understood but turned out to be complex and is still not fully explained. Yet in popular culture, as well as in medical clinics and even in some research labs, it is considered a settled matter with one right answer. It is just the sort of thing the medical historian Anne Fausto-Sterling had in mind when she noted, "A scientific fact, once established, may sometimes be disproved in one field, remain a 'fact' in others, and have a further life in the popular mind."
Source: pp. 20-21


It is striking what conclusions he draws from the somewhat basic observation about the cultural construction of scientific knowledge. For Ostertag, the takeaway is not that the distinction between "natural" and "cultural" states is, itself, a construct, but rather that it is "still not fully explained". While trying to be highly critical of science, Ostertag repeats one of the foundational myths of scientific progress: namely, that there is an objective, pre-cultural truth of the world which can be approached. There is an explanation—a full knowledge state—we just have not arrived at it yet. This runs absolutely contrary to the basic concepts within the field of science and technology studies, which, again, focuses on showing the way how the notion of scientific truth is itself inseparable from the context of its emergence. This, by the way, is what the Fausto-Sterling's quote suggests: a "fact" is not a "fact", but a convention about a concept's facticity.

Ultimately, Ostertag's critique goes half-way, and not further. He is ready to deconstruct some terms, but not others; he is ready to account for some epistemic uncertainty, but not all of it. His analogy to the human body temperature is supposed to indicate that much that we think we know about sex hormones, we do not know, merely assume; which is undoubtedly true, but the same applies to sex itself, which does not entirely concern him. And his dislike for the language of critical theory, which he heavily suggests is vapid and obscurantist, does him no favours in this; at the end of the introduction to Sex, Science, Self, Ostertag promises to criticize the common sense understanding of hormones, but he bases on in his personal, common sense understanding of how the world is.

Anyway, that's the introduction. If there is further interest in this project, please let me know. In any case, if I do move forward with this, I will not be doing a paragraph-by-paragraph reading anymore, mostly because the subsequent chapters are less densely packed with eyebrow-raising concepts (for reasons which are, themselves) rather interesting. That is, however, until we hit the conclusions. The conclusions are a lot.

In the meantime, I have managed to unfuck my ko-fi page after I got banned for peddling nsfw content. Tips welcome!
 
One thing that often strikes me about this sort of masturbatory individual academia is how shockingly arrogant a writer can portray themselves to be. "I am old and I have seen many things and the young people are foolish" didn't work for skinner and it doesn't suit Ostertag either.
 
The Most Tepid Conclusion
Upon further reflection, I have decided against doing a Let's Read of the entire book, for a number of reasons.

Mostly, I believe it not to be worth the time; the above look at the book's introduction is, I believe, sufficient to cover most of the problematic aspects of Ostertag's work. Although there is a lot of objectionable or flatly wrong material presented in the subsequent chapters, the individual criticisms I may make will, ultimately, start repeating themselves very quickly, or become so technical and detail-oriented as to be irrelevant to a more general reader. Putting in significant effort to cover the entire book page by page would, simply, be a waste, and I wanted to absolve myself of the responsibility of doing so and end this analysis on a conclusive note.

Furthermore, some of the analysis in the book, particularly the one in its final section, is difficult to criticize, because it is difficult to engage with. There is a number of assumptions that Ostertag makes which are so widely off-base that the only proper answer to them is to dismiss them outright. To illustrate:

Article:
Conversely, dealing with the medical power structure has been a lifelong priority for transpeople from Lili Elbe to Christine Jorgensen to Reed Erickson to Susan Stryker. As the transgender identity took off in the mid-1990s and was embraced by ever larger numbers of people, more and more queers spent more and more of their lives dealing with doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, surgeons, pharmacies, and insurance companies. Thus the rise of the transgender identity has swung the interface between queer people and medical authority strongly in the opposite direction it was headed in the 1960s and 1970s.
Source: p. 153


In this passage, Ostertag claims that, one: there is a direct line that connects "transgender" (in his usage of the term) people and their activism in such a way that one can establish direct continuity between Elbe, Jorgensen, and Stryker; furthermore, it is vitally important to Ostertag's argument that this continuity runs through persistent attempts at "dealing with" the medical structures, by which he understands submitting to doctor-controlled procedures of medical transition. Considering that Susan Stryker's most famous work (not referenced in the Sex, Science, Self) is probably the 1993 essay "My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix. Performing Transgender Rage" directly criticizes this model of "transsexuality", Ostertag's can only be described as flatly wrong, and once again showing his lack of familiarity with the field he is writing in.

Similar issues abound throughout Sex, Science, Self. To give another example, Ostertag mentions Iran in his analysis, and its high rate of sexual-reassignment surgeries (p. 136-138). In doing so, he repeats the popular media myth of the fact that this rate must be attributed to forcing such surgeries upon gay people, a myth that Najmabadi characterizes as a:

Article:
narrative framing (along with those concerning the suppression of women's rights and other political and labor struggles) [that] circulates within larger reductive and totalizing transnational discourses on Iran and Islam that equate them both with the most conservative factions of the Iranian government and with the views of the most regressive Islamists. Conservative transnational forces seem to have a common stake in ignoring the lively discourse about reform, as well as the history of progressive activism in contemporary Iran and the larger Islamicate world, which offer alternative notions of rights within an Islamic society and alternative modes of living a Muslim life.
Source: Professing Selves, p. 2


Importantly, Najmbadi's authoritative study of transsexuality in Iran, the aforementioned Professing Selves, came out in 2013. Had Bob Ostertag chosen to actually do his research, instead of relying on a single source (his sole citation for the entire section on Iran is a documentary movie), his arguments would have to take a different thrust. However, he did not.

Just as emblematic of the wider problems with Sex, Science, Self is the fact that Ostertag's analysis of Iran completely glosses over the role played by trans activists in Iran, whose work was vital for actually establishing a state-sanctioned form of gender-affirming care. This is entirely beyond Ostertag, as his perspective is firmly, if not obsessively, American. As a key aspect of his argument is his claim that gender transitions are popularized by the expansion of medical markets, he cannot properly account for the way that such transitions function outside of the libertarian ecosystem of US healthcare. Even more importantly, it is also emblematic of his consistent refusal to view trans people as endowed with their own agency and ability to effect social change. Nowhere is this more blatant than in his characterisation of trans people as, essentially, the dupes of Big Pharma—directly against their own protests:

Article:
There is an intellectual current now formulating in academia and trans health care that is trying to articulate an argument that health insurance should cover hormones and surgery and that there is no transgender pathology. This was a big part of why the 2013 DSM changed the diagnosis from "Gender Identity Disorder" to "Gender Dysphoria." Maybe if you have a "dysphoria" instead of a "disorder" you can be pathology-free but still get health insurance. This is a word game. Gender Dysphoria is the only diagnosis in the DSM that uses the term.

Several transgender activists with whom I have discussed these issues responded by asserting that neither they nor any of their transgender friends actually believed they were sick; they just said that to get hormones—in their words, to "game the system." But who is gaming whom? The pharmaceutical industry is a multibillion-dollar beast with a great big megaphone.
Source: p. 154


On a basic, methodological level, this is bad qualitative data analysis; a researcher is not supposed to simply dismiss the information provided to him by his interview partners because they do not align with his theories. But even setting that aside, it is striking how much Ostertag refuses to consider the option that trans people are anything but passive subjects of the expansion of pharmaceutical markets.

This is likewise visible in the way that Ostertag curiously refuses to actually discuss the experiential side of hormone usage among trans people. Much of his book is devoted to establishing—and successfully, I believe—that a lot of our knowledge about what hormones do is built on weak foundations, and that even the assignment of "sex" to those hormones is a cultural process. In doing so, he constantly suggests, though never fully states outright, that he does not believe that hormones have any beneficial effects, or, to be more precise, any "true" effects. This is evidenced by his decision to use the word "transition" as always surrounded by scare quotes, a decision which he himself admits that:

Article:
I am painfully aware that there are many in my own community who will take offense when I put "transitioning" in scare quotes, as I have done throughout this book. This is not my intention and I mean no disrespect. But to take the scare quotes away would be to accept the claim that testosterone and estrogen are substances that cause gender to transition.
Source: p. 165


Again, setting aside the fact that disrespect not meant is not a disrespect not evidenced, it is hard not to frown at the implications here. Ostertag seems to operate under the assumption that trans people believe that hormones are what transitions their gender, and that they are in fact the essence of transitioning. I understand that this claim is possible to defend using a motte-and-bailey routine, where one notes that what is criticized here is the centrality of hormones to trans conceptions of their gender, not the idea of transgender life itself, but I am profoundly uninterested in engaging in such games. The problem is that Ostertag fundamentally misunderstands what trans people get out of hormone use, or why do they take them in the first place. He does not stop to ask, instead believing that there is a perfect congruence between the medicalized vision of transsexuality and trans people's own self-image; just as importantly, he does not actually wonder why so many trans people feel like being on HRT is effective.

It is not hard to see why; intentionally or not, Ostertag ultimately comes to the side of a social contagion vision of transness, or at least one which assumes that the bulk of the trans experience has been fabricated by the medical establishment and the pharmaceutical companies. This is facilitated by his lack of interest in trans history that is not medical history, and by his lack of interest in the basic, ethnographic question of what it is that people transition for. Because, contrary to what he suggests, my own research, as well as lived experiences, suggest that the idea that HRT are the truth of transition and are the truth of gender is not one which is as widely adopted as Ostertag would have the reader believe.

But there is another reason for this particular shortcoming of his analysis, which loops us back to something I have mentioned in the previous update. I noted that Ostertag is ready to provide a critical analysis of the history of "sex hormones", but fails to extend the same critical apparatus to other key concepts that Sex, Science, Self traffics in. For example, he claims that Magnus Hirschfeld should be credited with establishing a "gender spectrum theory" (p. 53), which helped to stabilize uncertainty introduced into the world of sexology by the increasing visibility of intersex infant cases. Again, bracketing the specifics of the claim itself, it is fundamentally an anachronistic one, because the concept of "gender" that Ostertag introduces into Hirschfeld's theory had not been formulated at that time; in fact, several pages later, Ostertag directly references the fact, mentioning John Money's introduction of the notion of "gender" and "gender identity" into sexology. On one hand, this is a minute slip, likely caused by the fact that the word "gender" has eclipsed the older term "sex" in use, but it is also a slip that reveals profound inattention to the historical specificity of theories and concepts that Ostertag takes for granted.

Ostertag is correct in showing that the "sexual assignment" of estrogen and testosterone is a cultural and historical formation. This is why he argues that:

Article:
Anyone who is considering taking estrogen or testosterone to either transition their gender (transgender), amplify their gender (men who wish to be more masculine or women who wish to be more feminine), or reclaim their gender (aging people) should know that the idea that testosterone is the chemical essence of maleness and estrogen the chemical essence of femaleness comes from research done in the earliest days of endocrinology, which was thoroughly debunked nearly a hundred years ago but has lived on primarily through massive advertising campaigns run by the most powerful pharmaceutical corporations.
Source: p. 163


Yet, in doing so, he neglects that transitions are primarily a social fact. The experience of trans people who see their HRT as effective needs not to be understood as an ontological claim about who "really is" a man or a woman (though it is often rhetorically used as such, a distinction that Ostertag fails to recognize). No matter what one's opinion of trans people is, it is indisputably a social reality that people transition and sometimes receive recognition in the gender they transitioned into, whether helped by hormones or not. This is, among other reasons, because "sex" and "gender" are also historical and social constructs. Who is recognized as a man or a woman is just as arbitrary as what hormone is recognized as feminine or masculine. The action of this recognition says nothing about what one believes about the "reality" of transness. This is the source of the anxiety of the trans person as an infiltrator. One needs not to be trans-affirming to notice that sometimes, people transition successfully in the sense that they are recognized as people of the gender they want to be recognized as. Again, this is not ontology; this is sociology. But, judging by his work, Bob Ostertag lacks a sociological imagination.

The problem that Ostertag cannot overcome in his analysis is that HRT is experienced as effective, which is not the same as saying that it is essentially effective. In his arguments against the latter point he constantly ignores the former, treating it as, at best, a case of marketing's success. But even he slips, from time to time. For example, he notes that "the one thing testosterone did, without question, was produce obvious changes in the human body: muscle growth, facial hair, and lowered voices" (p. 61). This is stated during a broader analysis of how testosterone, after its synthesis, failed to find actual therapeutic use. But, obviously, muscle growth, facial hair, and lowered voices are all traits which are culturally coded as masculine. To say so is not to claim that they are the "essence of masculinity" but rather that they are recognized as such; this, in result, means that producing such effects in a body will make it more likely that the body will be recognized as masculine. If we lived in a world that understood masculinity differently, this would not be the case; but we live in a particular sex/gender system passed onto us by history: one where the effects wrought upon our bodies by specific applications of estrogen and testosterone are conditionally, culturally linked to recognition as a member of a specific gender.

This really is basic stuff, and one which can very easily be argued from an anti-trans perspective. There is a part of me that wants to provide Ostertag with notes about how to do so, because if I am to get academically bashed, I would like that to be done with some semblance of professionality, and analysis that trips over its own legs under the lightest scrutiny. But by failing to actually consider the social effects of HRT, and by failing to interrogate the agency of trans people, Ostertag fails to successfully argue his case, which is suspicion towards hormones (and a blanket ban on gender-affirming care for minors, because of course he does that). Instead, what he demonstrates is a poor grasp of existing literature, of academic methodologies, and actual analytic ability. Sex, Science, Self, as a piece of scholarship, is a work I deeply disagree with. But to say that would be too kind for it, for it would imply a possibility of productive contention, but there is very little chance for that, because above all else, Sex, Science, Self as a piece of scholarship is just plain bad, and I can't believe that I've typed almost 18.000 words about it just to arrive at this most tepid conclusion.

But, if I have your attention, I want to direct you to some of my other work, like:
A Machine for Gender, a set of three essays about trans-feminine submissiveness and radical feminism.
a prison, a body, a finished porn story about drone-kink, transness, feminism, and one very sad early-career scholar.
Mercy, and Other Costly Mistakes, a finished monster romance story with porn, alchemy, and people who are kinda like cats.
The Boy-Toy Wife, an ongoing (albeit very slowly updating) porn story about murder, being really low in the hierarchy of wives, and bottoming as a crime-solving practice.

And, of course, if you enjoyed this takedown of a book and want to see more of such contest by tempting me away from my actual work: give me a tip on ko-fi!
 
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