What did German and Japan do for each other?

[Kitsune]

In World War II, what did Japan do in a concrete way for Germany and what did Germany do for Japan?

I think a case might be able to be argued that German did help Japan to some extent by keeping the Western powers busy enough that they could not expend as great assets towards Japan as otherwise. The United States focused their major towards Europe after all and Germany invading the Low Countries made the forces pretty much be orphan forces.

Let us say that Japan stayed an untrustworthy neutral that the United States had to watch, how much would this have shortened the war in Europe if at all? Resources would have to be maintained and probably reinforced in the Pacific even if the United States did not go to war with Japan? Most critical was that the USSR did not have to keep back huge amount of forces to deal with Japan and Germany was defeated in the USSR more than anything else.

Going back to Japan, the war in the Pacific was largely a naval war and not sure how much quicker that could be concluded either without having to deal with Germany. I image that it would be sped up to some extent but not by all that much either.

Finally, did either German or Japan give the other anything critical in terms of cargo or technical exchange? I know there was a little trade but it seems insignificant because all of it had to go through submarines or other low bulk means. At the same time, I know that the United States and United Kingdom shared quite a bit in both regards.

 

[Eliar]

Why do you limit yourself just to the low countries?

Germany steamrolling Western Europe, France included did not just keep them busy. It utterly crippled their ability to respond to Japanese adventurism.

Germany gave Japan the French Indochina without a fight, stripped the rest of any real ability or chance to reinforce their colonial garrisons with troops and ships from the homelands. At the same time it locked Japan in collision course with the WAllies since the vulnerability of the european colonial holdings suddenly became very appetizing indeed but more critically Japan snapping up the French Indochina triggered the crippling US total embargo. No chance for Japan to remain neutral from that point on.

Japan on the other hand gave Germany a very pissed off US. Pearl Harbor ensured that WW2 would be a war to the knife with no such silliness as truces or negotiated peace. Thank you Tojo!

Let us say that Japan stayed an untrustworthy neutral that the United States had to watch, how much would this have shortened the war in Europe if at all? Resources would have to be maintained and probably reinforced in the Pacific even if the United States did not go to war with Japan? Most critical was that the USSR did not have to keep back huge amount of forces to deal with Japan and Germany was defeated in the USSR more than anything else.

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The War in Europe would have probably lengthened significantly and may have ended with a negotiated peace? The US would certainly step in later and with out the bloody mindeness brought about by Pearl Harbor. Uncertain on how the nuclear program would have been affected by a later and hesitant entrance to the war by the US.

Going back to Japan, the war in the Pacific was largely a naval war and not sure how much quicker that could be concluded either without having to deal with Germany. I image that it would be sped up to some extent but not by all that much either.

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Imagine Japan deciding to go at it alone. Now imagine the British,French,US and Netherlands navies showing up all together. Not to mention the massive reinforcements in all manner of troops from the homelands.

 

[xa na xa]

The War in Europe would have probably lengthened significantly and may have ended with a negotiated peace? The US would certainly step in later and with out the bloody mindeness brought about by Pearl Harbor. Uncertain on how the nuclear program would have been affected by a later and hesitant entrance to the war by the US.

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Gave you a like for your comment in general (particularly about French Indochina), but I want to quibble with this part.

I'm not sure US entry in the war would have been delayed for long without Japan.

More and more, FDR was pushing towards belligerency and aggressively supporting the anti-Axis powers. I think it was only a question of time before a casus belli incident occurred, like a U-boot sinking a US convoy escort. I'd speculate that an escalating Battle Of The Atlantic would see the US and Germany fully at war no later than mid to late 1942, and probably rather earlier.

 

[Night]

The US would certainly step in later and with out the bloody mindeness brought about by Pearl Harbor. Uncertain on how the nuclear program would have been affected by a later and hesitant entrance to the war by the US.

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The United States joining the war in late '42 without needing to fight Japan would have been a disaster for Germany, and it's improbable it would have delayed much longer considering Roosevelt was actively preparing the country for it, engaging in Lend-Lease, and having an undeclared war in the Atlantic. They're still heavily committed to Russia, the US is better-prepared to go to war, and rather than Torch you're likely to get a variant of Operation Roundup or Operation Sledgehammer and a spring 1943 Second Front against an unprepared Atlantic Wall manned by far fewer German troops and with the option to land anywhere it damn well pleases under cover of US and British carrier aircraft.

 

[Night]

In World War II, what did Japan do in a concrete way for Germany and what did Germany do for Japan?

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To answer the question, the relationship was essentially parasitic. Aside from some minor technical exchanges, they basically hoped that the others would draw the bulk of the Western Allies upon them.

 

[stevep]

To answer the question, the relationship was essentially parasitic. Aside from some minor technical exchanges, they basically hoped that the others would draw the bulk of the Western Allies upon them.

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Very true. There were the occasional minor exchanges of technology and equipment but otherwise virtually nothing. Probably a lot more importantly they never really talked to each other. Hitler assumed the Japanese would join in attacking the Soviets in June 41 without even checking with his diplomats who might have told him that Japan was already looking south for materials. Similarly the Japanese gave no warning about their attacks in Dec 41 and only Hitler's stupidity made him declare war on the US a couple of days later. If he hadn't the US joining the war in Europe would have been delayed, although probably not by more than about a year.

If Japan had never triggered a major international war in the Far East it would almost certainly have shortened the war in Europe. However, even if the US had still entered the European War in Dec 41, I can't see the western powers try something like Roundup or Sledgehammer as they would be likely to be serious disasters. Churchill was far too rash much of the time but I don't think he would have been that reckless. Especially since the forces involved would have been overwhelmingly from Britain and the empire and we could have ill afforded losses on that scale. Plus things like the massed USN CV forces, or even major USAAF strength in Britain wouldn't have been available until 44 in the 1st case and 43 in the 2nd.

What you might have had without Japan entering the war, would have been an earlier Torch, possibly in the summer of 42 once some US forces were available to join the British ones for such an operation. [ Presuming shipping was available of course as the Battle of the Atlantic was still at its height and if the Germans do what they did OTL attacking US coastal shipping when the US enters the war your going to see a hell of a lot of disruption.] From there some experience could be gained and possibly a strike against Sicily at least then you might get a landing in N France in 43.

 

[Kitsune]

Very true. There were the occasional minor exchanges of technology and equipment but otherwise virtually nothing. Probably a lot more importantly they never really talked to each other. Hitler assumed the Japanese would join in attacking the Soviets in June 41 without even checking with his diplomats who might have told him that Japan was already looking south for materials. Similarly the Japanese gave no warning about their attacks in Dec 41 and only Hitler's stupidity made him declare war on the US a couple of days later. If he hadn't the US joining the war in Europe would have been delayed, although probably not by more than about a year.

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Hear it argued that Germany pushed Japan to declare war against the United States and Hitler declared war with the United States because he saw them as being defacto at war anyway.

 

[Alane1]

I suspect no US war with Japan would rather require that Japan not conduct its war in China which did a great job in pissing of the american public with even the american isolationists of viewing the possibility of war against japan even as they opposed any possibility of getting involved in Europe and the US has been in the process of a US military build up in the US Philippines that had only partly been completed at the time of Pearl Harbor with the intent of attacking Japanese bases in Formosa and southern China once war started.

Part of how FDR was able to justify carrying about military buildups in the late 1930s up 1941 in spite of the isolationists was japan's threat was the Japanese war in Asia means that the US might be lagging behind what they were doing historically even if now they were facing only Germany.

 

[Night]

Hear it argued that Germany pushed Japan to declare war against the United States and Hitler declared war with the United States because he saw them as being defacto at war anyway.

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Hitler and the US is an interesting question, because he was actually quite adamant not to provoke the Americans to his U-boat forces, even after it was obvious the Americans no longer cared if they sank a U-boat. At the same time he was reading the Washington military attache's reports telling him, with ever-receding timelines, that America wouldn't be a factor before the war was won and appeared to believe them; he apparently took the step of declaring war on America with those specifically in mind.

What history I've read on the subject suggests a mercurial decision to do so, perhaps driven by the desire to declare war before the Americans did for propaganda reasons ("We will always strike the first blow!").

 

[Kitsune]

Hitler and the US is an interesting question, because he was actually quite adamant not to provoke the Americans to his U-boat forces, even after it was obvious the Americans no longer cared if they sank a U-boat. At the same time he was reading the Washington military attache's reports telling him, with ever-receding timelines, that America wouldn't be a factor before the war was won and appeared to believe them; he apparently took the step of declaring war on America with those specifically in mind.

What history I've read on the subject suggests a mercurial decision to do so, perhaps driven by the desire to declare war before the Americans did for propaganda reasons ("We will always strike the first blow!").

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I wish I could remember my source. It could have been an army staff college lecture. Try to see if i can find it.

 

[Kitsune]

If this is accurate, it does explain the situation

Hitler had received no advance notice from the Japanese about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although he and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had verbally indicated a willingness to join Japan in war against America however it broke out, Hitler had absolutely no formal treaty obligation to declare war on the United States. Such a treaty had in fact been drafted and circulated in the weeks prior to Pearl Harbor, but it remained unsigned. Not that a treaty with Hitler was worth the paper it was written on, as former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Josef Stalin had already discovered.

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http://www.thehistoryreader.com/mod...ler-arguably-insane-pivotal-decision-history/

 

[Night]

Plus things like the massed USN CV forces, or even major USAAF strength in Britain wouldn't have been available until 44 in the 1st case and 43 in the 2nd.

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The USAAF expected to have several thousand aircraft available for Roundup. It is worth remembering that 8th Air Force had effectively driven the Luftwaffe back into Germany by the end of '43. Without a need to keep carriers in the Pacific or combat losses the USN can muster 2 Lexingtons, 3 Yorktowns, Wasp, and Ranger, for a total 7 fleet CVs and something like 550 aircraft by mid-1942. By the first of 1943 to that total must be added Essex and two ships of Independence class for about 150 planes, probably slightly more. By summer of 1943, three more Essexes and and four more Independences can be added with around 360 more planes and we have surpassed the thousand aircraft mark using the fast carriers alone. To that could easily be added at least 30 to 40 CVEs with about two dozen planes each.

I have not yet counted any British fleet or escort carriers, please note.

A thousand aircraft is rather powerful card to play. Even 550 aircraft would have been more than enough to contest the skies over the Kiel area effectively if it was desired.

 

[Shaithan]

The War in Europe would have probably lengthened significantly and may have ended with a negotiated peace? The US would certainly step in later and with out the bloody mindeness brought about by Pearl Harbor. Uncertain on how the nuclear program would have been affected by a later and hesitant entrance to the war by the US.

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Seriously? No. The war was decided in the East, anything the US did in Europe was at worst a distraction from the real fight, aka Russia crushing the Wehrmacht.

Japan on the other hand gave Germany a very pissed off US. Pearl Harbor ensured that WW2 would be a war to the knife with no such silliness as truces or negotiated peace. Thank you Tojo!

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Eh, that wasn't too much of a problem, the pissed of Soviets on the other hand were and we brought those upon ourselves.

Kiel

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Oh, how cute. To put it in an American perspective, you have Air Control over Tampa with your fleet only able to reach Miami. Because you sure as hell are not going to force the Skaggerak.

Seriously, look at a bloody map. If you want any landings in Northern Germany, you're basically better served trying for the coast of Jutland and pushing down the flat land from there. One might try and force landings between Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, it will be difficult though and you are likely to lose quite a few of the bigger ships involved to beachings. The North Sea can get quite shallow off the German coast.

 

[stevep]

Hear it argued that Germany pushed Japan to declare war against the United States and Hitler declared war with the United States because he saw them as being defacto at war anyway.

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Don't think I've heard the former before? - about him pushing Japan to war with the US - but he was willing after Pearl Harbour to join the conflict because he thought Russia was nearly defeated and that he could help the Japanese defeat the western power. As well as being angry at US interference in the Atlantic and concerned about his own declining health and desire to complete the task of making Germany the supreme world power before he died.

 

[stevep]

I suspect no US war with Japan would rather require that Japan not conduct its war in China which did a great job in pissing of the american public with even the american isolationists of viewing the possibility of war against japan even as they opposed any possibility of getting involved in Europe and the US has been in the process of a US military build up in the US Philippines that had only partly been completed at the time of Pearl Harbor with the intent of attacking Japanese bases in Formosa and southern China once war started.

Part of how FDR was able to justify carrying about military buildups in the late 1930s up 1941 in spite of the isolationists was japan's threat was the Japanese war in Asia means that the US might be lagging behind what they were doing historically even if now they were facing only Germany.

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That would be the big issue. If Japan isn't deep into China, or makes some sort of peace agreement then a lot of the tensions in the Pacific and drivers for war there disappear. That's rather difficult to see however and also given how militarised and xenophobic it was Japan might well then attempt to join the 'crusade' against the Soviets. The fact Japan, with its navy, was the only even vaguely capable and willing to threaten US interests was a factor in helping Roosevelt get some of his military build up through Congress.

 

[stevep]

If this is accurate, it does explain the situation

http://www.thehistoryreader.com/mod...ler-arguably-insane-pivotal-decision-history/

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Thanks for the reference. Hadn't heard about those negotiations before but the general guist of it sounds right.

I have heard different things about American public opinion with some sources suggesting that isolationism was largely defeated by that time. Think a lot depends on how pollsters phased the questions and how they were interpreted. There was a debate on a naval site where someone dug up a lot of polls of US opinion throughout 41. A lot of people were saying Hitler had to be defeated but whether they were meaning the US should enter the war to do it was the subject of dispute. Frankly I don't know how things would have gone if Hitler had simply kept his mouth shut. Would have been awkward for America being allied to Britain in the Far East but technically neutral elsewhere but how long it would have taken for them to be fully active in the European conflict and what butterflies there would have been I don't know.

 

[xa na xa]

I suspect no US war with Japan would rather require that Japan not conduct its war in China which did a great job in pissing of the american public with even the american isolationists of viewing the possibility of war against japan even as they opposed any possibility of getting involved in Europe and the US has been in the process of a US military build up in the US Philippines that had only partly been completed at the time of Pearl Harbor with the intent of attacking Japanese bases in Formosa and southern China once war started.

Part of how FDR was able to justify carrying about military buildups in the late 1930s up 1941 in spite of the isolationists was japan's threat was the Japanese war in Asia means that the US might be lagging behind what they were doing historically even if now they were facing only Germany.

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That would be the big issue. If Japan isn't deep into China, or makes some sort of peace agreement then a lot of the tensions in the Pacific and drivers for war there disappear. That's rather difficult to see however and also given how militarised and xenophobic it was Japan might well then attempt to join the 'crusade' against the Soviets. The fact Japan, with its navy, was the only even vaguely capable and willing to threaten US interests was a factor in helping Roosevelt get some of his military build up through Congress.

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It was the occupation of Indochina, and the total oil embargo in reaction to that, that made war a few months later happen.

Strategically, bases in southern Indochina made western possessions in SEA very vulnerable to Japanese attacks; and that's why the US reacted so strongly with the embargo.

And the oil embargo meant that Japan had only reserves for a short time (like, just little more than a year iirc). This time limit is why the Japanese leadership felt compelled to choose the headlong rush of Pearl Harbor.

If Japan had limited its military activity to China instead of expanding and threatening western colonies (incl. the Philipines) by exploiting the helpless situation of France after its fall, the US would have continued to pump support to Chinese forces to resist the Japanese occupation, but it would not have taken the drastic measures that lead to war before the end of 1941.

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The occupation of French Indochina always get treated like some kind of completely unimportant trivia, when it was arguably one the most fateful events of World War II.

 

[stevep]

The USAAF expected to have several thousand aircraft available for Roundup. It is worth remembering that 8th Air Force had effectively driven the Luftwaffe back into Germany by the end of '43. Without a need to keep carriers in the Pacific or combat losses the USN can muster 2 Lexingtons, 3 Yorktowns, Wasp, and Ranger, for a total 7 fleet CVs and something like 550 aircraft by mid-1942. By the first of 1943 to that total must be added Essex and two ships of Independence class for about 150 planes, probably slightly more. By summer of 1943, three more Essexes and and four more Independences can be added with around 360 more planes and we have surpassed the thousand aircraft mark using the fast carriers alone. To that could easily be added at least 30 to 40 CVEs with about two dozen planes each.

I have not yet counted any British fleet or escort carriers, please note.

A thousand aircraft is rather powerful card to play. Even 550 aircraft would have been more than enough to contest the skies over the Kiel area effectively if it was desired.

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I see some problems with this scenario:
a) Exact timing as I thought you were talking about Operation Sledgehammer, which was a plan for autumn 42, instead of Operation Torch. Talking about something in mid/late 43 is a possibility as by that time the US is getting an army together and considerable progress is being made in winning in the Atlantic but its still going to mean a hell of a risk, especially since if you don't do Husky [Sicily] let alone other operations in Italy the US forces especially are desperately short of experience and the British have markedly less. Also would there be time to develop and deploy things like the Mulberries, without which a single storm could turn such an attempt into a disaster, with only minimal German involvement.

b) Similarly yes the allied airforces were increasingly dominant over western Europe by the end of 43 as you say but that's 6 months later than the latest date your mentioning. It required the longer range Mustangs and the like, which only became available in late 43 to destroy much of the Luftwaffe in Germany itself, which could have been moved out to oppose such an invasion.

c) That CV force would require stripping everything from the Pacific and elsewhere as well as assuming that all ships are available at the same time - which would be difficult both politically and logistically. Furthermore that they could be supported and supplied from Britain. The Battle of the Atlantic is being won but hasn't been yet so doing this isn't going to be easy. Also by their nature carrier a/c have relatively short endurance in terms of days spent in the battle zone. Once their used up their stockpiles of aviation fuel and bombs and torpedoes on the carriers then they have to return to port to resupply.

d) Ground based air forces are more flexible this way but they also need bases and resources and for the USAAF much of this would need to be built up very quickly. Possibly if you manage to persuade the political leadership to force the strategic bombing supporters of both air forces - which were in domination of those services in both UK and US - to end all strategic bombing you might get enough airfields and supplies made available in 43 and be able to supply them.

e) Somewhere like Kiel would be totally impractical, as Shaithan mentions as the range simply isn't there. Even the longer ranged fighter would only be able to spend limited time over the combat zone and your going to lose a lot more a/c and crew ditching due to damage/breakdowns meaning they can't make it back to Britain. The same problem would apply to the naval forces trying to supply fire support and escorting the landing and supply ships. Especially if the Germans had developed their guided bombs as OTL this could be costly for even the biggest ships. Which is ignoring whether tides, mindfields, coastal defences and the like are suitable for a major invasion. There were good reasons why only Normandy and Calais were seriously considered for landings OTL.

f) One other point to note is that if you did manage to get a sustainable landing in N France in 43 it probably wouldn't end the war more than 6 months earlier than OTL because of assorted logistical and deployment considerations. Also as Shaithan made reference to one result of this would be much, much higher western casualties, especially for the US as Britain's forces are likely to be exhausted earlier so the US would have to meet more of the butchers bill. You will save a fair number of Red Army soldiers and some numbers of civilians in eastern Europe but that might not make the result popular in Washington and elsewhere. Also its unlikely to change the final dividing line between western and eastern spheres much.

 

[stevep]

It was the occupation of Indochina, and the total oil embargo in reaction to that, that made war a few months later happen.

Strategically, bases in southern Indochina made western possessions in SEA very vulnerable to Japanese attacks; and that's why the US reacted so strongly with the embargo.

And the oil embargo meant that Japan had only reserves for a short time (like, just little more than a year iirc). This time limit is why the Japanese leadership felt compelled to choose the headlong rush of Pearl Harbor.

If Japan had limited its military activity to China instead of expanding and threatening western colonies (incl. the Philipines) by exploiting the helpless situation of France after its fall, the US would have continued to pump support to Chinese forces to resist the Japanese occupation, but it would not have taken the drastic measures that lead to war before the end of 1941.

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The occupation of French Indochina always get treated like some kind of completely unimportant trivia, when it was arguably one the most fateful events of World War II.

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Very true. I have read the primary purpose of the occupation of northern FIC was to cut off supply routes to the Chinese and also it gave additional bases for attacks on their positions in the south. However it definitely made the more important - in terms of raw materials - British and Dutch colonies reachable in a fairly sudden strike. The oil embargo and also related embargoes on things such as steel sales to Japan gave the Japanese a dead line but the US government seems to have misread either what the Japanese response would be and/or how long they would have to prepare for a Japanese attack. [I think the date of the attacks were also related to the need to complete the main southern conquests before the monsoon hits but the oil shortages especially were a crucial matter.]

However even if Japan hadn't occupied FIC I'm not sure how much longer they could have funded the purchase of raw materials given the massive resource sink China was becoming.

 

[Alane1]

It was the occupation of Indochina, and the total oil embargo in reaction to that, that made war a few months later happen.

Strategically, bases in southern Indochina made western possessions in SEA very vulnerable to Japanese attacks; and that's why the US reacted so strongly with the embargo.

And the oil embargo meant that Japan had only reserves for a short time (like, just little more than a year iirc). This time limit is why the Japanese leadership felt compelled to choose the headlong rush of Pearl Harbor.

If Japan had limited its military activity to China instead of expanding and threatening western colonies (incl. the Philipines) by exploiting the helpless situation of France after its fall, the US would have continued to pump support to Chinese forces to resist the Japanese occupation, but it would not have taken the drastic measures that lead to war before the end of 1941.

#####

The occupation of French Indochina always get treated like some kind of completely unimportant trivia, when it was arguably one the most fateful events of World War II.

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The occupation of French IndoChina was extremely important though it should be noted while the total Embargo against Oil, Steel scrap and other goods started in 1940 the US state department had already made efforts to prevent US banking from lending credit to Japan businesses in 1938 and in 1939 terminated the 1911 commercial treaty between the United States and Japan after which the US immediately cut of the sale of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline that year to the empire of Japan which for the Japanese economy was extremely bad even before they later got hit with the complete embargo on oil, steel and numerous other goods the next year.

 

[Kitsune]

b) Similarly yes the allied airforces were increasingly dominant over western Europe by the end of 43 as you say but that's 6 months later than the latest date your mentioning. It required the longer range Mustangs and the like, which only became available in late 43 to destroy much of the Luftwaffe in Germany itself, which could have been moved out to oppose such an invasion.

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There is so many factors with range that it is sometimes hard to compare ranges between services.
Still, I think the F4F can actually carry more fuel than the P-51.

Thanks for the reference. Hadn't heard about those negotiations before but the general guist of it sounds right.

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I also found this

 

[Night]

Seriously, look at a bloody map.

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I did and have. It was chosen because of its remoteness from the UK and it's fighter bases was illustrative, rather than as a particularly viable spot.

Also the argument about the North Sea is deeply unconvincing considering how well-charted it would be by that point. Very few ships ultimately ended up beaching while fighting in the Solomons or off the North Coast of New Guinea, despite relying on literally 18th Century charts in many cases. In northern Europe?

I see some problems with this scenario:
a) Exact timing as I thought you were talking about Operation Sledgehammer, which was a plan for autumn 42, instead of Operation Torch."

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Ignoring that I mentioned Operation Roundup as well. This is a straight untruth about what was said, man, come on!

b) Similarly yes the allied airforces were increasingly dominant over western Europe by the end of 43 as you say but that's 6 months later than the latest date your mentioning. It required the longer range Mustangs and the like, which only became available in late 43 to destroy much of the Luftwaffe in Germany itself, which could have been moved out to oppose such an invasion.

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The P-47 and P-38 are already available in numbers for long-range escort by summer of '43 and are flying as far as the German border, which is one of the primary reasons the Luftwaffe will move back to German skies; they are ineffective engaging escorted bombers before they reach that point. It is also worth pointing out that the Luftwaffe redeploying to oppose an invasion is actually a very questionable decision in this situation as a knock-down drag-out with a thousand carrier planes, including their tactical bombers to run counter-air missions, will simply destroy them much faster. (The situation becomes worse if 8th Air Force is devoted to saturation bombing of their bases, something that was never done during the war but could have been and was at different points during the jet and escort crisises proposed, since some of the bombers rarely reached their targets even if intercepted.) The Luftwaffe had very little success against USN combatant shipping during the war as well, which was much better armed to fight off air attack than most British ships. And their skill at anti-shipping operations in general was not something to write home about; it wasn't a large part of their doctrine or training, and their stocks of available antishipping weapons were actually fairly meager.

You're proposing feeding them into a meatgrinder for very uncertain gains.

c) That CV force would require stripping everything from the Pacific and elsewhere as well as assuming that all ships are available at the same time - which would be difficult both politically and logistically

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Japan has backed down at this point, or otherwise assented to US demands re: China, or its economy has collapsed. Otherwise they would have joined the war. They also no longer represent a viable threat in other dimensions; even the most frothingly optimistic Japanese recognized, for example, that by 1943 the USN would have an insurmountable edge in surface combatants, having built 4 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 82 destroyers over the course of 1942, in addition to 18 carrier hulls of different types to Japan's one battleship, four cruisers, and ten destroyers plus four carriers (two optimistically-rated CVLs and two CVEs). During the course of 1943 the US would have commissioned 65 carrier hulls, 2 battleships, 11 cruisers, and 128 destroyers, not counting anything smaller than a full DD; Japan would build two CVEs, three cruisers, and twelve destroyers.

The moment in which it was opportune for Japan to strike has passed, and the impulse to do so has either been checked before this point or overridden by the awareness no victory is possible any longer.

Similarly, the argument that the Battle of the Atlantic has not been won is questionable at best. Black May was in Spring 1943, and the Germans would never do better; Dornitz withdrew his boats from the convoy lanes in the summer. If one wants to go further, the Allies won the Battle of the Atlantic in Spring 1943, but Germany had already lost the battle of the Atlantic the moment the US entered the war and then built nearly 5.5 million tons of merchant shipping in 1942, an amount the U-boatwaffe could not hope to overcome in terms of sinkings.

The argument that a carrier task force is unable to remain off the target and have a knock-down drag-out with land-based air is fundamentally ignorant, because that is exactly what USN carrier forces did from the invasion of the Gilberts in Spring 1943 to the end of the war. If we were talking about Japan, sure, but by 1943 the USN is good enough at UNREP to keep a carrier force at sea and in action for over a month, if not longer.

 

[stevep]

Night

Not surprised your calling people liars when they point out the flaws in your arguments. If your talking about cancelling Torch and mentioning Sledgehammer than the obvious conclusion is that your assuming a late 42 invasion of France. Roundup was a planned follow up to that so doesn't change the logic of that assumption. When you start talking about resources available in late 43 for an invasion several months earlier - even when your clarified your talking about the summer of 43 - your further undermining your argument.

Also you are ignoring all questions of logistics, which despite your pipedreams DO matter.

On the Atlantic the worst point was actually in early 42 when the US entered the war but refused to use convoying in its coastal waters and the Caribbean, along with other errors, which meant that losses grew dramatically. The final end run for the U boats in terms of threatening the supply route was May 43 but once that's done AND its clear to the allies that has occurred you then have to ship the men, equipment, supplies etc. to Britain to build up for an invasion which takes time and a hell of a lot of shipping.

Not to mention those men have to be recruited, trained and equipped and the US simply didn't have the time and resources to prepare that many troops by mid 43 OTL. It will be a bit easier without a Pacific war but not greatly so.

You may blindly assume that Japan has collapsed but no one else has made that decision. If say its withdrawn from much of China as part of a peace deal, in response to economic pressure it is still probably a militaristic regime desiring expansion and with a lot of resources freed up for operations in the Pacific and reasons for resenting the US. True a strike south is markedly more difficult but if the US is stripping all its major warships from the Pacific its going to be tempting to the Japanese.

 

[obssesednuker]

The argument that a carrier task force is unable to remain off the target and have a knock-down drag-out with land-based air is fundamentally ignorant, because that is exactly what USN carrier forces did from the invasion of the Gilberts in Spring 1943 to the end of the war. If we were talking about Japan, sure, but by 1943 the USN is good enough at UNREP to keep a carrier force at sea and in action for over a month, if not longer.

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Continental Europe is rather a vastly different beast from a string of isolated Japanese island fortresses. The Japanese never had decent radar nor did they have any form of co-ordinated air defence network. Any carrier task force will be unlikely to be able to hide its position for long, if at all, as German reconnaissance aircraft and submarines in the North Sea will be numerous. And while a task force can strike a wide area, the Luftwaffe can similarly concentrate from dozens of disparate bases to mass at a single point.

Attrition would be high, as any worthwhile target would have heavy flak cover, superior German fighters could use their speed and firepower to attack and then withdraw and the USN would always have to keep forces back to protect its own task force. As well, the turn around time for the carrier aircraft would be longer and the often poor North Sea weather would ensure that many days operations could not be conducted at all. There would be no chance of any sort of sustained and continuous bombing campaign. Just a series of mostly nuisance raids, if on a large scale.

And once the Germans located the carriers it would be similarly easy for them to concentrate a large force of aircraft and throw it at the task force. Given the superiority of German land based aircraft to USN carrier aircraft, the Germans will likely prevail quite handily.

 

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Continental Europe is rather a vastly different beast from a string of isolated Japanese island fortresses. The Japanese never had decent radar nor did they have any form of co-ordinated air defence network. Any carrier task force will be unlikely to be able to hide its position for long, if at all, as German reconnaissance aircraft and submarines in the North Sea will be numerous. And while a task force can strike a wide area, the Luftwaffe can similarly concentrate from dozens of disparate bases to mass at a single point.

Attrition would be high, as any worthwhile target would have heavy flak cover, superior German fighters could use their speed and firepower to attack and then withdraw and the USN would always have to keep forces back to protect its own task force. As well, the turn around time for the carrier aircraft would be longer and the often poor North Sea weather would ensure that many days operations could not be conducted at all. There would be no chance of any sort of sustained and continuous bombing campaign. Just a series of mostly nuisance raids, if on a large scale.

And once the Germans located the carriers it would be similarly easy for them to concentrate a large force of aircraft and throw it at the task force. Given the superiority of German land based aircraft to USN carrier aircraft, the Germans will likely prevail quite handily.

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This is wrong on several levels.

The Germans cannot concentrate; the North Sea coast does not have the bases during this time period and the bases that do exist do not have the capacity. If they try to move a thousand or more aircraft into the theater they will be exposing most of them to easy destruction on the ground in the first week or so. Especially the multi-engine bombers that they will rely on to go after heavy ships in any serious way.

Most of the targets in a counter-air mission will not have heavy flak protection, which is concentrated around cities and major industries in cities. In addition, most flak will not be set up to deal with the kind low-level attacks likely to be employed by naval aircraft, and finally in 1943 the flak protection of any German target is going to be orders of magnitude lesser than in 1944.

German fighters circa 1943 are less than you think. The armament of the Bf 109 is markedly inferior to American aircraft and honestly anemic enough that if Zeros have difficulty with them, so will 109s. If equipped with Rüstsatz kits to improve it to a competitive level the performance advantages of early G-model 109s over Hellcat vanish. FW190 A-3 and A-4 are actually inferior to Corsair, though later models of the type won't be.