Russian Civil War in 1905

Anchises

Le Charismeur
Location
Germany
Pronouns
He/Him
What if the unsuccessful Revolution of OTL picks up more steam and seriously threatens the Tsar?

What could be the causes for a stronger Revolution?

The implications of a Civil War in 1905 are huge. This is a perfect POD to seriously change the power dynamic in Europe. WW1 is potentially butterflied away or completely changed.
 
The social democrats and the workers movement in general during this period was far weaker than in 1917, although it could be said that the workers movement was weak even in 1917 but events had it rapidly develop. In my mind, either a reactionary government would win, having probably the support of the majority of the army in this scenario, or a sort of broad conservative/liberal government would emerge.
 
Full on civil war?

Russia gets invaded from all sides, to keep the vile communists in check off course, not to grab juicy pieces of skin nopenopenopenope
 
The social democrats and the workers movement in general during this period was far weaker than in 1917, although it could be said that the workers movement was weak even in 1917 but events had it rapidly develop. In my mind, either a reactionary government would win, having probably the support of the majority of the army in this scenario, or a sort of broad conservative/liberal government would emerge.

Agreed. I thought about the idea of a much more devastating loss for the Tsarist government. Something to really weaken and divide the reactionary Whites.

Full on civil war?

Russia gets invaded from all sides, to keep the vile communists in check off course, not to grab juicy pieces of skin nopenopenopenope

Why didn't Germany attack IOTL though? 1905 would have been a perfect opportunity to break the diplomatic encirclement easily.

We shouldn't underestimate the family ties between monarchs and the willingness to defend the status quo.
 
Why didn't Germany attack IOTL though? 1905 would have been a perfect opportunity to break the diplomatic encirclement easily.

We shouldn't underestimate the family ties between monarchs and the willingness to defend the status quo.

Also, Russo-German relations were fairly good for a long period of time in European history. Even after the Franco-Russian Alliance, there were still certain lingering elements of good relations between the two countries. I would argue they didn't really end decisively until Russia formed the Triple Entente with Britain and France.

Honestly, in some ways, it's downright strange that Russia and Germany had a major falling-out: two staunchly conservative absolute monarchies with a long history of cooperation and alliance stretching back to before German unification.
 
Also, Russo-German relations were fairly good for a long period of time in European history. Even after the Franco-Russian Alliance, there were still certain lingering elements of good relations between the two countries. I would argue they didn't really end decisively until Russia formed the Triple Entente with Britain and France.

Honestly, in some ways, it's downright strange that Russia and Germany had a major falling-out: two staunchly conservative absolute monarchies with a long history of cooperation and alliance stretching back to before German unification.

I would mostly agree with you. Germany and Russia mostly clashed over the Balkans. Due to ethnic kinship and inflexible diplomatic thought Germany was hellbent on strenghtening A-H. Take A-H out of the picture and there aren't many hurdles for a German-Russian alliance.

I wouldn't call the German Empire a staunchly conservative absolute monarchy though. The SPD was there to stay and even the reactionaries were unwilling to change that with violence. The democratic elements became more and more influential and the power of the Junker and the Kaiser was slooowly but steadily eroding.
 
I would mostly agree with you. Germany and Russia mostly clashed over the Balkans. Due to ethnic kinship and inflexible diplomatic thought Germany was hellbent on strenghtening A-H. Take A-H out of the picture and there aren't many hurdles for a German-Russian alliance.

I wouldn't call the German Empire a staunchly conservative absolute monarchy though. The SPD was there to stay and even the reactionaries were unwilling to change that with violence. The democratic elements became more and more influential and the power of the Junker and the Kaiser was slooowly but steadily eroding.

The notion of Germanic solidarity takes a downright bizarre turn when one considers that there were a considerable amount of Germans in the Russian Empire and that the Baltic Germans actually had places of considerable prominence in the Imperial Russian bureaucracy and government. So at some point, amidst all of this great power competition, you had Germans on literally every side.

That's fair, Germany in 1914 actually had a wider electoral franchise than Great Britain (the supposed beacon of democracy and liberalism in Europe). Though I think it's fair to describe the Imperial German state as one that was illiberal with democratic elements but, as you say, in the process of changing.
 
The notion of Germanic solidarity takes a downright bizarre turn when one considers that there were a considerable amount of Germans in the Russian Empire and that the Baltic Germans actually had places of considerable prominence in the Imperial Russian bureaucracy and government. So at some point, amidst all of this great power competition, you had Germans on literally every side.

That's fair, Germany in 1914 actually had a wider electoral franchise than Great Britain (the supposed beacon of democracy and liberalism in Europe). Though I think it's fair to describe the Imperial German state as one that was illiberal with democratic elements but, as you say, in the process of changing.

That is really true. I would actually go as far as saying that Germans were a privileged class in the Tsarist Empire. I mean Paul von Renenkampff invaded Eastern Prussia and that is as German as it gets, at least name and ancestry wise.

I would argue though, that most of these Germano-Russians were fiercly loyal to the Tsar. At least the ones active in the military or bureaucracy. So from a German perspective the Austrians actually felt like "proper" Germans.

Also there is a healthy degree of "Realpolitik" involved. A-H was easily controlled and clearly the junior partner, even prior to WW1. A Russo-Germanic alliance would have required serious compromise and backing down from both sides due to overlapping spheres of interest.

I would agree with your assessment. Iliberal constitutional monarchy seems like a good fit to describe the Empire in the early 20th century. I had a great discussion back at ah.com, where I argued that most of the constiutional problems of the German Empire were easily fixable with a few changes and a lot of tradition.

In a TL where the German Empire avoids, wins or at least survives WW1 certain developments would be virtually guaranteed to happen. Ironically Britain and Germany would resemble each other, in the sense that the underlying political structure would be percieved as archaic but political traditions and conventions would make them normal democracies.
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As a different point: I am pondering changed alliances for an alt-WW1. 1905 seems like an attractive POD because there is great potential to rapidly change the political scene in Europe.

I was always interested in writing a TL, where "Old Europe" (mostly) survives WW1 but the technological and military changes of trench warfare still happen.

Russia seems like the most natural contender to switch alliances or to drop out of the Great Power race for a while.

What really bugs me is how to prematurely break up A-H. Or even better, how to create a POD where A-H is in an alliance with France and Britain.
 
That is really true. I would actually go as far as saying that Germans were a privileged class in the Tsarist Empire. I mean Paul von Renenkampff invaded Eastern Prussia and that is as German as it gets, at least name and ancestry wise.

I would argue though, that most of these Germano-Russians were fiercly loyal to the Tsar. At least the ones active in the military or bureaucracy. So from a German perspective the Austrians actually felt like "proper" Germans.

Also there is a healthy degree of "Realpolitik" involved. A-H was easily controlled and clearly the junior partner, even prior to WW1. A Russo-Germanic alliance would have required serious compromise and backing down from both sides due to overlapping spheres of interest.

I would agree with your assessment. Iliberal constitutional monarchy seems like a good fit to describe the Empire in the early 20th century. I had a great discussion back at ah.com, where I argued that most of the constitutional problems of the German Empire were easily fixable with a few changes and a lot of tradition.

In a TL where the German Empire avoids, wins or at least survives WW1 certain developments would be virtually guaranteed to happen. Ironically Britain and Germany would resemble each other, in the sense that the underlying political structure would be percieved as archaic but political traditions and conventions would make them normal democracies.

You're pretty much right about Germans in the Russian Empire. Though I should specify that this was primarily the Baltic Germans whereas other communities like the Volga Germans didn't really have the same close relationship with the state and access to power that many Baltic German nobles did. A long while ago I did a paper on the Russian administration of Turkestan (an entity which predates the drawing of modern Central Asia's borders) and I became quite familiar with the story of a prominent official named Konstanin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen, so even if you look at his name, you can tell that there's a strong blend of Russian and German influence: he bears a Russian name and a Russian patronymic from his father of the same name.

Another thing to really emphasise is how much Russo-German relations were changed by the death of Bismarck. The transition from Bismarckian realpolitik to future policies of weltpolitik drastically changed Germany's behaviour as a power but also its relations with other European states. It says a lot when the staunchly conservative Tsar Alexander III of Russia allies with France, a liberal republic, after Germany fails to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. The Reinsurance Treaty, as a secret treaty, probably wasn't of completely monumental importance to day-to-day Russo-German relations, but when the treaty expired and the German government refused a Russian request to renew it, that almost certainly set the path for Russia to form an alliance with France and surround Germany on both sides. After that happened, I would argue that conflict between Russia and Germany isn't inevitable but becomes vastly more likely.

----------------------

As a different point: I am pondering changed alliances for an alt-WW1. 1905 seems like an attractive POD because there is great potential to rapidly change the political scene in Europe.

I was always interested in writing a TL, where "Old Europe" (mostly) survives WW1 but the technological and military changes of trench warfare still happen.

Russia seems like the most natural contender to switch alliances or to drop out of the Great Power race for a while.

What really bugs me is how to prematurely break up A-H. Or even better, how to create a POD where A-H is in an alliance with France and Britain.

The period of the 1890's is pretty important for Russia's pre-WWI foreign relations. If you want to avert the Franco-Russian alliance and keep Russia friendly or at least affably neutral towards Germany, this is the time for it.

It's also a period of leadership transition in both countries: Bismarck in Germany is forced out of power by the ascendant Wilhelm II and, IOTL, Alexander III dies of nephritis in 1894, to be succeeded by his son, Nicholas.

This sort of convergent change: where new rulers with their own visions are coming to power in both countries can be very tumultuous and, as we saw IOTL, can severely hamper even previously strong relations.
 
You're pretty much right about Germans in the Russian Empire. Though I should specify that this was primarily the Baltic Germans whereas other communities like the Volga Germans didn't really have the same close relationship with the state and access to power that many Baltic German nobles did. A long while ago I did a paper on the Russian administration of Turkestan (an entity which predates the drawing of modern Central Asia's borders) and I became quite familiar with the story of a prominent official named Konstanin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen, so even if you look at his name, you can tell that there's a strong blend of Russian and German influence: he bears a Russian name and a Russian patronymic from his father of the same name.

Another thing to really emphasise is how much Russo-German relations were changed by the death of Bismarck. The transition from Bismarckian realpolitik to future policies of weltpolitik drastically changed Germany's behaviour as a power but also its relations with other European states. It says a lot when the staunchly conservative Tsar Alexander III of Russia allies with France, a liberal republic, after Germany fails to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. The Reinsurance Treaty, as a secret treaty, probably wasn't of completely monumental importance to day-to-day Russo-German relations, but when the treaty expired and the German government refused a Russian request to renew it, that almost certainly set the path for Russia to form an alliance with France and surround Germany on both sides. After that happened, I would argue that conflict between Russia and Germany isn't inevitable but becomes vastly more likely.



The period of the 1890's is pretty important for Russia's pre-WWI foreign relations. If you want to avert the Franco-Russian alliance and keep Russia friendly or at least affably neutral towards Germany, this is the time for it.

It's also a period of leadership transition in both countries: Bismarck in Germany is forced out of power by the ascendant Wilhelm II and, IOTL, Alexander III dies of nephritis in 1894, to be succeeded by his son, Nicholas.

This sort of convergent change: where new rulers with their own visions are coming to power in both countries can be very tumultuous and, as we saw IOTL, can severely hamper even previously strong relations.


I have to admit I have to wonder how much Czar Alexander III actions both on the domestic and foriegn front was a reaction against his father given how estranged the two reportedly were over many things including politics.
 
I have to admit I have to wonder how much Czar Alexander III actions both on the domestic and foriegn front was a reaction against his father given how estranged the two reportedly were over many things including politics.

Also, the notion of Alexander III as the arch-reactionary who stifled all reform and imposed autocracy everywhere is only partially true. Alexander III actually made some extremely effective economic reforms and showed a considerable amount of support to prominent reformers of the time such as Sergei Witte. Witte had married a divorced woman who was also a formerly Jewish convert to Russian Orthodoxy, which caused quite a scandal and estranged Witte from the Russian nobility. But Alexander III as Tsar supported him consistently throughout and ultimately the Tsar's favour protected Witte from any real consequences to his career. But this was a dynamic Tsar who actually undertook many economic reforms and vigourously promoted industrialisation and development of infrastructure.

Some of Alexander III's reforms, such as chartering the Peasants' Land Bank, actually built upon his father's reforms (the most notable of which was, of course, abolishing serfdom) and corrected many of the economic consequences of emancipation and helped restore financial stability to the peasantry.

And even many of the more conservative acts of Alexander III's government are perhaps more appropriately attributed to the people around the Tsar, rather than the Tsar himself. Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the Procurator-General* was perhaps the most notable example of this.

*A secular official who was head of the Russian Orthodox Church*
 
You're pretty much right about Germans in the Russian Empire. Though I should specify that this was primarily the Baltic Germans whereas other communities like the Volga Germans didn't really have the same close relationship with the state and access to power that many Baltic German nobles did. A long while ago I did a paper on the Russian administration of Turkestan (an entity which predates the drawing of modern Central Asia's borders) and I became quite familiar with the story of a prominent official named Konstanin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen, so even if you look at his name, you can tell that there's a strong blend of Russian and German influence: he bears a Russian name and a Russian patronymic from his father of the same name.

Another thing to really emphasise is how much Russo-German relations were changed by the death of Bismarck. The transition from Bismarckian realpolitik to future policies of weltpolitik drastically changed Germany's behaviour as a power but also its relations with other European states. It says a lot when the staunchly conservative Tsar Alexander III of Russia allies with France, a liberal republic, after Germany fails to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. The Reinsurance Treaty, as a secret treaty, probably wasn't of completely monumental importance to day-to-day Russo-German relations, but when the treaty expired and the German government refused a Russian request to renew it, that almost certainly set the path for Russia to form an alliance with France and surround Germany on both sides. After that happened, I would argue that conflict between Russia and Germany isn't inevitable but becomes vastly more likely.



The period of the 1890's is pretty important for Russia's pre-WWI foreign relations. If you want to avert the Franco-Russian alliance and keep Russia friendly or at least affably neutral towards Germany, this is the time for it.

It's also a period of leadership transition in both countries: Bismarck in Germany is forced out of power by the ascendant Wilhelm II and, IOTL, Alexander III dies of nephritis in 1894, to be succeeded by his son, Nicholas.

This sort of convergent change: where new rulers with their own visions are coming to power in both countries can be very tumultuous and, as we saw IOTL, can severely hamper even previously strong relations.

I am toying with the idea of changing the monarchs in both countries or at least Germany.

OTLs Wilhelm II. dies due to the complications at birth. His brother Heinrich becomes Crown Prince and Emperor instead. His character and his interests seem beneficial for a more sane and careful German foreign policy.

If we avoid the death of Alexander III's older brother, we might have a monarch that has a more friendly disposition towards Germany.
 
I wouldn't call the German Empire a staunchly conservative absolute monarchy though. The SPD was there to stay and even the reactionaries were unwilling to change that with violence. The democratic elements became more and more influential and the power of the Junker and the Kaiser was slooowly but steadily eroding.
That's fair, Germany in 1914 actually had a wider electoral franchise than Great Britain (the supposed beacon of democracy and liberalism in Europe). Though I think it's fair to describe the Imperial German state as one that was illiberal with democratic elements but, as you say, in the process of changing.
Eh, for whatever that franchise was worth. Yes you did have universal, equal male suffrage for the Reichstag; but the Reichstag's powers were quite limited. It even abridged the one great power it would have, over the budget, by allowing for multi-year budgets for the military. While chaotic and a struggle, it would have been entirely possible for the Imperial Government to govern without any majority backing in the Reichstag. The real power lay with the bureaucracy and to a lesser extent the military; and those classes were filled with the Junkers. So it's IMO fitting enough to call Imperial Germany a staunchly conservative constitutional-absolute monarchy.

What you did see in the late phase in the Empire was indeed a continual gain of seats by the SPD; but that didn't really translate into any meaningful reforms yet, and it is actually entirely open if it would have had WW1 not happened. Really, the Kaiserreich was not a good state construction on multiple levels; it had to go, like it historically did.

German solidarity. Germanic would include the Netherlands, Scandinavia, England, the Dominions, USA... ;)
This English conflation of Germanic and German (and it is indeed purely English) is just a pet peeve of mine.

But yes, reading about battles at the WW1 eastern front or even more so in the Baltic Sea is kinda hilarious, as the commanders on both sides usually have German names... Though, yes, that were the Baltic Germans, and they got a favoured position not because they were Germans, but because they were nobles. In fact, they were hit with Russification policies just like everyone else, and Russian was introduced as the only official language in the Baltic territories in the 1880s as well.

The period of the 1890's is pretty important for Russia's pre-WWI foreign relations. If you want to avert the Franco-Russian alliance and keep Russia friendly or at least affably neutral towards Germany, this is the time for it.
Hm. One important factor in that alliance were all the French investments in Russia. Russia, as an underdeveloped country, had a lot of potential, and France had the capital. Meanwhile, even while relations had been good, German investments in Russia had never reached nearly the same level. So, for one thing, France might still simply buy Russian goodwill, and for another, if it doesn't, Russia will probably have a worse economical standing than IOTL on account of missing those foreign investments.

Though I also remember people on AH.com opining that France and Russia were basically overspending, both on those investments and the military, in the starting 20th century, and that after another decade or so without WW1 would have had to cut back on that considerably. Not sure how much truth there is to that, though.

OTLs Wilhelm II. dies due to the complications at birth. His brother Heinrich becomes Crown Prince and Emperor instead. His character and his interests seem beneficial for a more sane and careful German foreign policy.
Who knows if Henry* would be the same if he were Crown Prince from the start. He would be an ideal monarch, yes, but safer to have William have a timely accident before he can procreate... preserve an as late as possible PoD so as to not influence Henry... But yes, Emperor Henry I is a good idea.

*names of monarchs and princes usually get translated, after all...
 
1) Eh, for whatever that franchise was worth. Yes you did have universal, equal male suffrage for the Reichstag; but the Reichstag's powers were quite limited. It even abridged the one great power it would have, over the budget, by allowing for multi-year budgets for the military. While chaotic and a struggle, it would have been entirely possible for the Imperial Government to govern without any majority backing in the Reichstag. The real power lay with the bureaucracy and to a lesser extent the military; and those classes were filled with the Junkers. So it's IMO fitting enough to call Imperial Germany a staunchly conservative constitutional-absolute monarchy.

What you did see in the late phase in the Empire was indeed a continual gain of seats by the SPD; but that didn't really translate into any meaningful reforms yet, and it is actually entirely open if it would have had WW1 not happened. Really, the Kaiserreich was not a good state construction on multiple levels; it had to go, like it historically did.

2) Hm. One important factor in that alliance were all the French investments in Russia. Russia, as an underdeveloped country, had a lot of potential, and France had the capital. Meanwhile, even while relations had been good, German investments in Russia had never reached nearly the same level. So, for one thing, France might still simply buy Russian goodwill, and for another, if it doesn't, Russia will probably have a worse economical standing than IOTL on account of missing those foreign investments.

Though I also remember people on AH.com opining that France and Russia were basically overspending, both on those investments and the military, in the starting 20th century, and that after another decade or so without WW1 would have had to cut back on that considerably. Not sure how much truth there is to that, though.


3) Who knows if Henry* would be the same if he were Crown Prince from the start. He would be an ideal monarch, yes, but safer to have William have a timely accident before he can procreate... preserve an as late as possible PoD so as to not influence Henry... But yes, Emperor Henry I is a good idea.

*names of monarchs and princes usually get translated, after all...

1) Oh, that imho overestimates the power and reach of the Junkers to a massive degree. I agree that conservative interests were deeply entrenched but ultimately dependend on a number of different factors.

a) Economically time was running out for the Junker. Their whole way of life was heavily dependent on agrarian protectionism and subsidies. This would have inevitably caused deep rifts in the right wing. Neither the National Liberals nor the Center could have supported these policies indefinetly. And in both the military and bureaucracy the burgeoisie was slowly taking over.

b) The SPD was driving the agenda in a lot of surprising ways. Studying law, I have to say that the courts at the time often ruled surprisingly progressive and even Bismarck was basically "forced", to enact social legislation. I know he tried to

The aristocrats were aware of the growing power of the "Reds". After the they proved their loyalty in the "Burgfrieden" it was basically unavoidable to integrate them more into the state.

Imho the German Empire will face considerable tests even in a TL without WW1. The position of the Junker wasn't secure and both the burgeoisie and the workers had a substantial interest in reaching actual democratic participation. Imho the Empire was actually on a good way.

2) I mean the Russian Empire couldn't grow forever. A bubble of overinvestment doesn't seem unlikely. Especially because a lot of the money was simply wasted.

3) Good idea! Simply killing off Wilhelm* at a convenient time probably ensures that Heinrich actually retains a character close to OTL.

*Imho using the native names helps me to keep apart the various European monarchs.
 
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