AHC: A World without WW1

Cetashwayo

Lord of Ten Thousand Years
Location
Across the Horizon
So I've been thinking about this on and off for a long time and I've always thought that a world without WW1 would be fascinating. The first world war was really the most dramatic upheaval since the Napoleonic Wars, and while WW2 accelerated the trends inaugurated by World War 1, the first world war put so much in motion. Fascism, the Bolshevik Revolution, the collapse of the old monarchical empires, the beginning of the end for colonialism, radical social reforms and considerable expansions of the state. Left-schisms, the May Fourth movement...the list is hard to quantify, which also makes the consequences interesting to fathom. A world without WW1 is obviously one with far greater continuities to the nineteenth century. So let's think about a scenario:

1. The PoD is at least after 1900 so that the pre-world war world is recognizable enough. The latest the PoD can be is averting the July Crisis (edited this from just the July Crisis as I realize that the July Crisis is a difficult point to properly avoid a war for good).
2. A war between most or all the major powers is averted for at least another forty years. There can still be significant crises and regional conflagrations but it does not lead to a world war.

The reason I've picked these two is mostly because I think that the closest we can place the PoD to WW1 the more legible the effects can be long-term from 1914. And the second condition is pretty obvious - without a general European war, the social tensions and societal stress and implosion of empires is delayed.

Some initial thoughts:

Geopolitical Questions

1. A longer and unreconstructed European colonialism, with all that entails. The first world war's most major global impact aside from the collapse of the old empires was that it significantly weakened the major colonial empires. Under pressure from the Americans and especially the pressure of activists and politicians in the colonies, Britain and France had to concede some home-rule, especially in the Middle East where they had annexed territories from the Ottoman Empire. Without the first world war, the economic and social strain on the European imperialists is less critical. Although over time there would be signifcant pressure and concessions given, they would I think be more hard-fought and more explicitly on the terms of the colonizer. Settler colonialism in Africa is likely to worsen - I would not be surprised if German Sudwest Africa becomes effectively an apartheid, given the treatment of the Herrero and the Namaqua. More significant white colonization in the Kenyan Highlands would also underline and exacerbate the tensions there. I would think that over time decolonization and the crisis of the colonies would be the most significant question for European and extra-European powers, especially as the economies of the metropole and the periphery can only have become more intertwined over time. And plenty of monstrous crimes to maintain that hegemony, even if there is effort to reform these colonies.

2. An Uncertain Situation in Russia. Russia before the first world war was a serious powder keg. There were significant strikes happening all the time, Stolypin had been assassinated in 1911, and the Romanov Monarchy seemed fairly incapable of responding well to the pressure placed on them. On the other hand, feeding into this unrest was the blistering pace of Russian industrialization, fed primarily by French capital. Enormous movement of workers into the cities and the expansion of Russia's capacity inspired significant fear in the German military planners who were afraid that the enormous country may surpass them. Without the war, is the Romanov monarchy able to navigate these issues, or will the country collapse into social unrest ala 1905? Aside from the First World War, what other external crises might Russia have to deal with?

3. The Issue of the Balkans. In the period before the first world war the Balkans had just undergone its most significant reorientation since the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War. Significant Ottoman territories had been seized by the Balkan nations, who subsequently fought among each other for the spoils. Only a year after the second Balkan War the first world war happened, so we'll never know what the next step would have been - but what do people think? Would there have been continuing conflicts over territory between the Balkan states? Given the scenario requires any conflict not to exacerbate into a general war, how might the major European powers (especially Austria and Russia) resolve these issues?

4. The Austrian Problem. Austria is one of the big wildcards of this scenario. Without the first world war, Austria does not enter into a disastrous conflict which sees the destruction of its best divisions within the first few months and then the total dissolution of the empire. At the same time, there are many major strains in the country which could lead to civil war. The two most glaring is Bosnia, which had been a tinderbox since the annexation in 1912, and Hungary, where the continued magyarization policies put extreme strain on that section of the empire. With the coming of universal suffrage these problems would have to be dealt with, partially, by the ballot box. This of course does not also mention the plans by Ferdinand of some kind of reformed or reconstituted Danubian Federation or United Austrian States or what-have-you. Can Austria somehow reform itself into the 21st century and survive without a war?

5. The Ottomans. In 1914 the Triumvarite of the Young Turks controlled the Ottoman Empire following a revolution against the autocratic sultan Abdul Hamid II only a few years prior (and then the suspension of elections by the Young Turks). They were also reeling from the loss of their European territories sans Constantiniyye in the Balkan Wars and Libya to Italy. Despite a reasonable showing, the great war put a fatal strain on the empire and the Young Turks resorted to horrific measures such as the Assyrian and Armenian genocides to keep control. The Ottomans at this point were in an extremely fluid and unstable situation and it was unclear would would become of the triumvirate over-time. Can the empire survive its significant debt-load and pressure from its minorities? Certainly, a world without the war is more favorable than even one where the Ottomans win the war. But is it enough to save the Empire, and if so what shape would it take? Zionism is still extant at this point, and there continues to be pressure in Palestine between Palestinians and Jews. How would the Young Turks try to resolve these issues? Obviously they will not be as sympathetic as Balfour was, but what could we expect?

6. British Financial Domination and Industrial Decline. One of the most important trends before WW1 was Britain's industrial decline. The significant lead it had opened up by being among the first states to industrialize was already closing or closed thanks to the rise of a united Germany and a rising America. In the years before the war, Britain relied on India in order to maintain a positive trade balance, and was increasingly above all a center for finance and capital. Without the first world war blowing up the British-dominated financial system, we might expect it to maintain that role, though perhaps facing stiffer and stiffer competition even in investment from American and German financiers. A great deal would depend on the maintenance of Britain's profitable colonies, especially India, and the success of its ventures in South America, where Britain was a major investor.

7. Whatever is happening in East Asia. I am not as well-informed on the situation in Japan and China during this period, but I do know that the complete capitulation of German territory in China at Versailles was the dominant factor in the May Fourth Movement, which would lay the groundwork for the ideological development of China over the next several decades and involved many of the most prominent figures in modern Chinese history. The weakening of the European powers due to the first world war also allowed Republican China to re-negotiate or end many of the unequal treaties during the interwar period. Here, that is less prominent. I also wonder about the state of Japan here - would it remain more liberal, or would it still turn to the right? This I'm not as sure of.

8. America. Funnily enough, I'm also not really sure what route the Americans would take in this timeline. America in the immediate pre-war period with Teddy Roosevelt had presented itself as another imperialist power wanting to join the club, with its seizure of the Spanish colonies and influence in Latin America. Wilson tried to reframe America, unsuccessfully, as a world mediator at the Treaty of Versailles, and despite isolationist pressure America became a major European creditor and investor in the interwar period, much to their detriment when the depression hit. Without that, does America become a hemispheric power? Does it oppose European colonialism on cynical terms, framing itself as a world-wide Monroe doctrine enforcing state while expanding markets and influence in China (the famous open door) and Latin America.

9. Latin America. In the pre-war period Latin America, especially Argentina, was heavily dependent on British-driven investment into its primary industries, which fuelled a considerable boom and enriched these countries to such an extent that some observers thought that Argentina might become the powerhouse of the 20th century. Obviously, that didn't happen, in part because these investments were mainly in primary industries and partly because British capital, debt-ridden and weakened by the strain of the war, pulled out and destroyed most of the fruits of the boom. At the same time, this was also an expansion that heavily benefited the new bourgeois of these states above all, while indigenous populations (as in Mexico) continued to suffer. The Mexican Revolution has already begun at this point, but what about the other countries of the south? And Brazil, for that matter (of which I know very little)?

Ideological Questions

7. The State of the Left. Without the Bolshevik Revolution and the first world war, the schism which had become apparent in the socialist left between social democrats and more radical revolutionary leftists would have been less stark. It is hard to overstate the impact of the (with some admirable exceptions) unanimous support for war that many Social Democrats had when it began and how it prepared the ground for the Socialist/Communist schism of the 1920s, to speak nothing of the Bolshevik revolution, the death of Rosa Luxemburg, the shooting of anti-war socialists like Jean Jaures and the effective collapse of a united left front into the recrimination and schismatics of the 21st century. None of this is to say that these schisms weren't happening before. The division between the more radical and moderate wing of the SPD was becoming apparent before the war. But the scale of the division would not be nearly so stark. The lack of a Bolshevik Revolution also would somewhat reduce the popularity of Marxism as 'the' left ideology - the anarchists were quite popular in the pre-WW1 period as well and there were also other brands of socialism which would retain some enduring strength.

8. Labour Militancy and Revolution. Although the lack of a great war means that the sinews of the old states are not nearly so frayed, this does not necessarily prevent the possibility of a revolution. As countries industrialize and their workers organize, the rise of new worker's parties and socialist ideology would continue. This is especially so in light of the fact that without the Bolshevik Revolution and the expansion of the welfare state granted by the two world wars and the depression, working conditions could be worse and concessions given far more slowly than in our timeline. It is important to underline the influence of the depression on this - many intellectuals genuinely did lose faith in capitalism or at least its most liberal variant, and felt compelled to seek alternatives such as more planned economies. At the same time, it is not as if there was not pressure for reform already, and some reforms took place before the war. So really the question is how far such reforms would go, and what the rights of the worker might look like compared to Post-WW2 Europe, as one example.

9. A Less Radical World? The first world war created the circumstances by which radical new ideologies seemed not only possible but necessary, in light of the collapse of the old order. We might expect that without a great war, at least in Europe, the old monarchical order and traditional conservatism (combined with old-fashioned reaction) would remain the major right-wing ideology. Indeed, it must be remembered that one of the lasting consequences of the second world war was not just the destruction of fascism, but also much of non-fascist reaction in Europe, because many of these traditional right-wing governments swung their support behind collaborationist regimes and were discredited, at least for a few decades. The dominant post-war European right-wing ideology, Christian Democracy, was far less resistant to change, and incorporated what had previously been strictly socialist and social democratic ideas into its platform. At the same time, in the colonial world we will continue to see the rise of European or native-educated elites who are nevertheless resistant to colonialism and call for its overthrow - more entrenched colonizers could only radicalize these calls to freedom. It would be interesting to see how such ideology would evolve, however, without the Bolshevik Revolution - after all, many future leaders such as Nehru drew explicitly on the Russian example, had studied in the Soviet Union and saw it as a model for industrialization. And at the same time as all of this, the radical illiberal fringe on the right first emerged before WW1 - WW1 was just their founding myth.

These are just some initial prompts and spitballs. I have not really covered everything - there are many areas where there'd be obvious differences from OTL but which I haven't covered:
  • The British settler colonies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand have slower movements for autonomy and independence. I have no idea what happens with South Africa.
  • Germany would be entirely different, and the Kaiserreich would likely still exist. However, we might expect that the Kaiser's power may be pulled back and weakened, and SPD pressure on the government would continue to rise.
  • Italy would be doing...something. Italia Irredenta still exists, as does the Italian effort to assert themselves as a true equal great power despite the poverty of the country and the extreme regional inequality. We will probably see the country industrialize over the next few decades.
  • Would scientific development be further ahead than OTL? I'd think so in many areas, though perhaps not in military matters. Germany may remain the scientific leader, not America, and German the main language of the hard sciences.
  • What happens in the artistic scene without the war? The shock of it really opened up the way for the avant-garde to pioneer entirely different styles, but they still existed before it.
  • The history of the wars is also the history of increasing pressure by the INC and others in India for greater independence and freedom. Strikes, political demands, protests and marches were all organized keeping in mind the growing weakness of Britain. Without that, how would the struggle for Indian independence develop?
  • Iran was a poor country which had just gone through a significant revolution in 1907 but was effectively under the boot of two separate powers, the British and Russians. How long would this arrangement last? Could Russia and Britain re-ignite the Great Game or come to blows?
  • Power dynamics and relations between the Great Powers. Obviously the shifting nature of alliances in the pre-war period means they would continue to shift. Could Britain and Germany reconcile while France breaks with Britain and aligns itself closer to a rising Russia? Would Japan maintain an alliance with Britain?
  • Spain was a significant center of anarchist organization and activity and anarchists formed one of the major pillars of the left there while the country itself was fairly unstable even in the pre-war period. How would the country develop over the next few decades?
  • The lack of a general war does not mean there is no conflict. What kind of more limited wars might we see, even between major powers?
And of course many other things I am missing. Consider the stuff I've posted as prompts rather than sure statements of opinion of what I think will happen. And try to keep discussion based more around the consequences of No-WW1 rather than the mechanism of it - I am more interested in the societal, political, economic and cultural fallout than the specific how and why of how WW1 is avoided, though if you have ideas of how that would happen then feel free to share them.

Discuss away!
 
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Forty years? I don't see it. You just got done listing all the various grievances and irredentas European powers have against each other -except not because Romania want lands controlled by Austria, Russia and Bulgaria.

But really, Franz Ferdinand was merely a convenient excuse for the war everyone wanted anyway. If he lives, I fully expect something else to come along within a decade at the most -and then everything burns.
 
Forty years? I don't see it. You just got done listing all the various grievances and irredentas European powers have against each other -except not because Romania want lands controlled by Austria, Russia and Bulgaria.

But really, Franz Ferdinand was merely a convenient excuse for the war everyone wanted anyway. If he lives, I fully expect something else to come along within a decade at the most -and then everything burns.

Okay. So how far back do you think it would need to go to avoid a war?
 
I'd love to dive deeper, but off the top of my head a butterflied WW1 means that the Lost Cause in the US is robbed of some major momentum. Don't get me wrong, Wilson was still a cartoonishly racist President and you're not going to be able to butterfly that away, but with no war there's no move by the government to re-habilitate the CSA.

Once the US was involved in the war, it necessitated drafting a huge army to field in Europe, one orders of magnitude larger than the one fielded at the time. That meant a draft, and to make the medicine go down smoother the Wilson administration pulled out all the stops to portray the Confederacy as part of the military continuity. That's why you've got Fort Bragg, Lee, etc., and why Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, etc. were elevated into the American military pantheon. You had public events celebrating the heroism of the CSA, speeches by Wilson and other officials about the nobleness of the cause, societies like Daughters of the Confederacy springing up left and right, the works. This article in the Atlantic goes into much greater depth if you want to know more.

In short, no war means no massive push for conscription, no conscription means no deliberate turbocharging of the Lost Cause, etc. This obviously wouldn't butterfly away the KKK entirely or white supremacy in general, but it's a huge historical curveball. A neutered Lost Cause blows open the political landscape moving into the 20's and 30's, IMO.
 
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On a lighter note, no WW1 means you've butterflied away Donald Trump (along with many, many other people). His mother was forced to emigrate to the US from Scotland after basically every young man in her town died in the war, and the ones that managed to survive died when the troopship returning them home sank a mile off shore.
 

That would be a pretty contrived scenario then. It's hard to see Germany not fighting Russia or France, or the Austrians or Turks fighting in the Balkans, or Italy not starting something somewhere, or China being stable, or Britain looking at another one of these situations and not sticking its dick into the blender.
 
That would be a pretty contrived scenario then. It's hard to see Germany not fighting Russia or France, or the Austrians or Turks fighting in the Balkans, or Italy not starting something somewhere, or China being stable, or Britain looking at another one of these situations and not sticking its dick into the blender.

A general war is a war involving every or almost every major power. That is what I meant. Sorry, I realize the word general can be confusing in this context. Regional wars or even a war between two great powers can still happen, but it can't escalate into a world war.
 
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I think a key to reducing the escalation and breaking the general web of disastrous secret alliances and so on might be removing the Kaiser and those sympathetic to a more aggressive German policy in Europe. It is not a perfect fix, but it is hard to deny that Willhelm II and his ministers had a major hand in the escalation while simultaneously diplomatically isolating Germany and driving Britain into the hands of France. It's only one crisis point, but it's an important one especially for the Atlantic side of the war. That said, I'm not sure, and I'd be interested to hear other thoughts.
 
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Okay. So how far back do you think it would need to go to avoid a war?
The most likely scenario is one where the tensions of OTLs WW1 are reduced in a serious of less intense conflicts.

I think the best way would be an earlier collapse of Russia and/or A-H.

The Russian Empires collapses after the Russo-Japanese war seems like a promising POD for the scenario you are aiming for.

Germany and France never end up in a military conflict without Russia. In Germany the SPD is going to tame German militarism and revanchism over A-L is eventually going to die down.

I am firmly in the camp that thinks A-H is headed for collapse anyway. I think Yugoslavia is a pretty good model for how Austria-Hungary would end up. People tend to ignore that Austria also had a massive problem with German nationalism.

Britain is sooner or later headed for a disaster in India. Without being weakened by the world wars they might very well chose a very different approach when it comes to unrest in India. People tend to underestimate that there were pretty influential voices IOTL who were calling for "harsher measures".
 
As far as the predictions of colonial disaster go, it's certainly possible and even most likely, but I think without the pressure of massive wars there's also the possibility the colonial systems are reformed to be less awful and far more industrialized.

For no other reason than that you can't squeeze blood from a stone. Any colonial power that develops their colonies to near-metropole GDP per capita becomes a superpower, or at least great power in the case of Belgium and Portugal.

With nothing else to distract them, it's hard to avoid the profitability of bringing the colonies out of the dark ages.

I always thought alternate histories where colonies are fully integrated are really interesting. Something as bizzare as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium being the leading world powers is fun to consider.
 
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I think a key to reducing the escalation and breaking the general web of disastrous secret alliances and so on might be removing the Kaiser and those sympathetic to a more aggressive German policy in Europe. It is not a perfect fix, but it is hard to deny that Willhelm II and his ministers had a major hand in the escalation while simultaneously diplomatically isolating Germany and driving Britain into the hands of France. It's only one crisis point, but it's an important one especially for the Atlantic side of the war. That said, I'm not sure, and I'd be interested to hear other thoughts.
A different Kaiser might help but if you want Germany to be the center of your PODs it might suffice to change Bethmann Hollweg's fate. There is some very interesting stuff about his personal fate.

IIRC he was in a deep depression during the July Crisis because his wife died. He realized too late what was happening because he was in a fatalistic and depressed mood and only started trying to stop the flow of events when it was too late. On top of his game he might have radically altered OTLs chain of diasters.
 
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As far as the predictions of colonial disaster go, it's certainly possible and even most likely, but I think without the pressure of massive wars there's also the possibility the colonial systems are reformed to be less awful and far more industrialized.

For no other reason than that you can't squeeze blood from a stone. Any colonial power that develops there colonies to near-metropole GDP per capita becomes a superpower, or at least great power in the case of Belgium and Portugal.

With nothing else to distract them, it's hard to avoid the profitability of bringing the colonies out of the dark ages.
Yes there is; it's called racism. The heartlands of various empires will not hear of properly developing possessions held by "lesser" people. Why, it might just make those people think they are equal, and that won't do at all.
 
Yes there is; it's called racism. The heartlands of various empires will not hear of properly developing possessions held by "lesser" people. Why, it might just make those people think they are equal, and that won't do at all.

That certainly true, and it's interesting how strong racism is to consistently make groups worldwide shoot themselves in the feet, but if just one nation decides to defect they suddenly have an enormous advantage.

If we're going far back for divergence, having Leopold be a different kind of crazy and him turn the Kongo into his own personal modernized absolute monarchy instead of massacring it would be a great change. It would make Belgium relevant, put a large power in central africa, and let other colonial empires realize the possibilities.
 
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I always thought alternate histories where colonies are fully integrated are really interesting. Something as bizzare as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium being the leading world powers is fun to consider.

Why would a wealthy colony have any reason to maintain dependence to the Metropole? Even settler colonies wanted independence and autonomy from the metropole and they certainly pursued alternative economic arrangements. The colonial system is geared around the sending of raw materials to the metropole in exchange for finished goods complete with copious brutality and racist policies to maintain control.

If the economies of colonies industrialize, all that is doing is giving them the power to break their masters. Portugal-Brazil was an attempt to try this in the nineteenth century and it fell apart in large part because it was impossible for the metropole to maintain control over a colony that was actually larger than it without accepting a secondary position in it is own empire. The same thing would happen here - some kind of very good idea by the Netherlands to industrialize Indonesia so they could make the Mega-Netherlands would just empower Indonesia and leave the Netherlands either playing second fiddle in its own empire or kicked out by a newly powerful Indonesia. That is leaving aside any opposition on the European side, of which there would obviously be a huge amount given the racial politics of the time. It is no surprise that the two post-colonial organizations of note, the Commonwealth or France's La Francophonie, are toothless and suspiciously neo-colonial in construction.

This is not to say that such imperial federation esque plots would not be tried - see Lusotropicalism - but I cannot see explicit integration succeeding especially as in even the most good faith effort it will likely favor the European side of the equation more and is stained by the past crimes of the metropole.
 
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Why would a wealthy colony have any reason to maintain dependence to the Metropole? Even settler colonies wanted independence and autonomy from the metropole and they certainly pursued alternative economic arrangements. The colonial system is geared around the sending of raw materials to the metropole in exchange for finished goods complete with copious brutality and racist policies to maintain control.

If the economies of colonies industrialize, all that is doing is giving them the power to break their masters. Portugal-Brazil was an attempt to try this in the nineteenth century and it fell apart in large part because it was impossible for the metropole to maintain control over a colony that was actually larger than it without accepting a secondary position in it is own empire. The same thing would happen here - some kind of very good idea by the Netherlands to industrialize Indonesia so they could make the Mega-Netherlands would just empower Indonesia and leave the Netherlands either playing second fiddle in its own empire or kicked out by a newly powerful Indonesia. That is leaving aside any opposition on the European side, of which there would obviously be a huge amount given the racial politics of the time. It is no surprise that the two post-colonial organizations of note, the Commonwealth or France's La Francophonie, are toothless and suspiciously neo-colonial in construction.

This is not to say that such imperial federation esque plots would not be tried - see Lusotropicalism - but I cannot see explicit integration succeeding especially as in even the most good faith effort it will likely favor the European side of the equation more.

If you view it as some way for the metropole to suck down more money, yeah, it makes things harder, but metropoles aren't people.

If I'm rich why should I give a shit if I live in Amsterdam or Jakarta, besides the weather, and why would I care which city my taxes and enormous political influence goes to?

There are more ways to organize countries besides pieces of dirt.

Plus, I'm not even convinced it would be unsupportable on either end by conventional methods. Superpower Netherlands could justify itself on how clearly superior it is to the rest of the world, and would be more able to defend itself from oppression with both a mainland Europe army and a navy that controls the Indian Ocean and West Pacific.

Other options like the 'Leopoldville' I just described are also fairly straightforward, and more balanced personal union arrangements like Austria-Hungary also exist.
 
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I just don't think such a mentality really captures the thoughts of either colonized or colonizer in the equation. It's more like the thinking of a paradox game player rather than a real person. You can't just convert a colony into a state and then everything is fine. Not to mention that the union you give as an example of it working, Austria-Hungary was literally forced on both parties and was a ticking time bomb :p

Like France actually did turn Algeria into departments but because it was a settler colony the same contradictions applied. You might be able to see this with some smaller colonies in the long run (e.g. French Guyana today) but larger ones? I'm don't think so.
 
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I just don't think such a mentality really captures the thoughts of either colonized or colonizer in the equation. It's more like the thinking of a paradox game player rather than a real person. You can't just convert a colony into a state and then everything is fine. Not to mention that the union you give as an example of it working, Austria-Hungary was literally forced on both parties and was a ticking time bomb :p

Like France actually did turn Algeria into departments but because it was a settler colony the same contradictions applied. You might be able to see this with some smaller colonies in the long run (e.g. French Guyana today) but larger ones? I'm don't think so.
Why did French Guyana 'succeed', as in, it kind of stands out as basically the sole non-island overseas territory to eventually just get integrated into the nation that colonized it. Even island territories tend to be rare, small, and lack full integration, rather than end up like Hawaii. Such a question seems important to ask:
While the 1960s world map is virtually identical to our own outside of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in the early 1900s the top 20 countries hold the vast majority of the world's territory, population, and resources. In a world where no ruinous world wars shatter the early 1900s imperial strangleholds even as the industrial revolution kicks in, it seems likely that more colonies would end up like French Guyana. Which ones do you think would be most likely?
 
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One of the most immediate consequences of avoiding the war would be yet another Greco-Turkish War. One of the many outstanding issues from the Balkan Wars was the island of Imbros (and the Aegean islands as a whole). The island commanded the approaches to the Dardanelles, and Greece had occupied the island and wanted to keep it. The Ottomans wanted it (and most other islands) back.

During the 1st Balkan War, the Greek Navy ran circles around the Ottoman fleet mainly because of one modern Greek ship that completely outclassed the elderly Ottoman fleet, the armored cruiser Georgios Averof. After the war, the Ottomans made rebuilding their navy a priority, and had soon commissioned one Dreadnought and bought another unfinished one from Brazil - the King George V class Reşadiye and Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel (former Rio de Janiero), respectively. These ships (and others) in turn would have made essentially the entire Greek navy irrelevant overnight

The Greeks had ordered dreadnoughts of their own, but the Ottomans ships were far more advanced in their construction, and both Ottoman ships would have been delivered before the Greek ships were even laid down. There's a very good chance that the Ottomans would either declare war outright to use these ships, or else use the ships' power to try and force the Greeks into making significant concessions
 
The Greeks had ordered dreadnoughts of their own, but the Ottomans ships were far more advanced in their construction, and both Ottoman ships would have been delivered before the Greek ships were even laid down. There's a very good chance that the Ottomans would either declare war outright to use these ships, or else use the ships' power to try and force the Greeks into making significant concessions

If the Ottomans were victorious what might the response of the other powers be? What do you think is the most realistic consequence for the Empire in the long-term, assuming a 1914 divergence (an earlier one raises the possibility of say, Abdul Hamid II keeping the throne which is a wildly different situation).
 
While the 1960s world map is virtually identical to our own outside of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in the early 1900s the top 20 countries hold the vast majority of the world's territory, population, and resources. In a world where no ruinous world wars shatter the early 1900s imperial strangleholds even as the industrial revolution kicks in, it seems likely that more colonies would end up like French Guyana. Which ones do you think would be most likely?

I think the example of the four communes of Senegal, probably the single most integrated non-settler colony in OTL, is instructive. There was significant division within the colony over whether to take a more pro-French line and embrace some kind of full French-African identity or to fight for greater autonomy and independence in Africa which became stronger over time.

But French Guiana is comparatively tiny, a very small overseas department of a few hundred thousand people where the indigenous population was almost completely wiped out. It doesn't really break the mold.

And don't forget that Puerto Rico and Hawaii are also both examples of colonies that were partially or fully integrated into the colonizing state. In general, though, I think that the major mechanism for 'integration' is going to be mass settler colonialism rather than rights for indigenous peoples.
 
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If the Ottomans were victorious what might the response of the other powers be?

That's of course the hard question to answer

One thing you might see would be the Italians trying to assert themselves. The Ottomans also wanted Italian-occupied Rhodes back, and Italy had no interest in giving it up. You might see the Italians (whose fleet in turn was bigger than even this hypothetical Ottoman fleet) intervene, perhaps in part to continue to try and build its own Mediterranean sphere of influence. And you might in turn see the Anglo-French and Germans, both viewing Italy as a more valuable ally than the Ottomans, compete with each other to support the Italians more

But on the other hand, you could also see the Germans thinking about the long term benefits of having the Ottomans on their side, and do the reverse by browbeating the Italians into staying quiet. Kaiser Wilhelm had an immense orientalist fascination with the Ottoman Empire and Islam in general, and "alienate your most shaky ally that nevertheless has a large army and fleet to satiate your fantasies of the orient" is an extremely Kaiser Wilhelm move to make


What do you think is the most realistic consequence for the Empire in the long-term, assuming a 1914 divergence (an earlier one raises the possibility of say, Abdul Hamid II keeping the throne which is a wildly different situation).

I'm writing some thoughts on this overall, I just wanted to get that short post out while I had it
 
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