Pardon a bit of pedantry, but words get slippery in philosophical discussion so I think it's important to pin them down:
God is not morality and neither is he supreme moral goodness. More specifically, the labels "the Abrahamic God" and "moral goodness" clearly do not refer to the same value, since they have non-identical sets of properties.
Moral goodness refers (very loosely speaking) to a set of agent behaviors that are deemed worthy of pursuit, and in pragmatic terms it usually comes with some sort of algorithm for classifying a behavior as "inside the set of morally good behaviors" or "outside the set of morally good behaviors".
The Abrahamic God, on the other hand, is (at minimum) a self-aware intelligent being that is maximally powerful, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and created the cosmos. Back in the Bronze/Iron Age he repeatedly took physical form and interacted with one small group of humans, used his supernatural powers to defy natural law (i.e. performed miracles) but has grown more withdrawn as time goes on.
Some theists would, I believe, assert something like the following: "God is omniscient and therefore knows the answers to all moral questions. Whatever action God takes in response to a moral question is by definition the right answer, in exactly the same way that 'one', 'uno', and 'ichi' by definition all refer to the same value. Therefore, 'the set of actions that God would take in any specific moral situation' is a coherent concept that provides a perfect moral standard for humans to emulate."
I think I understand what you're going for here, but I disagree with your terms, as shown above. Would you be amenable to this rephrasing?:
I tend to agree that many theists probably think this. An important note, however, is that "whatever brings me the most utility" is exactly opposed to "whatever I feel like doing at the moment." A large percentage of the population having a pro-social moral framework that promotes maximizing human weal and minimizing human woe allows for the development of widespread technological societies that provide vastly more utility to each member than would the freedom to commit a murder or three. Therefore, an atheist who does exactly as the theist predicts and chooses "Whatever brings me the most utility" will end up not raping and murdering.
You're right I've been fairly imprecise with the language here, and I think your rephrasing is fine. I have a few minor quibbles, but nothing particularly discussion-altering.
Your point that there are loads of reasons why "what brings me the most utility" isn't to murder and rape is definitely true! That's what I was referring to when I say
"very few of us really want to do this
overall due to a whole host of competing pressures to NOT murder and rape people such as habit, social expectations, and morals. Let's put aside those first two and attribute our good behaviour to morals."
Let's assume that we're talking about a Ring of Gyges style moral infraction though, and so you don't have to worry about the many obvious pitfalls in the "murder/rape people and expect my life to end up better afterwards" approach.
You pointed out reasons why we want others to behave morally toward US (and each other), and I totally agree that that's in our best interest; but that doesn't explain why WE should care to act morally. At best, assuming they (or others) have (or will have) the same degree of power over you, this puts you into a prisoners dilemma, where you need communication/cooperation to ensure that others modulate their behaviour so you end up at the globally optimal outcome. This then resolves back to a (albeit somewhat weakened) form of the theists statement: "without an agreed upon (absolute) and dominant (supreme) standard of behaviour in these 'moral situations' there's no reason not to be a murderer/rapist when I'm able to avoid the repercussions of my actions." Again, I'm still sympathetic that this is more of an argument for moral absolutism, rather than theism in particular.
At worst, in the Ring Of Gyges situation, the crime is in fact a perfect crime and you don't even have to worry that your poor behaviour will affect society: nobody will even know it was a crime at all. In this situation your behaviour is essentially entirely decoupled from how it encourages others to act, and you still get all the benefits of your post-violent, technologically ascendent society, while still being able to commit your murders or three.
QUOTE="eaglejarl, post: 13214731, member: 10324"]
I am not convinced that it's possible for there to be an objective morality, although I am willing to change my mind if shown evidence. That leaves me only the 'moral relativist' position to choose from.
My definitions and assertions on the subject would be as follows:
- An agent is a being with some degree of volition. Humans, other animals, true AIs, extraterrestrials, etc are agents. Rocks and water are not.
- The universe of discourse for morality is actions taken by agents.
- Actions are moral ("good"), immoral ("bad"), or amoral ("not a moral question"). Possible examples that most people would agree on in most situations would be feeding the hungry (moral), killing innocents (immoral), and wearing red shoes (amoral).
- 'Objective morality' is a moral code that exists completely separate from agency, in exactly the same way that 'objective reality' exists separate from agency. If every agent, including God, was wiped out, the objective moral code would still exist in exactly the same way that objective reality would still exist even if everything in the universe disintegrated back into primordial hydrogen, leaving no agents / minds / etc to observe it.
Given these definitions, it should be clear that an objective reality is not possible. I'm prepared to be convinced that I should change some of my definitions and I'm probably willing to use someone else's definitions for the sake of discussion, provided that I think they are reasonable and coherent.
Regardless, even if you disagree with the definitions, the idea of God providing an objective morality runs straight into the
Euthyphro dilemma.
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Hmm I'm not sure that I agree that morality inheres in moral agents anymore than mathematics inheres in there being (for example) objects that can be counted, but I think that might be a definitional disagreement, and I don't think it's too important either.
QUOTE="eaglejarl, post: 13214731, member: 10324"]
As I replied, all moral systems have an axiomatic foundation -- that is, a foundation that must be chosen a priori and cannot be defended from within the bounds of the system itself. I would tentatively assert that Christians have a duty to choose as their foundation "The set of actions generated by answering the question 'what would God do in this situation' for every possible non-amoral situation." Atheists are free to choose any foundation that they like, but many of us choose "The set of actions that will maximize human weal and minimize human woe."[1]
[1] I would actually substitute 'sapient' for 'human' in that foundation, but that renders things more complicated than necessary for right now.
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I think the issue with Moral Relativism, is that from a Rights Theory concept, it's not justifiable for one to impose their personal moral framework on others, but if your approach is purely utilitarian, that's not a problem: for the greater good is likely to be an oft-repeated and valid (indeed the only valid) justification for many things. There's no need to involve rights theory in this though, and I am convinced that in its broad strokes there's no inconsistency between moral relativist attitude and pure utilitarianism.